Water issues for Punchhi Commission
The terms of reference for the Punchhi Commission on Centre-State relations (2007), inter-alia, include the issues of sharing inter-State rivers and implementation of the river linking project. Though various high-power commissions and committees had examined these aspects in the past and made recommendations, some contentious points, as brought out below, on the Central government’s powers to regulate inter-State rivers, setting up river basin organisations, compensating the States for water surplus, etc., have remained unattended and hence would have to be addressed by the present Commission. More than 80 per cent of India’s water resources are contributed by interState rivers; but due to continued disputes among the states, a major portion of this precious asset has remained unutilised. An interState river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Hence, a conflict of interest is bound to arise among the co-basin States unless they are motivated to cooperate and share the water to reap benefits. However, the government of India, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, has been taking the stand that ‘water’ is a ‘State subject’.
This issue was examined earlier by the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988). The Commission concluded that Entry 56 of List I under the Constitution gives ample powers to the Union government to regulate and develop the inter-State rivers.
Inter-State rivers issue
While the Sarkaria Commission strongly supported the Union to use the power given to it under the Constitution, it did not appear to have examined whether the term “control, regulation and development” would include the ‘allocation’ of water to the State, though the ‘Entry’ in the present form appears adequate to cover the ‘apportionment’ and ‘use’ of these rivers under the power given to ‘regulate’ such rivers. Since within each State, the State decides the allocation, it could be argued that similar action could be taken by the Centre to allocate inter-State waters to states. These aspects need to be deliberated and clarified further.
Groundwater is another disputed issue, since the Indian Easement Act (1882) links access to groundwater with land ownership. However, neither the Krishna, Godavari and Narmada Tribunals examined this subject, nor was it addressed by the Sarkaria Commission. The controversy has cropped up since the U.N. Convention on international water courses (1997) had defined the water course as a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting a “unitary whole”. Also, the Working Group on inter–basin transfers, set up by the National Commission on water resources (1999), had observed that the fluvial part of groundwater needs to be considered as part of the water resources of a basin. The disputes arise mostly for want of agreement among the States concerned.
Move for consensus
Though the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has prepared detailed project reports, for implementation of the link schemes, the States have to agree. Water-rich States insist that they have no water to spare and do not want to negotiate away their future water uses. These have to be discussed in detail. Pricing the surplus water would encourage them to optimally use the water.
For enabling such discussions and for consensus building, River Basin Organisations (RBOs) with adequate powers, have to be constituted by amending the existing River Board’s Act (1956), which provides only for advisory boards. Constituting RBOs, pricing water, etc, would have to be addressed by the Commission.
With the spectre of drought looming large over many States while floods are ravaging large tracts in other parts of the country, the available option to minimise the distress, i.e., of linking rivers for transferring flood waters to water-deficit regions, continues to be a distant dream due to hydropolitics. It is to be hoped that the recommendations of the Commission would enable the Central government to take proactive decisions on the issues facing the water sector.
(The Hindu, dated 30th August, 2009)
•
Saturday, January 16, 2010
Indus Water Treaty
Withdraw from Indus treaty
THE despicable act of mass-casualty terrorism carried out by Pakistan sponsored terrorists on November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, and subsequent denials by our neighbour have revealed that India’s policy of appeasing Pakistan in the hope of peace had the opposite effect of what this country had hoped for.
Our often misplaced generosity had emboldened our neighbour to redouble its mischief with impunity, proving thereby that there is no short-cut to peace with Pakistan.
Unless Pakistan is made to realise that such acts of theirs against India would harm them more than hurting India, engaging them in the so-called peace process would ultimately turn out to be an exercise in futility.
Many retaliatory actions have been proposed and considered in the agonised deliberations subsequently held in India such as snapping tourism and trade, recalling our High Commissioner and even war.
Certainly war is not an option. But there is one option which can hurt Pakistan most — that of announcing India’s intent to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, signed between the two countries allocating the Indus waters .
As per the IWT, while Pakistan got the entire waters of the western rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) , India got the eastern rivers (The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) ie; only 20 per cent of the total water resources of the basin against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent.
If India walks out, the collapse of this Pakistan-biased treaty would trigger serious problems of water shortages there since India would then be having the option to divert and use its equitable share of Indus waters, which was denied all along due to the existing treaty provisions.
Internationally, an impression has been created by vested interests that the treaty is a model for trans-boundary river water agreements because of its in-built resilience and since it has survived two wars between the countries.
However, the fact is that even in spite of the unfair water allocations and treaty provisions, India has been always accommodating Pakistan’s unreasonable demands in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations.
The reduced allocation has caused water shortages in our states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan seriously affecting irrigated agriculture.
Also, endless arguments raised by our neighbour to delay every project planned by India, have grounded the pace of infrastructure development, particularly in J&K.
The treaty does not explicitly provide for an exit option or a mechanism to withdraw from the agreements. The only possibility is to modify the provisions by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two countries; but, this would remain a distant dream in view of the prevailing circumstances.
The time has, therefore, come to put an end to the covert wars waged by that country against India and the option available to us is by justifying India’s right to withdraw from the treaty citing Pakistan’s non-compliance with the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 on denial of terrorist sanctuaries and support.
Any pronouncement to walk out of the treaty would need to be followed by requisite actions to show that India means business since pious declarations alone would not stop the flow of the river. Hence, we must be ready with our plans to control and divert the river flows.
In this connection, available data indicate that, in the past, India had planned many schemes across the western rivers to tap the hydropower potential as permitted in the treaty. However, not much has been done to study the diversion possibilities of water from the western to the eastern rivers to augment the flows in the Indian side.
For example, there is a possibility of diverting the Indus at a point upstream of the Stakna hydro power project to a tributary of the Sutlej through a tunnel.
Similarly , the Chenab waters could be diverted from the river Chandra, a tributary of the Chenab, to a tributary of the Beas and from the Chenab main at Marlu to a tributary of the Ravi through tunnels.
A possibility also exists for constructing large dams on the Jhelum to facilitate the diversion of waters to the Chenab and to the Ravi.
In view of the large irrigation water demands made by Indian states, field surveys and sub-surface investigations should be taken up urgently and detailed project reports got ready for implementation of various diversion proposals.
It is, therefore, for India to take the lead in its own defence so that Pakistan would be forced to abide by the UN Security Council Resolution for ending terrorism.
(The Tribune, dated 30th January, 2009)
THE despicable act of mass-casualty terrorism carried out by Pakistan sponsored terrorists on November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, and subsequent denials by our neighbour have revealed that India’s policy of appeasing Pakistan in the hope of peace had the opposite effect of what this country had hoped for.
Our often misplaced generosity had emboldened our neighbour to redouble its mischief with impunity, proving thereby that there is no short-cut to peace with Pakistan.
Unless Pakistan is made to realise that such acts of theirs against India would harm them more than hurting India, engaging them in the so-called peace process would ultimately turn out to be an exercise in futility.
Many retaliatory actions have been proposed and considered in the agonised deliberations subsequently held in India such as snapping tourism and trade, recalling our High Commissioner and even war.
Certainly war is not an option. But there is one option which can hurt Pakistan most — that of announcing India’s intent to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, signed between the two countries allocating the Indus waters .
As per the IWT, while Pakistan got the entire waters of the western rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) , India got the eastern rivers (The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) ie; only 20 per cent of the total water resources of the basin against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent.
If India walks out, the collapse of this Pakistan-biased treaty would trigger serious problems of water shortages there since India would then be having the option to divert and use its equitable share of Indus waters, which was denied all along due to the existing treaty provisions.
Internationally, an impression has been created by vested interests that the treaty is a model for trans-boundary river water agreements because of its in-built resilience and since it has survived two wars between the countries.
However, the fact is that even in spite of the unfair water allocations and treaty provisions, India has been always accommodating Pakistan’s unreasonable demands in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations.
The reduced allocation has caused water shortages in our states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan seriously affecting irrigated agriculture.
Also, endless arguments raised by our neighbour to delay every project planned by India, have grounded the pace of infrastructure development, particularly in J&K.
The treaty does not explicitly provide for an exit option or a mechanism to withdraw from the agreements. The only possibility is to modify the provisions by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two countries; but, this would remain a distant dream in view of the prevailing circumstances.
The time has, therefore, come to put an end to the covert wars waged by that country against India and the option available to us is by justifying India’s right to withdraw from the treaty citing Pakistan’s non-compliance with the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 on denial of terrorist sanctuaries and support.
Any pronouncement to walk out of the treaty would need to be followed by requisite actions to show that India means business since pious declarations alone would not stop the flow of the river. Hence, we must be ready with our plans to control and divert the river flows.
In this connection, available data indicate that, in the past, India had planned many schemes across the western rivers to tap the hydropower potential as permitted in the treaty. However, not much has been done to study the diversion possibilities of water from the western to the eastern rivers to augment the flows in the Indian side.
For example, there is a possibility of diverting the Indus at a point upstream of the Stakna hydro power project to a tributary of the Sutlej through a tunnel.
Similarly , the Chenab waters could be diverted from the river Chandra, a tributary of the Chenab, to a tributary of the Beas and from the Chenab main at Marlu to a tributary of the Ravi through tunnels.
A possibility also exists for constructing large dams on the Jhelum to facilitate the diversion of waters to the Chenab and to the Ravi.
In view of the large irrigation water demands made by Indian states, field surveys and sub-surface investigations should be taken up urgently and detailed project reports got ready for implementation of various diversion proposals.
It is, therefore, for India to take the lead in its own defence so that Pakistan would be forced to abide by the UN Security Council Resolution for ending terrorism.
(The Tribune, dated 30th January, 2009)
disastrous floods
To prevent disastrous floods, avoid hydropolitics
The Centre must play a proactive role in coordinating all river and flood management agencies, writes MS Menon
Incessant rains and resulting floods this year have wreaked havoc in many parts of the country. When the flooded Kosi river unleashed by a bund breach in Nepal ravaged north Bihar and the Mahanadi in spate inundated many areas of Orissa, almost at the same time torrential rains caused water levels rising above danger marks in the Ganga and its tributaries, including the Yamuna, flooding many parts of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and New Delhi.
As the flood waters continued to inflict misery on millions of people, blame game among the power mongers started, opening the floodgates of hydropolitics, thereby affecting relief and rehabilitation efforts. Activists pursuing the fixed agenda of 'no dams, no embankments' also jumped into the fray to remain in the limelight.
The war of words would continue but there is a need to examine why various studies and flood control measures carried out in the past failed to deliver.
In 1980, the Rashtriya Barh Ayog had assessed the area prone to floods at 34 million hectares and reasonable protection available to about 10 mha. RBA had advised many actions including enactment of laws to regulate man-made activities in the flood plains. But most of its recommendations were not acted upon.
