Revive the river-linking project
The solution to India’s misery on account of droughts and floods lies in harnessing the water of its national rivers by linking them to each other. This should be done without further delay
The havoc created by the recurring floods and droughts annually in India is indicative of our failure to learn from past mistakes to take corrective actions in managing the abundant water resources we have. The available option of linking the rivers to contain these disasters, the Indian River Linking Project, though recognised three decades back, and a National Plan for interlinking rivers was approved by the Government of India then, not even a single link has been constructed so far. The project is limping from prefeasibility to feasibility studies, from preliminary to detailed investigations, and the stage of construction is nowhere in sight.
The reasons for this state of affairs in the project implementation are not far to seek. The Union Government’s lethargy in taking even the minimum preliminary actions needed in this regard has resulted in the tardy progress.
Presently, the States even within a basin are busy quarrelling with each other on their water rights. There are no basin-wise organisations which could provide a platform for serious discussions among the co-basin States and the Union Government, whenever approached, takes its own time to hold meetings with the disputants to sort out the issues. If there had been a River Basin Organisation in place, the problems could have been settled at the basin level itself.
Such an institution would have been able to bring about consensus among the States regarding all water issues and would have also encouraged them to look beyond water rights to concentrate on water needs for promoting joint ventures in areas like hydropower, flood control, etc, to yield benefits for all.
The National Water Resources Council, chaired by the Prime Minister with the Chief Ministers of the States and Union Territories as members, is the only forum available now to discuss on water issues at the national level. But due to various reasons, the Council’s meetings are rarely held and even at such meetings, decisions are seldom taken.
Though the existing River Board’s Act (1956) has provisions for setting up RBOs, it does not give the requisite authority to the Centre to regulate the inter-State rivers through them .Interestingly, Centre has not empowered itself to set up such organisations with requisite legal backing by amending the Act. Consequently, the disputes are never settled and billions of precious fresh water flows unutilised to the sea every year resulting in the flood-drought syndrome.
The Union Government, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, takes the usual stand that water is a State subject and Central intervention is possible only by amending the Constitution. Though many high-powered bodies had advised the Centre that ‘Entry 56, List 1’ gives ample powers to the Union Government to regulate inter-State rivers, it does not appear to be inclined to take action using such powers, though the rivers contribute more than 80 per cent of the annual water resources.
It is thus evident that water, which is at the centre of all development activities, is not high enough on the political agenda to promote initiatives to generate benefits.
Due to the uneven distribution of water in space and time leading to endemic and sporadic problems, interlinking of the surplus rivers with deficit ones continues to be the available option to contain the recurring miseries. But, apart from Union Government’s inaction in empowering itself to meet the hurdles in implementing the project, one another constraint is the lack of consensus among States regarding the surplus water availability. Water rich States insist that they have no surplus water to spare and they do not want to negotiate away their future water uses.
To disentangle the issues that complicate the process of negotiations and to accelerate the project implementation, immediate action is needed to set up an RBO for each river basin with a broad mandate and authority for developing the concept of catchment hydro-solidarity among the co-basin States. This would provide the requisite platform for discussions relating to water needs, compensating for water spared, etc, so as to bring about the needed consensus among the partners. By fixing a cost for the water, both the donor and the done States would be encouraged to optimally use and save water through efficient use, facilitating a win-win situation for both through the transfer.
Critics with vested interests have objected to the project raising the bogey of environmental impacts while transferring water from a wet to a dry area, conveniently ignoring the facts prevailing in the existing water transfer projects in the country and abroad. Prophets of doom have condemned the project stating that the IRL canal system would prove to be an open sewer criss-crossing the country. They had earlier made similar forecasts on the Golden Quadrilateral Project, warning that the national highways would become networks of conveyor belts spreading noxious emissions!
Self-appointed ‘eco-Taliban’ in their khap panchayats have also decreed — ‘no dams, no river linking projects’. These critics have only one objective as proved time and again: To remain in the lime light for their continued sustenance. Hence their criticism should be ignored.
Many studies carried out in the past by National Water Development Agency and other expert organisations had confirmed the feasibility of the project. Hence let us not waste time again carrying out too much of analysis to paralyse us into inaction. We have to remain vigilant of the vested interests and embedded activists who are interested only to sabotage the project to achieve their set goals.
The Union Government has no option but to use the available constitutional powers and go in a big way to implement the project without further loss of time. The scene has to shift from rhetoric to action to make the IRL project a reality.
(The Pioneer, dt.8th September, 2010)
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Sunday, April 18, 2010
Continuing Indus Water Disputes
Waters of discontent
India should press Pakistan for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, says M.S. Menon
PAKISTAN’S recent attempt to hoist the Indus waters issue in the framework of the proposed composite dialogue process is a shrewd approach to divert public attention from the recurring water scarcity in many parts due to mismanagement of its resources.
