Teesta and IRL project

                                                                                                                                                                                

The  Pioneer

TEESTA AND INTER-LINKING RIVERS

Wednesday, 12 August 2015

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 MS Menon | in Oped

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To facilitate an early Teesta accord, it is necessary to expedite and complete the Manas-Sankosh-Teesta-Ganga canal project, which can augment flows in the Teesta during the lean season. The Union Government has to act fast

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Bangladesh scripted a new chapter in India-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi and Dhaka should now move forward and find a solution to the most vexatious issue — the Teesta river issue, which has been under discussion since a long time.

It is unfortunate that this issue is stuck in the whirlpool of India’s internal hydro-politics. It has also raised some lingering doubts in our neighbourhood about our seriousness on the issue. Consensus building with West Bengal in this regard has been a complex and arduous task, thereby resulting in our failure to make any breakthrough in the proposed sharing agreement.

The Teesta river originates in Sikkim, flows past Jalpaiguri in West Bengal and then joins the Brahmaputra river in Bangladesh. It has a drainage area of 12,729 sq km, of which 83 per cent is situated in the Indian territory.

Presently, the river valley projects implemented in Sikkim are all hydro-projects that have no impact on the river flow. But the Gajoldoba barrage in West Bengal, situated about 90 km upstream of the international border with Bangladesh, envisages irrigation, water supply and also power generation.

Similarly, the Dalia barrage in Bangladesh, constructed 15 km downstream of the border, envisages irrigation and other benefits. During the non-monsoon period, between November to April, both experience shortage of water for irrigation.

Teesta is one of the 54 rivers that flow through the India-Bangladesh border. Of these, nine, including the Ganga and the Teesta river, are important, on which water-sharing issues between the two countries had cropped up. In 1996, the Ganga water-sharing agreement was signed, but discussions on others are still going on.

Since 1972, Bangladesh had been insisting on a 50 per cent share of Teesta waters to meet its requirements. However, after prolonged discussions, in 1983, an ‘understanding on an ad hoc sharing’ of Teesta river flows in lean season was reached between the two countries so as to help our neighbour get financial assistance for the construction of the Dalia barrage.

According to this ‘understanding’, of the dry season river flows, Bangladesh got 36 per cent of the share and India got 39 per cent while the remaining 25 per cent remained unallocated, pending further discussions.

Many factors have been considered by Delhi to arrive at a workable solution to the water-sharing issue. It was felt that since there is a likely regeneration of 25 per cent flows between the Indian and Bangladesh barrages across the Teesta, the additional 25 per cent sought by our neighbour during the lean season can be released by West Bengal.

However, the State Government was not willing to  release water from its barrage as it apprehended that a major project envisaging irrigation of 9.22 lakh hectare and power generation of 67.5 mw could be affected if this water is spared to Bangladesh.

West Bengal has its own reasons for not making any commitment to release water from its barrage. The main reason is the uncertainty of requisite quantum of river flows during the summer months. Hence, to make the Teesta water-sharing a reality, the only available alternative is to augment the river flows during the non-monsoon months.

In this connection, the Indian river-linking project offers an excellent opportunity to improve the Teesta river flows.

The Manas-Sankosh-Teesta-Ganga link canal is one of the major proposals under the Himalayan component of the IRL project. It envisages diversion of the surplus waters from the rivers like Manas and Sankosh (tributaries of the Brahmaputra river), to Ganga and beyond upto Mahanadi and thereafter towards south to meet the requirement of water short areas.

By incorporating the necessary provisions in the canal structures, it is possible to release from the MSTG canal, the requisite waters into the Teesta at a point upstream of the Gajoldoba barrage during the lean season to augment the river flows.

In such a situation, West Bengal will be able to release the needed flows downstream to fulfil the water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has been raising objections against India’s IRL project, pointing out that the project will affect the water availability downstream in their rivers. Since, in addition to Teesta, the MSTG link canal can also augment the river flows in the Ganga in a similar way, it is possible to convince our neighbour that the Teesta project, when implemented, can be a win-win situation for both the countries.

In view of these facts, to facilitate an early Teesta accord, it is necessary to expedite and complete the MSTG canal project which can augment flows in the Teesta during the lean season. The Government of India has to act fast in this regard. 