In 1999 the National Commission for Water Resources had observed that storage dams and embankments did provide effective protection to large flood-prone areas and prevent the loss of standing crops. It recommended performance review of selected embankments and stressed the need for associating the beneficiaries in the upkeep of the embankments. The commission also suggested adoption of nonstructural measures like flood forecasting to minimise flood impacts.
In 2004, unprecedented floods in the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers necessitated the Centre to constitute a Task Force (TF) to suggest remedial measures. The Task Force recommended more involvement by the Centre to make flood management efforts effective. The Working Group of the 11th Planning Commission had also emphasised the need for Central involvement and for setting up a Central Flood Management Organisation.
But the Centre's response remained lukewarm like before.
In the meanwhile, the much-hyped River Linking Project to divert flood waters to water deficit areas is progressing at snail's pace and not even a single link has been executed so far. The Centre does not appear to be serious about this project also.
Recently, as an aftermath of the Kosi floods, another 'dream' project has been announced by declaring the river Ganga as a national river. As per reports, this step is to ensure an integrated approach in the sustainable use of Ganga waters, flood management and pollution management, instead of the current piecemeal efforts taken up in a fragmented manner by different agencies in this regard.
What is required is a coordination among the concerned authorities and not pious words and hollow promises. Rather than taking shelter on the plea that 'water' is a state subject, the Centre should take proactive action on the recommendations made by the various committees and focus on the River Linking Project.
(The Pioneer, dated 20th november, 2008)
The Centre must play a proactive role in coordinating all river and flood management agencies, writes MS Menon
Incessant rains and resulting floods this year have wreaked havoc in many parts of the country. When the flooded Kosi river unleashed by a bund breach in Nepal ravaged north Bihar and the Mahanadi in spate inundated many areas of Orissa, almost at the same time torrential rains caused water levels rising above danger marks in the Ganga and its tributaries, including the Yamuna, flooding many parts of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and New Delhi.
As the flood waters continued to inflict misery on millions of people, blame game among the power mongers started, opening the floodgates of hydropolitics, thereby affecting relief and rehabilitation efforts. Activists pursuing the fixed agenda of 'no dams, no embankments' also jumped into the fray to remain in the limelight.
The war of words would continue but there is a need to examine why various studies and flood control measures carried out in the past failed to deliver.
In 1980, the Rashtriya Barh Ayog had assessed the area prone to floods at 34 million hectares and reasonable protection available to about 10 mha. RBA had advised many actions including enactment of laws to regulate man-made activities in the flood plains. But most of its recommendations were not acted upon.
In 1999 the National Commission for Water Resources had observed that storage dams and embankments did provide effective protection to large flood-prone areas and prevent the loss of standing crops. It recommended performance review of selected embankments and stressed the need for associating the beneficiaries in the upkeep of the embankments. The commission also suggested adoption of nonstructural measures like flood forecasting to minimise flood impacts.
In 2004, unprecedented floods in the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers necessitated the Centre to constitute a Task Force (TF) to suggest remedial measures. The Task Force recommended more involvement by the Centre to make flood management efforts effective. The Working Group of the 11th Planning Commission had also emphasised the need for Central involvement and for setting up a Central Flood Management Organisation.
But the Centre's response remained lukewarm like before.
In the meanwhile, the much-hyped River Linking Project to divert flood waters to water deficit areas is progressing at snail's pace and not even a single link has been executed so far. The Centre does not appear to be serious about this project also.
Recently, as an aftermath of the Kosi floods, another 'dream' project has been announced by declaring the river Ganga as a national river. As per reports, this step is to ensure an integrated approach in the sustainable use of Ganga waters, flood management and pollution management, instead of the current piecemeal efforts taken up in a fragmented manner by different agencies in this regard.
What is required is a coordination among the concerned authorities and not pious words and hollow promises. Rather than taking shelter on the plea that 'water' is a state subject, the Centre should take proactive action on the recommendations made by the various committees and focus on the River Linking Project.
(The Pioneer, dated 20th november, 2008)
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Cooperation with Nepal
Towards bilateral cooperation with Nepal
The river Kosi, originating from the southern slopes of the Himalayas, flows through the flat plains of the Nepal Terai, before it enters India, downstream of Hanumannagar. The river has been notorious in changing its course from east to west, having drifted more than 100 km from its original course and sweeping over an area of 13,000 sq km in India and 1,000 sq km in Nepal since the 18th century. It has therefore been described as Bihar’s river of sorrow. The construction of a barrage with embankments at Hanumannagar in 1963 changed this scenario to a great extent ensuring the river to be confined to a definite channel, thus preventing lateral movements for the last few decades. However, the recent breach of the bund at Kusaha in Nepal caused the surging waters of the Kosi leaving its earlier course to follow the lay of the land to the east with gargantuan sheets of water spread over more than 1,000 sq km in Nepal and India, before joining the Ganga.
The present deluge has not only brought about vast devastation but has also triggered the blame game among the governments concerned. The Nepal government has blamed India for the calamity. Quoting the provisions of the Kosi Project Agreement (1954), Kathmandu pointed out that it was India’s responsibility for the repair, maintenance and overall surveillance of the Kusaha embankment within Nepalese territory. While the central government blamed the Bihar government for not taking timely action, the latter blamed Nepal for not cooperating with it and not allowing Indian contractors to do the maintenance jobs.
Lack of agreement
India has to live with the fact that the chronic floods caused by the Himalayan rivers originating from Nepal can be controlled only by damming them and carrying out river training works.
Though both countries have entered into agreements for specific development aspects of the rivers such as the Kosi, the Gandak and the Mahakali, implementation has been poor for various reasons. The proposal to have a Kosi High Dam envisaging irrigation, power and flood control benefits mooted more than five decades back is still to see the light of the day.
Same is the case regarding the Kamla Multipurpose project, Pancheswar project and the Karnali hydroelectric project.For the past 30 years, committees for embankment construction, monitoring works, inundation problems, etc., have been examining and advising the governments concerned on these international rivers. For issues connected specifically with the Kosi also there are many committees. Unfortunately, everyone is working in isolation without knowing or caring to know what others are doing and years of analysis paralysed them into inaction when tragedy struck now. The integrated development of the Himalayan rivers calls for cooperation and India should work for such cooperation with Nepal since dams on these rivers alone can provide a certain degree of protection against floods.
Taming the rivers
A change in the bureaucratic mindset of rigidly sticking to our terms while dealing with Nepal can help to find an agreed plan of action not only to tame the Kosi but also other rivers originating from Nepal. Discussions at political level should enable the setting up of a high power Indo-Nepal Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) at the ministerial level to function better than the Indo-Pak Permanent Indus Commission and the Indo-Bangladesh JRC. It would then be possible to set up specific project authorities for the Kosi, Karnali, etc., with equal representation from both the countries and having adequate administrative and financial powers.
Such a step similar to the Tala project (Bhutan)would enable timely implementation of the projects and their proper maintenance to avoid calamitous situations. In view of the reported moves being made by China to enter the hydro-development field in Nepal, India has to move fast to resolve the contentious issues to get the best out of the Himalayan rivers.
(The Hindu, dated 21st September, 2008)
The river Kosi, originating from the southern slopes of the Himalayas, flows through the flat plains of the Nepal Terai, before it enters India, downstream of Hanumannagar. The river has been notorious in changing its course from east to west, having drifted more than 100 km from its original course and sweeping over an area of 13,000 sq km in India and 1,000 sq km in Nepal since the 18th century. It has therefore been described as Bihar’s river of sorrow. The construction of a barrage with embankments at Hanumannagar in 1963 changed this scenario to a great extent ensuring the river to be confined to a definite channel, thus preventing lateral movements for the last few decades. However, the recent breach of the bund at Kusaha in Nepal caused the surging waters of the Kosi leaving its earlier course to follow the lay of the land to the east with gargantuan sheets of water spread over more than 1,000 sq km in Nepal and India, before joining the Ganga.
The present deluge has not only brought about vast devastation but has also triggered the blame game among the governments concerned. The Nepal government has blamed India for the calamity. Quoting the provisions of the Kosi Project Agreement (1954), Kathmandu pointed out that it was India’s responsibility for the repair, maintenance and overall surveillance of the Kusaha embankment within Nepalese territory. While the central government blamed the Bihar government for not taking timely action, the latter blamed Nepal for not cooperating with it and not allowing Indian contractors to do the maintenance jobs.
Lack of agreement
India has to live with the fact that the chronic floods caused by the Himalayan rivers originating from Nepal can be controlled only by damming them and carrying out river training works.
Though both countries have entered into agreements for specific development aspects of the rivers such as the Kosi, the Gandak and the Mahakali, implementation has been poor for various reasons. The proposal to have a Kosi High Dam envisaging irrigation, power and flood control benefits mooted more than five decades back is still to see the light of the day.
Same is the case regarding the Kamla Multipurpose project, Pancheswar project and the Karnali hydroelectric project.For the past 30 years, committees for embankment construction, monitoring works, inundation problems, etc., have been examining and advising the governments concerned on these international rivers. For issues connected specifically with the Kosi also there are many committees. Unfortunately, everyone is working in isolation without knowing or caring to know what others are doing and years of analysis paralysed them into inaction when tragedy struck now. The integrated development of the Himalayan rivers calls for cooperation and India should work for such cooperation with Nepal since dams on these rivers alone can provide a certain degree of protection against floods.
Taming the rivers
A change in the bureaucratic mindset of rigidly sticking to our terms while dealing with Nepal can help to find an agreed plan of action not only to tame the Kosi but also other rivers originating from Nepal. Discussions at political level should enable the setting up of a high power Indo-Nepal Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) at the ministerial level to function better than the Indo-Pak Permanent Indus Commission and the Indo-Bangladesh JRC. It would then be possible to set up specific project authorities for the Kosi, Karnali, etc., with equal representation from both the countries and having adequate administrative and financial powers.
Such a step similar to the Tala project (Bhutan)would enable timely implementation of the projects and their proper maintenance to avoid calamitous situations. In view of the reported moves being made by China to enter the hydro-development field in Nepal, India has to move fast to resolve the contentious issues to get the best out of the Himalayan rivers.
(The Hindu, dated 21st September, 2008)
Cleaning Yamuna
Krishna's river turns cesspool
But all is not lost: With the right effort by the right people Yamuna can be saved
The river Yamuna, in its 22 km stretch between Wazirabad barrage and Okhla, is today an aquatic mass of pollution, a filthy choked drain with tonnes of sewage and industrial effluents discharging into it. Many committees after examining the factors causing the deterioration of its water quality suggested measures to improve the condition. Even the Supreme Court expressed concern over Yamuna's poor water quality and directed a High Powered Committee to be set up to formulate an action plan to clean the river.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was initiated and sewage treatment plants (STPs) were installed in the drains that empty into the Yamuna. The plan, known as YAP-1, failed to achieve the objectives envisaged as the existing/constructed STPs remained under utilised due to shortcomings in the sewerage network. Thus even after spending crores of rupees, the Yamuna continues to be dirty.