A Tribune Special
Waters of discontent
India should press Pakistan for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, says M.S. Menon
PAKISTAN’S recent attempt to hoist the Indus waters issue in the framework of the proposed composite dialogue process is a shrewd approach to divert public attention from the recurring water scarcity in many parts due to mismanagement of its resources. From past experience, Islamabad has learnt that by accusing New Delhi of impeding Indus flows with projects in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions, it could escape criticism for giving preferential treatment to north Punjab by depriving water to some states and for its failure to build and maintain adequate storages to meet shortages.
Though Pakistan is aware that IWT has the mechanism of a Permanent Indus Commission to settle disputes between the two countries, it also knows that raising the issue in a different forum is a politically safe move to thwart Indian attempts to construct projects for infrastructure development in Jammu and Kashmir.
The IWT is hyped internationally as a model for sharing waters of trans-boundary rivers among co-basin states. The treaty is said to be a unique example of successful conflict resolution in international water disputes, particularly its inbuilt resilience to survive two wars. With Pakistan urging India recently to include the issue of water sharing in the agenda for talks to ventilate its unhappiness on the allocation, attempts are again being made to vindicate the fairness of the treaty. According to the fresh line of argument by some analysts, as both India and Pakistan are unhappy about the allocation, questions could be raised over the fair division of waters.
Apparently, the real facts in the treaty are concealed. In reaching conclusions, it has not followed any existing principles of law nor any prevailing theories as such — it is unique in ignoring accepted international practices.
The river basin extends over an area of 11,65,500 sq km with seven major tributaries draining areas of China, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. However, in this treaty aimed at achieving the optimal development and utilisation of the Indus waters, the requirements of China and Afghanistan were ignored. For unexplained reasons, contribution of one tributary, the Kabul river, was combined with the Indus; and to give an impression of apparently equal share distribution, the resultant six tributaries were equally divided between India and Pakistan.
Accordingly, Pakistan got the western rivers (the Indus along with the Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab), and India, the eastern rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej). Consequently, the then assessed irrigable area of 39 million acres in India had to remain satisfied with the available water of 32.8 million acre feet (MAF) while Pakistan’s 26 million acres of irrigable area got a large quantum of 135.6 MAF of water from the Indus under the treaty. The fundamental principles of equitable distribution of the water resources were thus thrown to winds, thereby making a mockery of the model treaty.
Interestingly, while other similar international treaties executed elsewhere had a fixed period of validity, the IWT has no such fixed timeframe and hence is a permanent agreement with no exit option.
India was never happy with the Pakistan-biased conditions in the treaty, but agreed in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations and early settlement of the dispute since the World Bank had brokered the treaty. The disenchantment is growing since the unprincipled method of allocation resulted in India getting only 20 per cent of the Indus waters against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent, causing water scarcity in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan due to constraints imposed by the IWT on water use.
Further, frequent wrangling in the interpretation of the treaty’s clauses affected India’s development plans in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, the construction of the Wular project on the Jhelum to provide cheap water transport had to be stopped due to Pakistan’s objections. The Baglihar hydel project got delayed only due to manipulations by our neighbour. Now it is targeting to delay the Kishan Ganga hydel project by making it a subject of endless debate.
Having raised the bogey of IWT violations, Pakistan has been successful in stalling or delaying about 27 projects planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, of 8769 MW of estimated hydro potential from these rivers, India has been able to tap only 1500 MW so far.
Despite these limitations, India tried its best to make the treaty a success, accommodating Pakistan’s tantrums. The treaty could survive the tempests of history only because of the conciliatory spirit shown by India. However, this is being considered as a weakness, encouraging Pakistan to take up the issue frequently in various forums to malign India.
Now with China having started its dam project in its part of the basin, the river flow patterns downstream are bound to be affected. India should view this seriously in the light of past experience in the Sutlej basin. In August 2000, flash floods left a trail of destruction in Himachal Pradesh. Prior to that, in the summer months, there were reduced river flows into the Bhakra reservoir, an unusual feature during the snow-melting season. The causes were not known then but were presumed to be due to Chinese construction activities in the river upstream. Again, in 2004 and 2005, heavy flows from China caused panic in India and even necessitated the closure of the Naptha Jhakri project for a couple of days.
Of late, Pakistan is blaming India for shortfalls in Indus flows even though they are aware of Chinese structures upstream which affect the flows. The experience of Thailand and other co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to operations of the Chinese dams upstream should also be a lesson to us. The indiscriminate upstream reservoir operations by China affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism projects. The flood flows released from its reservoirs inundated many lands in these states. China never bothered about their protests and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) could not do much on the complaints of these states as China is not a member of the MRC.
Likewise, China is not associated with the IWT. Of the four co-basin states, India and Pakistan are only parties to the treaty. As such, there are no river water agreements between China and these countries except for a joint declaration made in 2006 between India and China to share the hydrological data of such rivers.