(The writer is a former Member Secretary, Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, Central Water Commission)

Brahmaputhra - A Fatal Understanding

FRIDAY, 23 OCTOBER 20150:40:37

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AN ‘UNDERSTANDING’ THAT CAN PROVE FATAL

Friday, 23 October 2015

 MS Menon

New Delhi has reasons to be worried by the fast pace with which China is building dams along rivers that impact India

Faced with an acute shortage of water and energy resources to meet the needs of a burgeoning population, China has turned to exploit the Tibetan rivers and is now in a damming spree in the Brahmaputra river (Yarlung Tsangpo) to fulfil its increasing needs. Hence after constructing the two inter-linking canals, the eastern and the central routes, to transfer water from the water endowed south to the arid northern areas in 2014, it has operationalised  recently the Zangmu project, the largest hydropower facility located in the middle reaches of the river, raising concerns for India.

This project is to be followed by five more dams upstream for power generation. The Shuomatan project, the Great Bend project near Indian border, is also being planned by the Chinese to divert the Brahmaputra waters to its north areas through the third link canal, the western route.

Though our neighbour has been insisting time and again that their projects being run-of-the river schemes would not affect downstream flows, the deep reservoirs built with sufficiently large storage capacities at such projects and the highly snow melt yield at the sites could be diverted by the Chinese  through tunnel intakes to create artificial water scarcity downstream. Further, simultaneous opening of the project gates could result in man-made floods downstream. However, China has assured that it would be providing more river flow data as per the ‘Understanding’ signed in 2013 and that India need not be unduly perturbed over Chinese projects in Yarlung Tsangpo.

A perusal of the existing ‘Understanding’ would reveal that it deals only with regard to exchange of flow data between the countries, and hence, it is not a guarantee to allay our fears of floods and  water scarcity in Brahmaputra, arising particularly during conflicts.

For taking care of such situations, we have to have a high dam with a storage capacity adequate to absorb the floods from upstream and also to contain high water level fluctuations in the river due to indiscriminate operation of upstream Chinese reservoirs, as presently there are no such structures downstream in the river. Therefore, such a project is strategically important for India.

Looking at the experience of the Mekong river basin countries with China, we should not remain complacent with the ‘Understanding’ and the assurances offered by

our neighbour. We need to put the country’s strategies in place well in time,  so that our national interests are insured against  future developments. This is all the more necessary since projects like the High Dam take years to be implemented to address the concerns arising out of the Chinese projects.

However, our relevant ministry is yet to start work. Leave alone construction, even preliminary works for taking up this strategically important project are still to be initiated by the authorities. In fact, succumbing to the diktats of environmental activists and groups, authorities have put a complete ban on the design and approval of new water resource development projects, till the committee set up by the Government some time back submits its report on environmental flows (e-flows) required for all the rivers in the country. Hence, all such projects, including the Brahmaputra High Dam, the river-linking project, the India-Nepal Pancheshwar project etc, irrespective of whether they are strategically important or not, will have to wait till the committee’s report on e-flow is finalised!

Unfortunately, even after conceiving this project more than a decade ago in the aftermath of floods resulting from the failure of a Chinese dam in 2000, our authorities continue to be lackadaisical in their approach regarding the construction of the project. This is sure to cost heavily to the country since, for want of a storage dam we would have to depend on China for the release of waters during the dry season and for protection from floods during the wet season.

Added to this situation is the likely security threats arising from the Tibetan liquid bombs during periods of conflicts with our neighbour. We cannot ignore history.

(The writer is a former Member Secretary, Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, Central Water Commission)

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Make the IRL Project

Indian Express

Make The Link

Inter-linking of rivers holds the key to addressing water scarcity.

Written by M.S. Menon
Published:Apr 27, 2016

Dilapidated Satluj Yamuna Link Canal at Ropar. (Source: Express photograph by Swadesh Talwar)

Climate change, coupled with the El Nino weather event, has resulted in an unusually harsh summer with many parts of the country reeling under heat wave conditions. Vast tracts of Maharashtra, Telangana and Bundelkhand (UP) are facing drought. Many of the minor water tanks have dried up and storage in the 91 nationally monitored reservoirs has gone down from 158 billion cubic metres (BCM) to about 36 BCM.

Water scarcity is so acute in places like Latur, which is facing a second successive drought, that trains have been deployed to carry water from the Krishna river to that district to provide drinking water. Apprehending that people could riot over water, Maharashtra has even issued prohibitory orders in some villages.