Presently. sewage of about 3800 million litres daily (mld) is generated in Delhi whereas the treatment capacity available is only for 2330 mld and sewage actually treated is 1600 mld due to deficiencies in the network. The trunk sewers are heavily silted while many of the internal sewers and peripheral sewers are old, undersized or damaged. Further, nearly 40 per cent of Delhi's population does not have any sewerage facility. Consequently, the treated, untreated and uncollected sewage finds its way through storm water drains joining the river and causing unacceptable levels of pollution.
The Yamuna in Delhi is polluted primarily because 21 drains empty their waste waters directly into the river. Of these, the 25 km long Najafgarh drain alone carries about 50 per cent of the municipal waste in addition to draining 60 per cent of Delhi's watershed. This drain collects treated waste water from 4 STPs and untreated waste from 38 drains outfalling into it and discharges into Yamuna about 21 cumecs of waste waters containing 90 per cent of the raw sewage.
It is therefore not surprising that the plan (YAP-1) failed.
World over, many rivers flow through major urban concentrations carrying the city's pollutants. The Thames flowing through London and the Rhine in Europe are such examples. These rivers could be revived with people's unstinted support and by implementing well studied, needed works.
The failure of YAP-1 led the authorities to come up with a new plan,YAP-2. The plan would have three components: Mapping the major drains -- Najafgarh drain, Supplementary drain and Shahdara drain -- to assess desilting, repairs and other works needed; protecting the other 18 drains which outfall directly into the river from becoming the dumpyards of Delhi garbage so as to ensure optimum functioning of the STPs installed in these drains; and constructing a sewage interceptor system to intercept the sewage falling into these drains. The new plan is expected to become operational by 2012-13.
Here, it would be better to examine whether the present proposal would really be able to reduce the river pollution. One of the main parameters to assess water quality is the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) level in water which, according to Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), should not be more than 3 mg/litre in this river stretch. Presently it is almost 15 times more. Even if all the sewage is intercepted and treated using conventional process at STPs, BOD level can at best be brought down to 20. Hence other technologies have also to be thought of to supplement the efforts.
One method to bring down the level to the acceptable figure is to dilute the sewage by releasing more water into the river. For diluting the present sewage flow (30 cumecs), it is estimated that about 450 cumecs of fresh water would be needed. However, this much water is not available/sparable due to the existing demands for irrigation, drinking and other needs of the co-basin States.
Another method is to use the technology involving constructed wetlands for reducing the pollution. This method has been successful in improving the condition of the much polluted Kshipra river near Ujjain and other water bodies in Madhya Pradesh. In Kshipra, an artificial floating island (AFI) of size 200 sqm was installed at the confluence of the city's domestic waste water drain with the river and quality of water downstream tested. The field trials carried out by Prof Billore of Vikram University have shown a reduction of 40-50 per cent of pollutants comprising nitrates, ammonia etc and also substantial lowering of the BOD levels in Kshipra.
Cleaning the Yamuna would need a combination of technologies such as constructed wetlands and STPs for intercepting and treating the sewage and proper maintenance of the created infrastructure. With people's active participation and the administration taking the right steps, the Yamuna experiment could become a great environmental success story.
(The Pioneer, dated 11th September, 2008)
But all is not lost: With the right effort by the right people Yamuna can be saved
The river Yamuna, in its 22 km stretch between Wazirabad barrage and Okhla, is today an aquatic mass of pollution, a filthy choked drain with tonnes of sewage and industrial effluents discharging into it. Many committees after examining the factors causing the deterioration of its water quality suggested measures to improve the condition. Even the Supreme Court expressed concern over Yamuna's poor water quality and directed a High Powered Committee to be set up to formulate an action plan to clean the river.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was initiated and sewage treatment plants (STPs) were installed in the drains that empty into the Yamuna. The plan, known as YAP-1, failed to achieve the objectives envisaged as the existing/constructed STPs remained under utilised due to shortcomings in the sewerage network. Thus even after spending crores of rupees, the Yamuna continues to be dirty.
Presently. sewage of about 3800 million litres daily (mld) is generated in Delhi whereas the treatment capacity available is only for 2330 mld and sewage actually treated is 1600 mld due to deficiencies in the network. The trunk sewers are heavily silted while many of the internal sewers and peripheral sewers are old, undersized or damaged. Further, nearly 40 per cent of Delhi's population does not have any sewerage facility. Consequently, the treated, untreated and uncollected sewage finds its way through storm water drains joining the river and causing unacceptable levels of pollution.
The Yamuna in Delhi is polluted primarily because 21 drains empty their waste waters directly into the river. Of these, the 25 km long Najafgarh drain alone carries about 50 per cent of the municipal waste in addition to draining 60 per cent of Delhi's watershed. This drain collects treated waste water from 4 STPs and untreated waste from 38 drains outfalling into it and discharges into Yamuna about 21 cumecs of waste waters containing 90 per cent of the raw sewage.
It is therefore not surprising that the plan (YAP-1) failed.
World over, many rivers flow through major urban concentrations carrying the city's pollutants. The Thames flowing through London and the Rhine in Europe are such examples. These rivers could be revived with people's unstinted support and by implementing well studied, needed works.
The failure of YAP-1 led the authorities to come up with a new plan,YAP-2. The plan would have three components: Mapping the major drains -- Najafgarh drain, Supplementary drain and Shahdara drain -- to assess desilting, repairs and other works needed; protecting the other 18 drains which outfall directly into the river from becoming the dumpyards of Delhi garbage so as to ensure optimum functioning of the STPs installed in these drains; and constructing a sewage interceptor system to intercept the sewage falling into these drains. The new plan is expected to become operational by 2012-13.
Here, it would be better to examine whether the present proposal would really be able to reduce the river pollution. One of the main parameters to assess water quality is the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) level in water which, according to Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), should not be more than 3 mg/litre in this river stretch. Presently it is almost 15 times more. Even if all the sewage is intercepted and treated using conventional process at STPs, BOD level can at best be brought down to 20. Hence other technologies have also to be thought of to supplement the efforts.
One method to bring down the level to the acceptable figure is to dilute the sewage by releasing more water into the river. For diluting the present sewage flow (30 cumecs), it is estimated that about 450 cumecs of fresh water would be needed. However, this much water is not available/sparable due to the existing demands for irrigation, drinking and other needs of the co-basin States.
Another method is to use the technology involving constructed wetlands for reducing the pollution. This method has been successful in improving the condition of the much polluted Kshipra river near Ujjain and other water bodies in Madhya Pradesh. In Kshipra, an artificial floating island (AFI) of size 200 sqm was installed at the confluence of the city's domestic waste water drain with the river and quality of water downstream tested. The field trials carried out by Prof Billore of Vikram University have shown a reduction of 40-50 per cent of pollutants comprising nitrates, ammonia etc and also substantial lowering of the BOD levels in Kshipra.
Cleaning the Yamuna would need a combination of technologies such as constructed wetlands and STPs for intercepting and treating the sewage and proper maintenance of the created infrastructure. With people's active participation and the administration taking the right steps, the Yamuna experiment could become a great environmental success story.
(The Pioneer, dated 11th September, 2008)
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Kishanganga Project ( Indus)
India has to act fast on Kishanganga project
PAKISTAN is again resorting to accusations about projects in J&K after it failed to convince the World Bank about India violating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions in the Baglihar project. Its attempt now is to make the Kishanganga Project a disputed scheme, thereby seeking the bank’s intervention and delaying the project.
Pakistan’s only objective seems to be to stall India’s efforts in developing the hydro-potential in the Indus system, permitted by the IWT (1960), a treaty lauded as a model for international agreements on water sharing, though it is nothing of the sort.
International treaties on the use of trans-boundary rivers aim at achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the water resources to benefit the co-basin states. But this is not happening in the case of the IWT.
Unlike other international water treaties, IWT is unique in ignoring accepted international practices. For example, the method adopted for water sharing is by equal distribution of the number of rivers in the system flowing through India, rather than equitable distribution of water in the entire basin; there is no time limit for its operational validity thus making it an agreement ad-infinitum; there is no provision for either party to withdraw from the treaty; its clauses enable non-constructive application of treaty provisions to stall developmental efforts but are not very specific on sound engineering practices needed to achieve the objectives.
All along, the treaty has been hyped as a model for sharing and utilisation of any international river, since, due to its in-built resilience, it could survive two wars and many war-like situations between the two countries in the past. But the fact is that it has outlived the tempests of history only because India was willing to adjust to Pakistan’s tantrums, though India got a raw deal in the treaty getting only about 20 per cent share of the Indus waters against more than 40 per cent due on equity considerations. Other treaty provisions are also favouring Pakistan.
India has always been willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of good neighbourly relations. Encouraged by our tolerance, Pakistan continues to make Indian projects a subject of endless debate, to delay implementation. Construction of the Wular project meant to facilitate cheap inland water transport to the apple growers of interior J&K, had to be stopped. Completion of the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450MW) was delayed by many years.
Pakistan has so far succeeded in delaying more than 25 Indian projects raising the bogey of treaty violations.Consequently, out of the estimated 8825 mw of hydro-potential to be exploited by India from the western rivers of the Indus system, only about 1300 mw has been harnessed so far. This has affected development plans in J&K.
The Kishanganga project envisages construction of a dam across the Kishanganga river, a tributary of the Jhelum. The ponded waters would be diverted through a tunnel and a powerhouse again to the main Jhelum river and in the process would generate 330 mw of power using a drop of 297 metres. With the diverted Jhelum water returning back to the main river, Pak’s share of Jhelum water would remain unaffected.
The project details were furnished to Pakistan in the nineties, as per the treaty provisions. As usual, Pakistan objected, insisting out that the Indian project affected their existing uses downstream. In meetings after meetings India sought details of their existing uses, but instead of the details, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India to attract World Bank intervention.
Recent media reports indicate that China has offered help to Pakistan to overcome its water and power crisis. It has promised help to construct their Basha dam. It is also reported that Pakistan has awarded the 2.16 billion dollar Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project at a site downstream of our project, to Chinese companies, to complete the work in 7 years.
Experience shows that China is least concerned about Indian protests. Thus, while engaging India on unending discussions, Pakistan would be able to complete the project before India and then claim that the Indian project would affect the existing power generation, and hence would be violating treaty provisions.
India should take up and complete the Kishanganga project immediately. It has lost many trying to appease Pakistan. Still, it is not too late. India has to act and act fast.
(The Tribune, dated 22nd May, 2008)
PAKISTAN is again resorting to accusations about projects in J&K after it failed to convince the World Bank about India violating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions in the Baglihar project. Its attempt now is to make the Kishanganga Project a disputed scheme, thereby seeking the bank’s intervention and delaying the project.
Pakistan’s only objective seems to be to stall India’s efforts in developing the hydro-potential in the Indus system, permitted by the IWT (1960), a treaty lauded as a model for international agreements on water sharing, though it is nothing of the sort.