The extremely hot weather has led to a rise in the demand for water. It has revived disputes between water-endowed states and their neighbouring deficit ones. The Punjab assembly even passed a resolution invalidating earlier agreements regarding the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal, stating that it has no water to spare. The matter is now in the Supreme Court.

Water has become a political issue for want of proper development and management of the resource. While millions suffer from droughts and floods, waters in the country’s many rivers flow unutilised, and are discharged into the sea every year.

The authorities have attributed the present water crisis to climate change. This is a cover-up for their past failures in taking steps for storing and equitably distributing water. Though the signs of distress were evident for long, the authorities did not take necessary action to pre-empt the situation.

Many opportunities to harness the highly skewed, seasonal and spatial distribution of monsoon flows, which occur in a four-month period from June to September annually, have been lost. Since these few months account for most of the rainfall and consequent fresh water availability, the need for holding rain water in reservoirs, for subsequently releasing it for use over the year, is a necessity nobody can afford to overlook. However, petty hydro-politics clouding long-term vision and opposition from self-appointed environmentalists and activists have led to adhocism in policies thereby creating the present water crisis.

Weather experts have predicted a good monsoon this year. But we are not prepared for that. As of now, only a little more than 10 per cent of the annually available monsoon flows can be stored. People will  have to face the ravages of climate change unless authorities take immediate steps  to arrest the deteriorating conditions in  the development and management of  water resources.

As climate change will continue to affect weather conditions and create water shortages and excesses, the solution lies in expediting the Indian River Linking (IRL) project that was proposed three decades ago. The proposals envisaged linking the rivers to enable inter-basin water transfer from surplus to deficit basins, so as to even out the variations of water availability and for optimum utilisation of the resource. However, in spite of many expert committees recommending the project and a taskforce preparing a timeframe for its execution, not a single link has been constructed so far due to opposition from water-endowed states. Since water has become an emotive issue, none of the water-rich states would like to accept that they have surplus water to spare. By offering to compensate the economic cost of the water surplused, these states could be persuaded to share the  surplus. This would pave the way for early implementation of the project.

The IRL project is a great challenge and an opportunity to address the water issues arising out of climate change. The transfer of water by trains is an immediate solution — the first water train was deployed in the 1980s to feed the parched city of Rajkot (Saurashtra). However, with the canals from the Sardar Sarovar dam bringing the Narmada waters there, Rajkot did not have to look for a water train this season.

The long-term solution to water  scarcity lies in making the IRL project  work by building a network of dams  and canals across the length and breadth  of the country.

The writer is former member-secretary, INCID, Ministry of Water Resources

IRL-Solution to water crisis

Tuesday, 19 April 2016 | 04:08:23

» Columnists »Oped

Long-term solution to the water crisis

Tuesday, 19 April 2016

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 MS Menon | in Oped

Transfer of water by train is only a short-term solution to the water crisis. The long-term solution lies in a network of rivers and canals across the country

Many States in this country are reeling under an acute drinking water shortage and facing drought-like situations. Large parts Maharashtra, Telangana and Karnataka are currently in the throes of a severe water crisis. The impact of a harsh summer is already rippling across the land, with failed hydroelectric plants affecting industrial production, and agricultural activities threatened for want of irrigation water. Water trains have been pressed into service to carry thousands of litres of water from the Krishna river to the parched district of Latur to quench the thirst of millions over there.

According to the Ministry of Water Resources, presently, water levels are significantly lower than their 10-year average in the nationally-monitored 91 water reservoirs. Experts are of the view that climate change, coupled with El Nino, a weather phenomenon caused by higher sea temperatures, is the main cause for extremely hot summer seasons and the resultant water scarcity in the country.

With increasing demands of water, conflicts are arising between States and communities are claiming their rightful share of water. Water-endowed States often cite the ‘Harmon Doctrine', asserting absolute sovereignty over water flowing through their territories, and have even passed Assembly resolutions, invalidating earlier agreements signed with their neighbouring States. This has recently happened in Punjab regarding the Sutlej-Yamuna link canal. Maharashtra, apprehensive about water disputes turning into law and order problems, has imposed prohibitory orders in some villages in Latur.

This crisis is the culmination of years of water mismanagement on the mistaken belief that India is a water-rich country. It is the result of missed and missing opportunities in harnessing the highly skewed seasonal and spatial distribution of monsoon flows which occurs over a four-month period. It is also a consequence of petty hydro-politics clouding long term vision, thereby, necessitating ad hoc solutions.