International treaties on the use of trans-boundary rivers aim at achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the water resources to benefit the co-basin states. But this is not happening in the case of the IWT.
Unlike other international water treaties, IWT is unique in ignoring accepted international practices. For example, the method adopted for water sharing is by equal distribution of the number of rivers in the system flowing through India, rather than equitable distribution of water in the entire basin; there is no time limit for its operational validity thus making it an agreement ad-infinitum; there is no provision for either party to withdraw from the treaty; its clauses enable non-constructive application of treaty provisions to stall developmental efforts but are not very specific on sound engineering practices needed to achieve the objectives.
All along, the treaty has been hyped as a model for sharing and utilisation of any international river, since, due to its in-built resilience, it could survive two wars and many war-like situations between the two countries in the past. But the fact is that it has outlived the tempests of history only because India was willing to adjust to Pakistan’s tantrums, though India got a raw deal in the treaty getting only about 20 per cent share of the Indus waters against more than 40 per cent due on equity considerations. Other treaty provisions are also favouring Pakistan.
India has always been willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of good neighbourly relations. Encouraged by our tolerance, Pakistan continues to make Indian projects a subject of endless debate, to delay implementation. Construction of the Wular project meant to facilitate cheap inland water transport to the apple growers of interior J&K, had to be stopped. Completion of the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450MW) was delayed by many years.
Pakistan has so far succeeded in delaying more than 25 Indian projects raising the bogey of treaty violations.Consequently, out of the estimated 8825 mw of hydro-potential to be exploited by India from the western rivers of the Indus system, only about 1300 mw has been harnessed so far. This has affected development plans in J&K.
The Kishanganga project envisages construction of a dam across the Kishanganga river, a tributary of the Jhelum. The ponded waters would be diverted through a tunnel and a powerhouse again to the main Jhelum river and in the process would generate 330 mw of power using a drop of 297 metres. With the diverted Jhelum water returning back to the main river, Pak’s share of Jhelum water would remain unaffected.
The project details were furnished to Pakistan in the nineties, as per the treaty provisions. As usual, Pakistan objected, insisting out that the Indian project affected their existing uses downstream. In meetings after meetings India sought details of their existing uses, but instead of the details, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India to attract World Bank intervention.
Recent media reports indicate that China has offered help to Pakistan to overcome its water and power crisis. It has promised help to construct their Basha dam. It is also reported that Pakistan has awarded the 2.16 billion dollar Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project at a site downstream of our project, to Chinese companies, to complete the work in 7 years.
Experience shows that China is least concerned about Indian protests. Thus, while engaging India on unending discussions, Pakistan would be able to complete the project before India and then claim that the Indian project would affect the existing power generation, and hence would be violating treaty provisions.
India should take up and complete the Kishanganga project immediately. It has lost many trying to appease Pakistan. Still, it is not too late. India has to act and act fast.
(The Tribune, dated 22nd May, 2008)
Needed River Basin Authorities
Need for river basin authorities
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution can provide a platform to build consensus among States
On the occasion of World Water Day, 2002, Kofi Annan, the then U.N. Secretary General, had warned that “water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.” Similar sentiments were echoed recently by Ban Ki-moon in his message on World Water Day, 2008, that the problems growing from the scarcity of a vital resource (like water) would spill over state borders creating a high risk of violent conflict.
We do not have to look elsewhere for examples in this regard since it is happening right here in India. The Hogenakkal project, a drinking water scheme across the interstate Cauvery river planned by Tamil Nadu recently, caused a serious law and order situation both in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with tempers running high in the States.
Hydropolitics
Similarly widespread protests raged in Orissa when Andhra Pradesh started works on the Mahendratanaya drinking water and irrigation project in the interstate Vamsadhara river basin. Unfortunately, such situations occur due to hydropolitics encouraging ad hoc measures for resolving problems, ignoring needed actions with long term vision, particularly in the case of interstate rivers.
An interstate river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Conflict of interest is the normal state of affairs when the uneven distribution of rainfall in space and time leads to endemic problems of water shortage in the basin.
Consequently, the co-basin States start claiming ownership rights to water flowing through their territories forgetting their obligation to cooperate with each other, thus causing irreparable harm to the principle of federalism of the polity. The Central government, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, takes the plea that under the Constitution, water is a State subject and Central intervention is possible only when the subject is brought under “Central” or “Concurrent” List.
Non-use of a given power
In this connection, the opinion of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) would be of interest. The Commission had stated that the Centre could take over the regulation and development of interstate river waters by virtue of Entry 56, List 1 (Central List) of the Constitution. It had also observed that “the present situation is more a case of non-use of a given power by the Union than one of want of the same.”
It had also pointed out that with more frequent meetings of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC), chaired by the Prime Minister with Chief Ministers as members, the points of difference on water issues between the States could be resolved through accommodation.
Unfortunately, NWRC was not able to meet frequently and find time to discuss and sort out the issues with the result that water disputes continued for want of a duly empowered forum to enable mutual consultations among the States and to focus the dialogue on water needs rather than water rights.
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution comprising Central and State representatives would be able to provide a platform to build consensus among the States through discussions.
Interestingly, the River Boards Act, 1956, has a provision for setting up River Basin Organisations (RBO). But the Act provides only for boards advisory in nature and hence does not give any authority to the Central government to control and develop the interstate rivers or regulate the activities of the State governments in these matters.
Though in 1988, the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources had recommended setting up of RBOs having authority for regulation and control of the basin under Article 246 by suitable enactments, as of now, there is not a single RBO established for the purpose. A duly empowered, well structured RBO alone would be able to promote ethically based behaviour and action in a river basin and guide all parties towards a common goal and collective good.
The composition, powers, etc., of RBOs have to be detailed while planning the organisation to ensure that conflicts do not crop up during the operational stages and thereafter, as happened in the Murray-Darling Basin Organisation in Australia and in the Fracer Basin Council in Canada.
Considering the fact that interstate rivers contribute a major share of the utilisable water resources of the country, a legally backed RBO has to be in position to accelerate the consensus building process to optimally utilise the precious water resources of the country, as the demand for fresh water is increasingly taking centre-stage on the economic and political agenda, and more and more disputes are arising between States.
(The Hindu, dated 20th April, 2008)
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution can provide a platform to build consensus among States
On the occasion of World Water Day, 2002, Kofi Annan, the then U.N. Secretary General, had warned that “water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.” Similar sentiments were echoed recently by Ban Ki-moon in his message on World Water Day, 2008, that the problems growing from the scarcity of a vital resource (like water) would spill over state borders creating a high risk of violent conflict.
We do not have to look elsewhere for examples in this regard since it is happening right here in India. The Hogenakkal project, a drinking water scheme across the interstate Cauvery river planned by Tamil Nadu recently, caused a serious law and order situation both in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with tempers running high in the States.
Hydropolitics
Similarly widespread protests raged in Orissa when Andhra Pradesh started works on the Mahendratanaya drinking water and irrigation project in the interstate Vamsadhara river basin. Unfortunately, such situations occur due to hydropolitics encouraging ad hoc measures for resolving problems, ignoring needed actions with long term vision, particularly in the case of interstate rivers.
An interstate river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Conflict of interest is the normal state of affairs when the uneven distribution of rainfall in space and time leads to endemic problems of water shortage in the basin.
Consequently, the co-basin States start claiming ownership rights to water flowing through their territories forgetting their obligation to cooperate with each other, thus causing irreparable harm to the principle of federalism of the polity. The Central government, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, takes the plea that under the Constitution, water is a State subject and Central intervention is possible only when the subject is brought under “Central” or “Concurrent” List.
Non-use of a given power
In this connection, the opinion of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) would be of interest. The Commission had stated that the Centre could take over the regulation and development of interstate river waters by virtue of Entry 56, List 1 (Central List) of the Constitution. It had also observed that “the present situation is more a case of non-use of a given power by the Union than one of want of the same.”
It had also pointed out that with more frequent meetings of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC), chaired by the Prime Minister with Chief Ministers as members, the points of difference on water issues between the States could be resolved through accommodation.
Unfortunately, NWRC was not able to meet frequently and find time to discuss and sort out the issues with the result that water disputes continued for want of a duly empowered forum to enable mutual consultations among the States and to focus the dialogue on water needs rather than water rights.
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution comprising Central and State representatives would be able to provide a platform to build consensus among the States through discussions.
Interestingly, the River Boards Act, 1956, has a provision for setting up River Basin Organisations (RBO). But the Act provides only for boards advisory in nature and hence does not give any authority to the Central government to control and develop the interstate rivers or regulate the activities of the State governments in these matters.
Though in 1988, the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources had recommended setting up of RBOs having authority for regulation and control of the basin under Article 246 by suitable enactments, as of now, there is not a single RBO established for the purpose. A duly empowered, well structured RBO alone would be able to promote ethically based behaviour and action in a river basin and guide all parties towards a common goal and collective good.
The composition, powers, etc., of RBOs have to be detailed while planning the organisation to ensure that conflicts do not crop up during the operational stages and thereafter, as happened in the Murray-Darling Basin Organisation in Australia and in the Fracer Basin Council in Canada.
Considering the fact that interstate rivers contribute a major share of the utilisable water resources of the country, a legally backed RBO has to be in position to accelerate the consensus building process to optimally utilise the precious water resources of the country, as the demand for fresh water is increasingly taking centre-stage on the economic and political agenda, and more and more disputes are arising between States.
(The Hindu, dated 20th April, 2008)
China Aggressive on Rivers
China aggressive on Tibetan rivers
CHINA has recently announced that a 141 km highway linking Bome to Medok City in Nyingtri Prefecture will be constructed next year. An airport has also been opened in this Prefecture at an altitude of 2949 metres. Medok is located near the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangppo (India’s Brahmaputra) where the river takes a sharp U-turn to enter into India. India is interested in these developments since the road and the airstrip at Nyingtri would facilitate construction of the project planned by China at the Great Bend to divert the Brahmaputra waters to its north.
One of the major problems facing China presently is water scarcity, as the mighty Yellow River has become a seasonal stream and the Yangtze river is in a critical condition. China does not want its aspirations to superpower status thwarted by a water crisis and hence its plans to divert the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Region to the arid north through 3 links – the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages the Brahmaputra diversion.
The Chinese plans for using the Brahmaputra waters have been in the news since last few decades, as brought out in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982), and the Scientific American (June, 1996). For many years China had been vehemently denying any such move. However, in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed the plans for the Tsangpo
Diversion Project.
The project, scheduled to start in 2009, would be sited at Permakoe near the Great Bend and would have two components (i) a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40000 MW utilizing the fall of 3000mts. in the river and (ii) arrangements for diverting Tsangpo waters.
The Chinese interventions in the Sutlej, Brahmaputra, etc. could affect river flows into India.Our irrigation and hydroprojects would suffer if the Chinese divert the waters during glacier melting period and release large flows during the monsoon.
In this connection, the experience of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, the co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to China constructing 2 hydro-dams in its territory, should be an eye opener for India.