More than 90 per cent of the annual flows in peninsular rivers and 80 per cent of such flows in the Himalayan rivers occur during the monsoon months from June to September. Since these few months account for most of the rainfall and consequent water availability, the capacity to hold water in reservoirs and spread out its release over the year can mean the difference between managing devastating floods and droughts and routinely falling prey to them.

This year, a good monsoon is expected soon after the harsh summer. However, we are not prepared to address even heavy monsoon flood situations, since we do not have large dams across major rivers like the Brahmaputra to absorb and regulate the floods.

From past experience within the country and abroad, water professionals have been insisting on river linking projects to enable inter-basin water transfers, from surplus to deficit basins, to even out the variations of water availability and allow for optimal utilisation. Convinced of the proposal, even though the Union Government had set up a National Water Development Agency to study and implement a river linking project more than three decades ago but the latter has not made much progress due to stiff opposition from some State Governments and self-appointed environmental activists .

It is high time that the river-linking project be taken up on a war footing instead of permitting it to crawl and slip into the shadows of history. Transfer of water by train, is a short-term solution but the long-term solution lies in having a network of rivers and canals in the country to address the impact of climate change and provide succour to the millions who suffer from the ravages of floods and droughts stalking the country every year.

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Mullaperiyar -Many lives

The Pioneer

Two States, one dam, many lives

Tuesday, 22 December 2015

 M.S.Menon

The Centre needs to intervene in the Mullaperiyar dam issue. It should authorise construction of a new dam and set up a control board, jointly manned by Tamil Nadu and Kerala. This will allay fears of both States

The recent incessant rains and resulting floods in Tamil Nadu had its repercussions on  the Mullaperiyar reservoir, threatening the safety of the century old dam there. As Tamil Nadu could not divert the alarmingly increasing water flows into the reservoir, due to the limited capacity of its conveyance system, the wait-and-watch attitude of the authorities led to the rise in water levels in the reservoir, threatening the dam structure and causing many sleepless nights for the inhabitants downstream.

Though Kerala has been insisting for a regulated release of the flood waters from the dam, Tamil Nadu has ignored all such demands — even that of the high powered committee set up by the Supreme Court to monitor the water levels. Subsequently, aghast by the continued rains in the catchment and the inflows alarmingly raising  the reservoir levels, the authorities had a knee-jerk reaction: They opened some of the shutters of the dam in the midnight, to release the floodwaters, thereby, causing havoc and untold sufferings to the residents in the valley.

The failure of these authorities in proper operation and management of reservoirs is also evident in Chennai city, where, as a panic reaction, floodwaters from the reservoirs were released into already swelling downstream channels, enhancing the existing flood situation there.

The incident has made it necessary for Kerala to push its earlier proposal of a new dam, since it has been proven that Tamil Nadu is not be able to handle such crisis situations when reservoir inflows increase alarmingly due to unpredicted rainfall events, thereby, threatening the safety of the dam structure.

Though the dam has been certified as safe by experts, being an old structure, constructed using obsolete technology, the possibility of failure and consequent turmoil in the event of unexpected floods occurring due to climate changes cannot be ruled out, as experiences in Kashmir and Uttarakhand have shown.

Kerala’s insistence on a new dam is justified under the Precautionary Principle of the 1984 Bermen Ministerial Declaration which warrants risk prevention through proactive measures against specific environment or safety risk. Since the parameters considered for the safety study of the dam have been upset by the recent occurrence of rains in the catchment, which surpassed all predictions by experts, the Precautionary  Principle  has to be given due weightage in the present suggestion for a new structure.

Similarly, old Anicuts constructed across the Godavari, Mahanadi and Krishna rivers, though considered safe, were replaced in the recent past by new structures for the safety of the people living  downstream. At the same time, the new structures also ensure uninterrupted irrigation supply.

Time and again, Kerala has assured Tamil Nadu that the waters of the Mullaperiyar, as agreed to in the 1893 Treaty, will be made fully available from the new dam for use by that State. But it appears, Tamil Nadu is still apprehensive of such assurances and, hence, is opposing the construction of a new dam.

In the meanwhile, to cover  up its failure in handling the crisis situation which arose due to the unexpected flood  flows into the reservoir, Tamil Nadu has approached the Centre seeking that Central forces be posted at the dam complex, in place of Kerala Police, who are presently securing the area. Such a change, if agreed to by the Centre, will tantamount to amending some of the Treaty provisions.