These states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities; also, the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more waters than normal from its upstream reservoirs into the river below. However, China did not bother about the objections raised by these states and even of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) stating that it is not a member of MRC.
India too had experienced heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past. The large floods in the Sutlej in 2000, 2004 and 2005 necessitated closure of the Nathpa Jhakri Project and evacuation of people from the affected areas. Arunachal Pradesh also suffered due to a flooded Brahmaputra reportedly caused by dam failures in Tibet.
China is not answerable to India on the use of the Tibetan rivers since there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers, a situation similar to the Mekong basin. Hence it would be in the interest of India to enter into an agreement with China for the optimum utilization of the Tibetan rivers as a follow up of the joint declaration made by the two countries in 2006 for exchanging hydrologic data.
Sharing information on flow data alone is not adequate to address our concerns. The impacts on the rivers due to upstream Chinese operations such as (i) reduction of flows by diversion and (ii) floods resulting from breaches or sudden gate openings, have to be addressed by India. Construction of cascade projects across the concerned rivers is therefore a necessity to ensure water conservation and flood absorption. Unfortunately proposed projects like Khab project(s) in Himachal Pradesh and Siang project(s) in Arunachal Pradesh investigated earlier appears to have been dropped on benefit -cost considerations.
The strategic importance including disaster mitigation offered by these projects should have been given due weightage while evaluating them instead of applying the routine norms . It is time Government of India takes special interest to implement these projects to address India’s concerns instead of labouring under an ideology induced myopia.
(The Tribune, dated 26th December, 2007)
CHINA has recently announced that a 141 km highway linking Bome to Medok City in Nyingtri Prefecture will be constructed next year. An airport has also been opened in this Prefecture at an altitude of 2949 metres. Medok is located near the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangppo (India’s Brahmaputra) where the river takes a sharp U-turn to enter into India. India is interested in these developments since the road and the airstrip at Nyingtri would facilitate construction of the project planned by China at the Great Bend to divert the Brahmaputra waters to its north.
One of the major problems facing China presently is water scarcity, as the mighty Yellow River has become a seasonal stream and the Yangtze river is in a critical condition. China does not want its aspirations to superpower status thwarted by a water crisis and hence its plans to divert the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Region to the arid north through 3 links – the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages the Brahmaputra diversion.
The Chinese plans for using the Brahmaputra waters have been in the news since last few decades, as brought out in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982), and the Scientific American (June, 1996). For many years China had been vehemently denying any such move. However, in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed the plans for the Tsangpo
Diversion Project.
The project, scheduled to start in 2009, would be sited at Permakoe near the Great Bend and would have two components (i) a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40000 MW utilizing the fall of 3000mts. in the river and (ii) arrangements for diverting Tsangpo waters.
The Chinese interventions in the Sutlej, Brahmaputra, etc. could affect river flows into India.Our irrigation and hydroprojects would suffer if the Chinese divert the waters during glacier melting period and release large flows during the monsoon.
In this connection, the experience of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, the co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to China constructing 2 hydro-dams in its territory, should be an eye opener for India.
These states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities; also, the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more waters than normal from its upstream reservoirs into the river below. However, China did not bother about the objections raised by these states and even of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) stating that it is not a member of MRC.
India too had experienced heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past. The large floods in the Sutlej in 2000, 2004 and 2005 necessitated closure of the Nathpa Jhakri Project and evacuation of people from the affected areas. Arunachal Pradesh also suffered due to a flooded Brahmaputra reportedly caused by dam failures in Tibet.
China is not answerable to India on the use of the Tibetan rivers since there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers, a situation similar to the Mekong basin. Hence it would be in the interest of India to enter into an agreement with China for the optimum utilization of the Tibetan rivers as a follow up of the joint declaration made by the two countries in 2006 for exchanging hydrologic data.
Sharing information on flow data alone is not adequate to address our concerns. The impacts on the rivers due to upstream Chinese operations such as (i) reduction of flows by diversion and (ii) floods resulting from breaches or sudden gate openings, have to be addressed by India. Construction of cascade projects across the concerned rivers is therefore a necessity to ensure water conservation and flood absorption. Unfortunately proposed projects like Khab project(s) in Himachal Pradesh and Siang project(s) in Arunachal Pradesh investigated earlier appears to have been dropped on benefit -cost considerations.
The strategic importance including disaster mitigation offered by these projects should have been given due weightage while evaluating them instead of applying the routine norms . It is time Government of India takes special interest to implement these projects to address India’s concerns instead of labouring under an ideology induced myopia.
(The Tribune, dated 26th December, 2007)
Monday, January 11, 2010
China's Rivers
•
India should talk rivers with China
Recent reports on the project proposed by China to divert the Upper Brahmaputra waters (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) do not augur well for India. Though Union water resource minister Saifuddin Soz finds no cause for alarm on the plea that the scheme is only for a small hydro-project (40 MW) to help a local village, the secrecy over diversion has fuelled many misgivings in India.
One of the major problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow River is at present reduced to a seasonal stream and the Yangtze River is also in a critical condition, with pollution aggravating the situation. China does not want its aspiration to super power status thwarted by a water crisis. It knows that fundamental changes have to be made in water management to achieve its objectives; new sources of water have to be located to ward off the impending crisis. The solution it found was in the interbasin water transfer from the wet south to the arid north through three links — the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) diversion.
The proposed diversion of Tsangpo would adversely affect the flow pattern of the river downstream. As China would control the flow to suit its hydropower generation and irrigation demands, India would be at its mercy for releases during dry and flood seasons. The diversion would also upset Indian river linking project, in which Brahmaputra has a decisive role. Further, the use of nuclear explosives for tunnelling through the Himalaya could trigger major earthquakes in the region.
Though Beijing had been secretive about the scheme, frequent media reports did expose the Chinese plans. For example, in February 1982, the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report quoted studies carried out on the feasibility of damming the Tsangpo at the Great Bend where the river takes a sharp U-turn before entering India. The proposed diversion through tunnels would enable 240 to 330 billion units of power generation annually.
Another report in the Scientific American (June, 1996) brought out Chinese engineers assuring the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in December 1995 that Tsangpo waters could be diverted to the Gobi desert blasting a 20 km channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives. A news item in July 2000, described flash floods in the river devastating many areas in Arunachal Pradesh. The flow pattern indicated a dam failure in Tibet and, though China denied it, satellite imagery confirmed this.
After many such reports in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, finally confirmed plans for the Tsangpo Water Diversion Project on the basis of preliminary studies carried out in mid-2003, followed by feasibility studies in October. The project to be located at Perma Koe site at the Great Bend would have two components: one, a power plant with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW to use the river’s potential falling through 3000 m in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of Tsangpo waters by pumping across the Tibet Plateau to the North West provinces. The construction of the project is scheduled to start in 2009.
No one would doubt the Chinese capacity to implement such projects. One example is the gigantic Water Diversion project that annually transfers 1.8 billion cubic metres of water through a 85.3 km long tunnel in the mountainous Northeastern China to the Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun River. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.
In 2003, India had expressed to China its concern over the issue. But, unfortunately, China continues with the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or water quality in the river, considering the terrain and limited culturable area and the population in Tibet. However, unless China is brought under a treaty on the use of the Tibetan rivers, we are bound to suffer. Interestingly, some time ago the Chinese Committee on Irrigation and Drainage was keen to enter in an MoU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information. But India let the opportunity slip through sheer inaction.
At present there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers except for an MoU for sharing hydrological information on these rivers.
There is a glimmer of hope now with China showing renewed interest in activating the joint mechanism set up in 2006 to address the long-pending issues. It is up to India to seize the opportunity.
(The Indian Express, dated 17th July, 2007)
India should talk rivers with China
Recent reports on the project proposed by China to divert the Upper Brahmaputra waters (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) do not augur well for India. Though Union water resource minister Saifuddin Soz finds no cause for alarm on the plea that the scheme is only for a small hydro-project (40 MW) to help a local village, the secrecy over diversion has fuelled many misgivings in India.
One of the major problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow River is at present reduced to a seasonal stream and the Yangtze River is also in a critical condition, with pollution aggravating the situation. China does not want its aspiration to super power status thwarted by a water crisis. It knows that fundamental changes have to be made in water management to achieve its objectives; new sources of water have to be located to ward off the impending crisis. The solution it found was in the interbasin water transfer from the wet south to the arid north through three links — the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) diversion.
The proposed diversion of Tsangpo would adversely affect the flow pattern of the river downstream. As China would control the flow to suit its hydropower generation and irrigation demands, India would be at its mercy for releases during dry and flood seasons. The diversion would also upset Indian river linking project, in which Brahmaputra has a decisive role. Further, the use of nuclear explosives for tunnelling through the Himalaya could trigger major earthquakes in the region.
Though Beijing had been secretive about the scheme, frequent media reports did expose the Chinese plans. For example, in February 1982, the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report quoted studies carried out on the feasibility of damming the Tsangpo at the Great Bend where the river takes a sharp U-turn before entering India. The proposed diversion through tunnels would enable 240 to 330 billion units of power generation annually.
Another report in the Scientific American (June, 1996) brought out Chinese engineers assuring the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in December 1995 that Tsangpo waters could be diverted to the Gobi desert blasting a 20 km channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives. A news item in July 2000, described flash floods in the river devastating many areas in Arunachal Pradesh. The flow pattern indicated a dam failure in Tibet and, though China denied it, satellite imagery confirmed this.
After many such reports in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, finally confirmed plans for the Tsangpo Water Diversion Project on the basis of preliminary studies carried out in mid-2003, followed by feasibility studies in October. The project to be located at Perma Koe site at the Great Bend would have two components: one, a power plant with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW to use the river’s potential falling through 3000 m in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of Tsangpo waters by pumping across the Tibet Plateau to the North West provinces. The construction of the project is scheduled to start in 2009.
No one would doubt the Chinese capacity to implement such projects. One example is the gigantic Water Diversion project that annually transfers 1.8 billion cubic metres of water through a 85.3 km long tunnel in the mountainous Northeastern China to the Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun River. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.
In 2003, India had expressed to China its concern over the issue. But, unfortunately, China continues with the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or water quality in the river, considering the terrain and limited culturable area and the population in Tibet. However, unless China is brought under a treaty on the use of the Tibetan rivers, we are bound to suffer. Interestingly, some time ago the Chinese Committee on Irrigation and Drainage was keen to enter in an MoU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information. But India let the opportunity slip through sheer inaction.
At present there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers except for an MoU for sharing hydrological information on these rivers.
There is a glimmer of hope now with China showing renewed interest in activating the joint mechanism set up in 2006 to address the long-pending issues. It is up to India to seize the opportunity.
(The Indian Express, dated 17th July, 2007)
Indus Waters Treaty
A redundant treaty
THE 46-YEAR-OLD history of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the story of a tragedy that began with hope as demonstrated by past events and confirmed by the recent verdict of Raymond Lafitte, the World Bank appointed neutral expert for the Baglihar project.
The treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the aim of achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters, has miserably failed not only in accomplishing the objectives but also in settling water disputes between the two all these years.
A perusal of the treaty would reveal that it is biased in favour of Pakistan, ignoring international rules on equitable distribution of waters. Against India's rightful share of more than 40 per cent of the Indus waters, we got only about 20 per cent in the allocation.
Further, using the loopholes in the treaty, Pakistan succeeded in stalling/delaying Indian projects, 30 in all, planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. At every stage, India agreed to the demands of Pakistan such as stopping the Tulbul project works and closing the sluices in the Salal project, only to maintain good neighbourly relations. This conciliatory approach emboldened Pakistan to allege IWT violations by India on the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450 MW).
India had given the project features of Baglihar to Pakistan in May, 1992 as per treaty provisions. Despite many meetings at Commissioner and Secretary levels, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India on project designs, etc. It was willing for negotiations, if India stopped the work, but this time India did not oblige. Our neighbour then approached the World Bank seeking the appointment of a neutral expert to look into the dispute. Accepting Pakistan's plea, the Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte.
After site visits, discussions with the parties concerned and studying the presentations made by them, the expert has now given his verdict.
Both India and Pakistan have claimed that their contentions have been upheld by the expert. But will the incendiary politics of the subcontinent further trigger more conflicts?
A perusal of the verdict would reveal that while provision of sluices and gated spillway has been accepted by the expert, India would have to modify the design to reduce the height of the dam, limit the pondage and raise the level of the power intake. India has therefore to incur additional costs to carry out these changes and get reduced peak power benefits and flood moderation advantages. By awarding such a decision the expert has overlooked the very basis of the treaty i.e. the maximum utilisation of Indus waters for mutual benefit.
Years of wrangling in the interpretation of the clauses has proved beyond doubt that the treaty has outlived its utility, to address the changing geopolitical situations and emerging norms of international laws. Hence India has to insist on a review of the treaty.
The rights and obligations of the parties to a treaty are well laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 which inter alia states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose."
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances.
Pakistan has already cut out its strategy to delay the Indian projects, next in its agenda being the Kishanganga project (J&K). Hence we cannot and should not allow our development efforts in J&K to be sabotaged by Pakistan wrongly using the provisions of a redundant treaty.
(Thee Hindu, dated 8th April, 2007)
THE 46-YEAR-OLD history of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the story of a tragedy that began with hope as demonstrated by past events and confirmed by the recent verdict of Raymond Lafitte, the World Bank appointed neutral expert for the Baglihar project.
The treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the aim of achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters, has miserably failed not only in accomplishing the objectives but also in settling water disputes between the two all these years.
A perusal of the treaty would reveal that it is biased in favour of Pakistan, ignoring international rules on equitable distribution of waters. Against India's rightful share of more than 40 per cent of the Indus waters, we got only about 20 per cent in the allocation.
Further, using the loopholes in the treaty, Pakistan succeeded in stalling/delaying Indian projects, 30 in all, planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. At every stage, India agreed to the demands of Pakistan such as stopping the Tulbul project works and closing the sluices in the Salal project, only to maintain good neighbourly relations. This conciliatory approach emboldened Pakistan to allege IWT violations by India on the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450 MW).
India had given the project features of Baglihar to Pakistan in May, 1992 as per treaty provisions. Despite many meetings at Commissioner and Secretary levels, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India on project designs, etc. It was willing for negotiations, if India stopped the work, but this time India did not oblige. Our neighbour then approached the World Bank seeking the appointment of a neutral expert to look into the dispute. Accepting Pakistan's plea, the Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte.
After site visits, discussions with the parties concerned and studying the presentations made by them, the expert has now given his verdict.
Both India and Pakistan have claimed that their contentions have been upheld by the expert. But will the incendiary politics of the subcontinent further trigger more conflicts?
A perusal of the verdict would reveal that while provision of sluices and gated spillway has been accepted by the expert, India would have to modify the design to reduce the height of the dam, limit the pondage and raise the level of the power intake. India has therefore to incur additional costs to carry out these changes and get reduced peak power benefits and flood moderation advantages. By awarding such a decision the expert has overlooked the very basis of the treaty i.e. the maximum utilisation of Indus waters for mutual benefit.
Years of wrangling in the interpretation of the clauses has proved beyond doubt that the treaty has outlived its utility, to address the changing geopolitical situations and emerging norms of international laws. Hence India has to insist on a review of the treaty.
The rights and obligations of the parties to a treaty are well laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 which inter alia states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose."
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances.
Pakistan has already cut out its strategy to delay the Indian projects, next in its agenda being the Kishanganga project (J&K). Hence we cannot and should not allow our development efforts in J&K to be sabotaged by Pakistan wrongly using the provisions of a redundant treaty.
(Thee Hindu, dated 8th April, 2007)
Raging Cauvery waters
Cauvery waters still rage
The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT), after 16 years of deliberation, gave its unanimous final award on February 5, 2007, in one of the longest water disputes in the world. As per the verdict, out of the utilisable quantum of the waters of the Cauvery river system assessed as 740 thousand million cubic feet (TMC), the allocation to the three states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Puducherry would be 30 TMC, 270 TMC, 419 TMC and 7 TMC respectively. It has also identified inter-state contact points for monitoring water deliveries; ordered tentative monthly deliveries during a normal year to be made available by Karnataka; proportionate reduction of allocation among the states in a distress year; and constitution of a Cauvery Management Board (CMB) to implement its directions.
Going by media reports, none of the states are fully satisfied with the allocation and now plan to file review petitions under the Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956 (ISWD Act).
As per ISWD Act, if the Centre or any concerned state needs any guidance on any point in the verdict, they could again refer the matter to the tribunal for further consideration within a period of three months and ask for a further report. Once the further report is received, the Centre has to notify the award and the decision shall be final and binding on the parties. The amended Act stipulated further that the tribunal’s decision shall have the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court. It is also to be noted that under Article 262 of the Constitution, the tribunal’s decisions are outside the jurisdiction of the courts, including the Supreme Court.
A study of the final order would confirm that it is a just and equitable settlement of a highly contentious inter-state water dispute. However, some politicians have unleashed a disinformation campaign against the award. For example, the upper riparians are being given the impression that against 205 TMC to be released by Karnataka as ordered under the interim relief in 1991, a substantially large quantum — 419 TMC — has been allotted to Tamil Nadu in the final award! The fact is that as per the award, Karnataka is to release 192 TMC to Tamil Nadu, which includes environmental releases of 10 TMC and Puduchery allocation of 7 TMC.
There are certain grey areas in the verdict that need to be clarified in the further report. These are: one, a more elaborate clause on distress/deficit sharing as to how the sharing is to be done when there is distress in the upper basin areas due to a weak southwest monsoon while there is a normal northeast monsoon providing adequate precipitation to the lower areas in the basin and vice versa. Two, there is need for a time period to be fixed for which such allocation shall remain binding on the parties, since water allocation may become inequitable when the conditions on which it is based are substantially altered such as due to climate change. Three, a direction has to be given to the co-basin states to furnish to the regulatory authority the water utilisation data in the basin to facilitate modification/ adjustment in the delivery schedules in future.
The tribunal has given its verdict and now it is for the basin states to forge a policy for maximising a fair distribution to reap the benefits of the Cauvery waters. With a major part of the country’s river waters going unutilised and flowing into the sea every year, the Union government cannot and should not remain a helpless spectator to the water disputes on the plea that water is a state subject. Of course, in the present political scenario any change in the constitutional scheme to bring water entirely under Union List or Concurrent List is to be ruled out. But the Centre has to seriously consider how it can empower itself under Entry 56, List I, to enact laws to regulate interstate river waters. It especially needs to step in now since the spectre of scarcity haunting this water-endowed country in the coming decades is becoming a reality, what with falling water tables and drying streams.
(Indian Express, dated 26th February,2007)
The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT), after 16 years of deliberation, gave its unanimous final award on February 5, 2007, in one of the longest water disputes in the world. As per the verdict, out of the utilisable quantum of the waters of the Cauvery river system assessed as 740 thousand million cubic feet (TMC), the allocation to the three states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Puducherry would be 30 TMC, 270 TMC, 419 TMC and 7 TMC respectively. It has also identified inter-state contact points for monitoring water deliveries; ordered tentative monthly deliveries during a normal year to be made available by Karnataka; proportionate reduction of allocation among the states in a distress year; and constitution of a Cauvery Management Board (CMB) to implement its directions.
Going by media reports, none of the states are fully satisfied with the allocation and now plan to file review petitions under the Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956 (ISWD Act).
As per ISWD Act, if the Centre or any concerned state needs any guidance on any point in the verdict, they could again refer the matter to the tribunal for further consideration within a period of three months and ask for a further report. Once the further report is received, the Centre has to notify the award and the decision shall be final and binding on the parties. The amended Act stipulated further that the tribunal’s decision shall have the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court. It is also to be noted that under Article 262 of the Constitution, the tribunal’s decisions are outside the jurisdiction of the courts, including the Supreme Court.
A study of the final order would confirm that it is a just and equitable settlement of a highly contentious inter-state water dispute. However, some politicians have unleashed a disinformation campaign against the award. For example, the upper riparians are being given the impression that against 205 TMC to be released by Karnataka as ordered under the interim relief in 1991, a substantially large quantum — 419 TMC — has been allotted to Tamil Nadu in the final award! The fact is that as per the award, Karnataka is to release 192 TMC to Tamil Nadu, which includes environmental releases of 10 TMC and Puduchery allocation of 7 TMC.
There are certain grey areas in the verdict that need to be clarified in the further report. These are: one, a more elaborate clause on distress/deficit sharing as to how the sharing is to be done when there is distress in the upper basin areas due to a weak southwest monsoon while there is a normal northeast monsoon providing adequate precipitation to the lower areas in the basin and vice versa. Two, there is need for a time period to be fixed for which such allocation shall remain binding on the parties, since water allocation may become inequitable when the conditions on which it is based are substantially altered such as due to climate change. Three, a direction has to be given to the co-basin states to furnish to the regulatory authority the water utilisation data in the basin to facilitate modification/ adjustment in the delivery schedules in future.
The tribunal has given its verdict and now it is for the basin states to forge a policy for maximising a fair distribution to reap the benefits of the Cauvery waters. With a major part of the country’s river waters going unutilised and flowing into the sea every year, the Union government cannot and should not remain a helpless spectator to the water disputes on the plea that water is a state subject. Of course, in the present political scenario any change in the constitutional scheme to bring water entirely under Union List or Concurrent List is to be ruled out. But the Centre has to seriously consider how it can empower itself under Entry 56, List I, to enact laws to regulate interstate river waters. It especially needs to step in now since the spectre of scarcity haunting this water-endowed country in the coming decades is becoming a reality, what with falling water tables and drying streams.