Next, Tamil Nadu may seek the Centre’s intervention in transferring the entire area to itself, citing similar reasons, so as to indirectly modify the clauses in the Treaty, instead of approaching Kerala for reviewing the Treaty provisions. This is going to escalate the dispute.

The Centre has all along taken the stand that the present dispute has to be settled by mutual discussions by the parties concerned. However, since the dispute is also a question of life and death for the people in the valley if something untoward happens to the dam structure due to changing climatic events, it has to intervene immediately in the issue.

Taking into consideration  the risks involved, the Centre should agree to construct a new dam, keeping the Precautionary Principle in view. For the operation and maintenance of the new dam, the Centre should constitute a control board with members from the two States that will be chaired by the Centre. This body may be similar to the Tungabhadra Control Board.

Such an arrangement will allay the fears of Tamil Nadu regarding the availability of water and the fears of Kerala about the collapse of the old dam. This is a win-win situation for both.

(The writer is a former Member Secretary, Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage, Central Water Commission)

Relook at Teesta for agreement.

Indian Express

Time To Look At Teesta

Delhi must now prioritise settling the water-sharing issue with Dhaka

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Written by M.S. Menon | Published:August 13, 2015 12:00 am

Having resolved the longstanding issue of enclaves during the prime minister’s recent visit to Bangladesh, New Delhi has to focus now on other bilateral issues, the most contentious one being the sharing of Teesta waters. Though the PM’s visit has significantly contributed to removing some of the mistrust that plagued India-Bangladesh relations, a strong sense of disappointment is evident in the local media about the failure to make a breakthrough on water-sharing.

Sikkim has constructed some hydro-power projects across the Teesta, but these do not cause any impact on the flow downstream. However, there are two irrigation projects on the Teesta, a barrage at Gajoldoba in West Bengal and another at Dalia in Bangladesh, which draw water from the river to meet irrigation needs. The dispute about Teesta waters arose mainly because of the shortage of water during the dry months.

Since 1972, Bangladesh has been insisting that a 50 per cent share of Teesta waters be made available to the lower riparian country to meet its requirements. In July 1983, an “understanding” on an ad hoc sharing of waters was reached to help Bangladesh get financial assistance for constructing the Dalia barrage. According to this, Bangladesh would get a share of 36 per cent of the lean season flows and India 39 per cent, while the remaining 25 per cent would remain unallocated pending further discussion.

India has been examining many parameters for arriving at a workable solution. A possible option considered was that — since the regeneration of flow in the river channel between the Gajoldoba and Dalia barrages is about 25 per cent, which would be available at the downstream barrage — the additional 25 per cent demanded by Bangladesh could be released by West Bengal from the upstream barrage. But the state had its own compulsions for meeting irrigation needs as the summer flows are generally erratic. Hence, West Bengal did not want to commit to releasing water from the upstream barrage, at the cost of its major project envisaging the irrigation of 9.22 lakh hectares in the ultimate stage. Thus, the water-sharing arrangement got embroiled in domestic hydro-politics, stalling further action to find an acceptable solution to the dispute.

It is apparent that to make Teesta water-sharing a reality, there is a need to augment the river flows during the non-monsoon months, without which West Bengal would not allow further discussion on the subject. The deficit in flows can be met by the transfer of water from other water-endowed basins. In this connection, the proposals made in the Indian River Linking (IRL) project could be considered. The Manas-Sankosh-Teesta-Ganga (MSTG) link canal is one of the links proposed under the Himalayan component of the IRL. It envisages diversion of the surplus waters of the Manas and Sankosh rivers to the Teesta, Ganga and beyond, to meet the requirements of water-deficit areas. By making suitable provisions in the link canal, it should be possible to release the required water into the Teesta during the summer to augment river flows, thus meeting the requirements being proposed for water-sharing with Bangladesh.

It would be of interest to note here that while the IRL project was being deliberated on by India, Bangladesh had been raising objections, stating that it would affect water availability downstream. Since India would be augmenting the Teesta flows from the IRL project, to counter Bangladesh’s objection, we could also make provisions in the MSTG canal to augment river flows in the Ganga in a similar way. It would then be possible to convince our neighbour that the project would be a win-win for both countries.

The Centre must, therefore, act fast and expedite the implementation of the proposed MSTG link.

The writer is former member-secretary, INCID, Ministry of Water Resources