(Indian Express, dated 26th February,2007)
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Mulla-periyar dispute
A win-win approach on Mullaperiyar
The century-old Mullaperiyar Project is a grand example of inter-basin water transfer helping to green vast tracts of otherwise arid land in southern Tamil Nadu. The project came into being after the Madras government (now Tamil Nadu) entered into an agreement with Travancore state (now Kerala) in 1886 for the lease of a specified tract at the proposed dam site and the use of waters of the river flowing through the tract for irrigation purposes by diversion.
The period of the agreement being 999 years. Accordingly, a dam with full reservoir level (FRL) of 152 ft using then available technology of ‘surkhi lime’ mortar was constructed at the leased site by Tamil Nadu in 1895 to facilitate diversion of the Periyar waters. Subsequently, a supplement to the principal agreement was signed in May 1970 by both parties to enable the use of the waters for power generation by TN. At present about 2.5 lakh acres of land in the rain shadow areas in TN are under irrigation using the diverted water, and people from both states are reaping the benefits of this century-old interbasin water transfer.
In 1979, the dam showed signs of distress necessitating urgent repairs. Consequently the water level was brought down to 136 ft. After the requisite repairs were completed, TN wanted the water level to be raised to 152 ft, which Kerala did not agree to, on grounds of safety. Consequently the matter was taken right up to the Supreme Court, which permitted the level to be raised as sought by TN. Meanwhile, taking into account the safety of all existing dams in the state, Kerala enacted a law putting a cap on water levels in such dams. For Mullaperiyar dam, the limit prescribed was 136 ft.
Hydropolitics now took control of the situation, as tension between the two states got escalated. The despicable actions of opportunistic politicians ultimately succeeded in dividing the peace-loving dwellers of the region. Aggrieved by Kerala’s action, TN approached SC again — seeking its direction to raise the level. The apex court directed the Government of India and both states to discuss and sort out the issues. Accordingly a meeting at the chief ministerial level and thereafter one at the level of the water resources ministers were held by the Union water resources minister. The outcome indicates that both parties are hopeful of finding a suitable solution.
In these meetings, while sparing the water to TN was never an issue, Kerala insisted on a new dam being constructed in lieu of the old one which, it argued, would endanger the lives of more than three million people downstream. TN wanted, instead, the water level to be raised. It quoted the judgment of the apex court and the report of the Experts on Dam Safety. However, in the meetings, the core issue of a possible dam failure does not appear to have been given due weightage.
The fact that the dam is more than a century old and has shown signs of distress. Both states would be the losers if a calamity strikes. Though the expert committee has certified the safety of the dam on the basis of available data, with further data becoming available due to more instrumentation to study seismic effects, the safety aspect may need a review. No expert can vouch for the safety of this dam even for a few decades, leave alone 999 years.
Considering the issues involved, it would be in the interest of both Tamil Nadu and Kerala to construct a new dam using the latest technology to ensure water for Tamil Nadu’s farmers and safety to people in Kerala. The new dam could be a multi-purpose one with provision for dam site power generation apart from ensuring irrigation water transfer. The cost of the project could be shared by the two states, and the Centre could also do its bit.
Both the states would eventually benefit from such an option as it provides a win-win situation to both. Till the new dam becomes a reality, the existing dam would have to be used for diverting water. The performance of the dam would have to be monitored more rigorously by a dedicated joint team of experts, nominated by the states.
The proposal for a new dam was put forth by TN and Kerala in 1979 itself, but unfortunately it was not followed up, although suitable sites had also been identified in that proposal. Now that the dam has survived another three decades, should the concerned authorities wait for a disaster to occur or wake up now?
(The Indian Express,dated 27th December, 2006)
....
The century-old Mullaperiyar Project is a grand example of inter-basin water transfer helping to green vast tracts of otherwise arid land in southern Tamil Nadu. The project came into being after the Madras government (now Tamil Nadu) entered into an agreement with Travancore state (now Kerala) in 1886 for the lease of a specified tract at the proposed dam site and the use of waters of the river flowing through the tract for irrigation purposes by diversion.
The period of the agreement being 999 years. Accordingly, a dam with full reservoir level (FRL) of 152 ft using then available technology of ‘surkhi lime’ mortar was constructed at the leased site by Tamil Nadu in 1895 to facilitate diversion of the Periyar waters. Subsequently, a supplement to the principal agreement was signed in May 1970 by both parties to enable the use of the waters for power generation by TN. At present about 2.5 lakh acres of land in the rain shadow areas in TN are under irrigation using the diverted water, and people from both states are reaping the benefits of this century-old interbasin water transfer.
In 1979, the dam showed signs of distress necessitating urgent repairs. Consequently the water level was brought down to 136 ft. After the requisite repairs were completed, TN wanted the water level to be raised to 152 ft, which Kerala did not agree to, on grounds of safety. Consequently the matter was taken right up to the Supreme Court, which permitted the level to be raised as sought by TN. Meanwhile, taking into account the safety of all existing dams in the state, Kerala enacted a law putting a cap on water levels in such dams. For Mullaperiyar dam, the limit prescribed was 136 ft.
Hydropolitics now took control of the situation, as tension between the two states got escalated. The despicable actions of opportunistic politicians ultimately succeeded in dividing the peace-loving dwellers of the region. Aggrieved by Kerala’s action, TN approached SC again — seeking its direction to raise the level. The apex court directed the Government of India and both states to discuss and sort out the issues. Accordingly a meeting at the chief ministerial level and thereafter one at the level of the water resources ministers were held by the Union water resources minister. The outcome indicates that both parties are hopeful of finding a suitable solution.
In these meetings, while sparing the water to TN was never an issue, Kerala insisted on a new dam being constructed in lieu of the old one which, it argued, would endanger the lives of more than three million people downstream. TN wanted, instead, the water level to be raised. It quoted the judgment of the apex court and the report of the Experts on Dam Safety. However, in the meetings, the core issue of a possible dam failure does not appear to have been given due weightage.
The fact that the dam is more than a century old and has shown signs of distress. Both states would be the losers if a calamity strikes. Though the expert committee has certified the safety of the dam on the basis of available data, with further data becoming available due to more instrumentation to study seismic effects, the safety aspect may need a review. No expert can vouch for the safety of this dam even for a few decades, leave alone 999 years.
Considering the issues involved, it would be in the interest of both Tamil Nadu and Kerala to construct a new dam using the latest technology to ensure water for Tamil Nadu’s farmers and safety to people in Kerala. The new dam could be a multi-purpose one with provision for dam site power generation apart from ensuring irrigation water transfer. The cost of the project could be shared by the two states, and the Centre could also do its bit.
Both the states would eventually benefit from such an option as it provides a win-win situation to both. Till the new dam becomes a reality, the existing dam would have to be used for diverting water. The performance of the dam would have to be monitored more rigorously by a dedicated joint team of experts, nominated by the states.
The proposal for a new dam was put forth by TN and Kerala in 1979 itself, but unfortunately it was not followed up, although suitable sites had also been identified in that proposal. Now that the dam has survived another three decades, should the concerned authorities wait for a disaster to occur or wake up now?
(The Indian Express,dated 27th December, 2006)
....
Chinese Barrage
Concerns over Chinese barrage on Sutlej
The harnessing of Tibetan rivers influences drought/flood conditions in our border States
THE NEWS from across the Tibetan border about the Chinese building a barrage on the Sutlej river portends strategic concerns to the country's border areas. According to media reports, the Chinese have been constructing, for the past few years, a diversion structure across the Zada Gorge in the river (locally known as Lang Chen Khambab) located in the western part of Tibet and satellite imageries indicate the work as complete.
So far, China does not appear to have taken India into confidence about this project which has the potential of controlling Sutlej flows into India.
At present, except for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for sharing the hydrological information of the Tibetan rivers concerned during flood season, there are no subsisting agreements between India and China on water related issues even though Indian rivers such as the Brahmaputra, Indus, Sutlej, Kosi, etc., originate from Tibet.
As of now, Indian authorities do not appear to be much concerned about the possible upstream uses in Tibet to cause reduction in Himalayan river flows on the presumption that such utilisation will be minimal due to the terrain conditions and sparse population there. But if the Chinese plan is to divert the waters during lean periods in winter and release large flood flows during the glacier melting periods in summer, India has to be bothered about it as experienced in the recent past.
Flash floods
The flash floods which occurred in August 2000 when water levels in the Sutlej rose by about 30 m. in a short span of time at the Nathpa Jhakri Project (NJP) in Himachal Pradesh have raised many intriguing issues. The river discharge increased from 1,480 cumecs to 5,100 cumecs in two hours, leaving behind a trail of destruction in Himachal Pradesh. Luckily the Bhakra Reservoir downstream could absorb the floods thereby containing the devastation in the lower reaches in Punjab. Earlier, it was also seen that there was reduced inflow in the summer months into the Bhakra reservoir, an unusual feature during the snow-melting season.
The floods could have been caused due to heavy rainfall in Tibet, or breaches in lakes upstream or due to collapse of constructed structures or failure of temporary obstructions across the river channel upstream.
Interestingly, rainfall in the area is a rare event as most of the precipitation in the upper Sutlej is in the form of snowfall. Hence the flood could not have been caused by rainfall. The pre and post flood event satellite data did not show any noticeable change in the water spread in the connecting channel of the upper lakes (the Mansarovar and Rakas Tal) and hence breaches of the lakes contributing to these floods could also be ruled out. Hence it has to be concluded that the floods were triggered by the failure of a blockage across the river channel caused either due to construction activities or landslips. The reduced inflow into the Bhakra in the previous months, the sudden rise and fall in water levels during August, all these strongly point to the failure of a dam on the river. Since Sino-Indian relationship was at a low ebb during this period, field verification could not be done to confirm the findings.
Flash floods in the Sutlej in 2005, reportedly due to landslips in Tibet necessitated evacuation of people and even shutting down of the NJP power generation activities resulting in heavy losses.
The above instances highlight the need for India to be concerned about the Chinese activities in harnessing the rivers in the Tibetan region which influence the drought/flood conditions occurring in the border States. Interestingly, prior to 2000, floods of such intensity were not reported from the upper reaches of the Sutlej river whereas thereafter such floods have become frequent probably due to construction activities in this reach.
In view of the increased interest China is showing to divert flows of some of the Himalayan rivers such as the Sutlej and the possible repercussions there of, India has to take steps to minimise the impacts such as reduction of flows caused by upstream diversions or flash floods resulting from breaches, sudden gate openings or even dam failures. Hence construction of a storage project near the border is a necessity to avoid pressing the panic button as and when China informs of the situation or even otherwise.
(The Hindu, dated 30th July, 2006)
________________________________________________________________________________
The harnessing of Tibetan rivers influences drought/flood conditions in our border States
THE NEWS from across the Tibetan border about the Chinese building a barrage on the Sutlej river portends strategic concerns to the country's border areas. According to media reports, the Chinese have been constructing, for the past few years, a diversion structure across the Zada Gorge in the river (locally known as Lang Chen Khambab) located in the western part of Tibet and satellite imageries indicate the work as complete.
So far, China does not appear to have taken India into confidence about this project which has the potential of controlling Sutlej flows into India.
At present, except for a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for sharing the hydrological information of the Tibetan rivers concerned during flood season, there are no subsisting agreements between India and China on water related issues even though Indian rivers such as the Brahmaputra, Indus, Sutlej, Kosi, etc., originate from Tibet.
As of now, Indian authorities do not appear to be much concerned about the possible upstream uses in Tibet to cause reduction in Himalayan river flows on the presumption that such utilisation will be minimal due to the terrain conditions and sparse population there. But if the Chinese plan is to divert the waters during lean periods in winter and release large flood flows during the glacier melting periods in summer, India has to be bothered about it as experienced in the recent past.
Flash floods
The flash floods which occurred in August 2000 when water levels in the Sutlej rose by about 30 m. in a short span of time at the Nathpa Jhakri Project (NJP) in Himachal Pradesh have raised many intriguing issues. The river discharge increased from 1,480 cumecs to 5,100 cumecs in two hours, leaving behind a trail of destruction in Himachal Pradesh. Luckily the Bhakra Reservoir downstream could absorb the floods thereby containing the devastation in the lower reaches in Punjab. Earlier, it was also seen that there was reduced inflow in the summer months into the Bhakra reservoir, an unusual feature during the snow-melting season.
The floods could have been caused due to heavy rainfall in Tibet, or breaches in lakes upstream or due to collapse of constructed structures or failure of temporary obstructions across the river channel upstream.
Interestingly, rainfall in the area is a rare event as most of the precipitation in the upper Sutlej is in the form of snowfall. Hence the flood could not have been caused by rainfall. The pre and post flood event satellite data did not show any noticeable change in the water spread in the connecting channel of the upper lakes (the Mansarovar and Rakas Tal) and hence breaches of the lakes contributing to these floods could also be ruled out. Hence it has to be concluded that the floods were triggered by the failure of a blockage across the river channel caused either due to construction activities or landslips. The reduced inflow into the Bhakra in the previous months, the sudden rise and fall in water levels during August, all these strongly point to the failure of a dam on the river. Since Sino-Indian relationship was at a low ebb during this period, field verification could not be done to confirm the findings.
Flash floods in the Sutlej in 2005, reportedly due to landslips in Tibet necessitated evacuation of people and even shutting down of the NJP power generation activities resulting in heavy losses.
The above instances highlight the need for India to be concerned about the Chinese activities in harnessing the rivers in the Tibetan region which influence the drought/flood conditions occurring in the border States. Interestingly, prior to 2000, floods of such intensity were not reported from the upper reaches of the Sutlej river whereas thereafter such floods have become frequent probably due to construction activities in this reach.
In view of the increased interest China is showing to divert flows of some of the Himalayan rivers such as the Sutlej and the possible repercussions there of, India has to take steps to minimise the impacts such as reduction of flows caused by upstream diversions or flash floods resulting from breaches, sudden gate openings or even dam failures. Hence construction of a storage project near the border is a necessity to avoid pressing the panic button as and when China informs of the situation or even otherwise.
(The Hindu, dated 30th July, 2006)
________________________________________________________________________________
Indus water dispute
Watering down Pak tantrums
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan (1960) for sharing the Indus waters is much advertised as a model for sharing the waters of international rivers, for having survived two wars between the two countries, thanks to its claimed resilience. But the inequitable distribution of allocating only 20% of Indus waters to India and the rest to Pakistan in spite of India having about 50% of the catchment area contributing to the flows (thus favouring Pakistan), the operational provisions leaving room for misinterpretation and such other deficiencies observed over the past four decades, have sabotaged the very objective of the treaty — that of optimum utilisation and development of the water resources of the basin.
The treaty has perpetuated the dispute between the two countries on the Indus waters to suit the interests of many international groups. Raising the bogey of IWT violations, Pakistan has succeeded in stalling or delaying Indian projects, about 30 in all, with the result that out of 8769 MW of estimated hydro-potential from that part of the basin flows which India could utilise, only about 1500 MW could be tapped by India so far.
The ongoing 450 MW Baglihar Project across the Chenab in J&K, which has been dragged to the World Bank for arbitration, is a case in point as to how the treaty provisions could be misinterpreted to suit our neighbour’s arguments.
According to provisions in IWT , apart from the use of the allotted Eastern Rivers (The Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), India has also the right to the use of the waters of the Western Rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) allocated to Pakistan for hydropower generation subject to certain conditions including the storage and release of water downstream.
The Baglihar project, across the Chenab, about 120 km from border, is located upstream of the existing Salal Project and is one such project being executed by India conforming to these provisions. However, in spite of furnishing all data about the project features and discussing in several meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) and secretary level meetings, Pakistan said the design of the plant did not conform to the criteria laid down in IWT.
India for its part has been clarifying the treaty has not imposed any ban on the height of the dam; it provides for pondage adequate to meet the power load variations and to take due account of the requirement of secondary power other than firm power; there is no restriction on the freeboard though there is limit to the storage to be retained; any flooding action would first affect Indian areas and also the India’s Salal project before affecting Pakistan, and fear on that account is unfounded; provision of sluice spillways is a technology driven need for any dam; and the heavy silt flows in the river reaching Pakistan would be reduced under ‘with a dam’ condition rather than ‘without’.
Ignoring the clarifications, Pakistan unilaterally took up the matter with the World Bank, charging India with the flouting of IWT and seeking the appointment of a Neutral Expert (NE) to examine the issues. It never tried to substantiate its objections before approaching the Bank. However, its real intentions got exposed when during the meeting between the two countries it stated its willingness to resolve the differences bilaterally, provided India stopped all construction activities at the site. (India already had the experience of a similar Pakistani offer in the Tulbul project.)
Eighteen years and numerous meetings later, Pakistan is still to agree to the project proposals, thereby stalling the benefits to the people of J&K. Hence India informed the World Bank that Pakistan’s recourse was premature and the Bank should not appoint the NE at this stage. However, ignoring India’s contentions, the expert (NE) was appointed by the Bank. Both countries have submitted their views in writing to the NE and have made oral presentations at the hearings in London in May. One more chance to present the case will be given in the meeting scheduled in Paris in October and the verdict is expected in November this year. Till then should we keep quiet?
Past events have shown that India has to be cautious about Pakistan’s intentions; it would resort to manipulation yet again. Since the treaty is already biased in Pakistan’s favour and leaves room for misinterpretation, it is time India pre-empted Pakistan’s moves by insisting on review of the treaty.
Such a review would enable enhanced Indus water availability to various Indian states, thus correcting the wrongs already inflicted on India. We have to remain prepared to face Pakistan’s tantrums. Today Baglihar has been dragged for World Bank arbitration. Next it would be the Kishenganga project. The existing treaty would be cleverly used by Pakistan to question and stall every Indian project on Western Rivers to sabotage developments in J&K. The warning shots have already been fired by our neighbour and it is now our turn to strike.
...
(The Indian Express, dated 8th June, 2006)
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan (1960) for sharing the Indus waters is much advertised as a model for sharing the waters of international rivers, for having survived two wars between the two countries, thanks to its claimed resilience. But the inequitable distribution of allocating only 20% of Indus waters to India and the rest to Pakistan in spite of India having about 50% of the catchment area contributing to the flows (thus favouring Pakistan), the operational provisions leaving room for misinterpretation and such other deficiencies observed over the past four decades, have sabotaged the very objective of the treaty — that of optimum utilisation and development of the water resources of the basin.
The treaty has perpetuated the dispute between the two countries on the Indus waters to suit the interests of many international groups. Raising the bogey of IWT violations, Pakistan has succeeded in stalling or delaying Indian projects, about 30 in all, with the result that out of 8769 MW of estimated hydro-potential from that part of the basin flows which India could utilise, only about 1500 MW could be tapped by India so far.
The ongoing 450 MW Baglihar Project across the Chenab in J&K, which has been dragged to the World Bank for arbitration, is a case in point as to how the treaty provisions could be misinterpreted to suit our neighbour’s arguments.
According to provisions in IWT , apart from the use of the allotted Eastern Rivers (The Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), India has also the right to the use of the waters of the Western Rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) allocated to Pakistan for hydropower generation subject to certain conditions including the storage and release of water downstream.
The Baglihar project, across the Chenab, about 120 km from border, is located upstream of the existing Salal Project and is one such project being executed by India conforming to these provisions. However, in spite of furnishing all data about the project features and discussing in several meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) and secretary level meetings, Pakistan said the design of the plant did not conform to the criteria laid down in IWT.
India for its part has been clarifying the treaty has not imposed any ban on the height of the dam; it provides for pondage adequate to meet the power load variations and to take due account of the requirement of secondary power other than firm power; there is no restriction on the freeboard though there is limit to the storage to be retained; any flooding action would first affect Indian areas and also the India’s Salal project before affecting Pakistan, and fear on that account is unfounded; provision of sluice spillways is a technology driven need for any dam; and the heavy silt flows in the river reaching Pakistan would be reduced under ‘with a dam’ condition rather than ‘without’.
Ignoring the clarifications, Pakistan unilaterally took up the matter with the World Bank, charging India with the flouting of IWT and seeking the appointment of a Neutral Expert (NE) to examine the issues. It never tried to substantiate its objections before approaching the Bank. However, its real intentions got exposed when during the meeting between the two countries it stated its willingness to resolve the differences bilaterally, provided India stopped all construction activities at the site. (India already had the experience of a similar Pakistani offer in the Tulbul project.)
Eighteen years and numerous meetings later, Pakistan is still to agree to the project proposals, thereby stalling the benefits to the people of J&K. Hence India informed the World Bank that Pakistan’s recourse was premature and the Bank should not appoint the NE at this stage. However, ignoring India’s contentions, the expert (NE) was appointed by the Bank. Both countries have submitted their views in writing to the NE and have made oral presentations at the hearings in London in May. One more chance to present the case will be given in the meeting scheduled in Paris in October and the verdict is expected in November this year. Till then should we keep quiet?
Past events have shown that India has to be cautious about Pakistan’s intentions; it would resort to manipulation yet again. Since the treaty is already biased in Pakistan’s favour and leaves room for misinterpretation, it is time India pre-empted Pakistan’s moves by insisting on review of the treaty.
Such a review would enable enhanced Indus water availability to various Indian states, thus correcting the wrongs already inflicted on India. We have to remain prepared to face Pakistan’s tantrums. Today Baglihar has been dragged for World Bank arbitration. Next it would be the Kishenganga project. The existing treaty would be cleverly used by Pakistan to question and stall every Indian project on Western Rivers to sabotage developments in J&K. The warning shots have already been fired by our neighbour and it is now our turn to strike.
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(The Indian Express, dated 8th June, 2006)
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