The existing international laws on trans-boundary rivers being weak, it is highly essential to have proper water-sharing agreements among the co-basin states to avoid future conflicts in the Indus basin. Hence, a comprehensive review of the IWT is a compelling necessity to address the changing geopolitical situation and emerging international norms for sharing these rivers. India has to press Pakistan for such a review.
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to relevant articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, to which it is also a signatory. Article 31 inter alia states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose. In this case, the stated purpose is to achieve optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters.
If Pakistan still does not accept our request for the review, India has to draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from the treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances. India can exercise this option since this change has now occurred with China entering the scene to exploit Indus waters in its territory.
The increased demand for water from the Indus system is already triggering disputes among the basin states in India while Pakistan is blaming us for its water woes even when its surplus flows are discharging into the sea unused. It is therefore for India to seize this opportunity to call the bluff and insist for the review of the treaty taking into account the changes that have occurred since 1960.
(The Tribune,dated, 4th April, 2010)
India should press Pakistan for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, says M.S. Menon
PAKISTAN’S recent attempt to hoist the Indus waters issue in the framework of the proposed composite dialogue process is a shrewd approach to divert public attention from the recurring water scarcity in many parts due to mismanagement of its resources.
A Tribune Special
Waters of discontent
India should press Pakistan for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, says M.S. Menon
PAKISTAN’S recent attempt to hoist the Indus waters issue in the framework of the proposed composite dialogue process is a shrewd approach to divert public attention from the recurring water scarcity in many parts due to mismanagement of its resources. From past experience, Islamabad has learnt that by accusing New Delhi of impeding Indus flows with projects in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions, it could escape criticism for giving preferential treatment to north Punjab by depriving water to some states and for its failure to build and maintain adequate storages to meet shortages.
Though Pakistan is aware that IWT has the mechanism of a Permanent Indus Commission to settle disputes between the two countries, it also knows that raising the issue in a different forum is a politically safe move to thwart Indian attempts to construct projects for infrastructure development in Jammu and Kashmir.
The IWT is hyped internationally as a model for sharing waters of trans-boundary rivers among co-basin states. The treaty is said to be a unique example of successful conflict resolution in international water disputes, particularly its inbuilt resilience to survive two wars. With Pakistan urging India recently to include the issue of water sharing in the agenda for talks to ventilate its unhappiness on the allocation, attempts are again being made to vindicate the fairness of the treaty. According to the fresh line of argument by some analysts, as both India and Pakistan are unhappy about the allocation, questions could be raised over the fair division of waters.
Apparently, the real facts in the treaty are concealed. In reaching conclusions, it has not followed any existing principles of law nor any prevailing theories as such — it is unique in ignoring accepted international practices.
The river basin extends over an area of 11,65,500 sq km with seven major tributaries draining areas of China, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. However, in this treaty aimed at achieving the optimal development and utilisation of the Indus waters, the requirements of China and Afghanistan were ignored. For unexplained reasons, contribution of one tributary, the Kabul river, was combined with the Indus; and to give an impression of apparently equal share distribution, the resultant six tributaries were equally divided between India and Pakistan.
Accordingly, Pakistan got the western rivers (the Indus along with the Kabul, Jhelum and Chenab), and India, the eastern rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej). Consequently, the then assessed irrigable area of 39 million acres in India had to remain satisfied with the available water of 32.8 million acre feet (MAF) while Pakistan’s 26 million acres of irrigable area got a large quantum of 135.6 MAF of water from the Indus under the treaty. The fundamental principles of equitable distribution of the water resources were thus thrown to winds, thereby making a mockery of the model treaty.
Interestingly, while other similar international treaties executed elsewhere had a fixed period of validity, the IWT has no such fixed timeframe and hence is a permanent agreement with no exit option.
India was never happy with the Pakistan-biased conditions in the treaty, but agreed in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations and early settlement of the dispute since the World Bank had brokered the treaty. The disenchantment is growing since the unprincipled method of allocation resulted in India getting only 20 per cent of the Indus waters against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent, causing water scarcity in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan due to constraints imposed by the IWT on water use.
Further, frequent wrangling in the interpretation of the treaty’s clauses affected India’s development plans in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, the construction of the Wular project on the Jhelum to provide cheap water transport had to be stopped due to Pakistan’s objections. The Baglihar hydel project got delayed only due to manipulations by our neighbour. Now it is targeting to delay the Kishan Ganga hydel project by making it a subject of endless debate.
Having raised the bogey of IWT violations, Pakistan has been successful in stalling or delaying about 27 projects planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, of 8769 MW of estimated hydro potential from these rivers, India has been able to tap only 1500 MW so far.
Despite these limitations, India tried its best to make the treaty a success, accommodating Pakistan’s tantrums. The treaty could survive the tempests of history only because of the conciliatory spirit shown by India. However, this is being considered as a weakness, encouraging Pakistan to take up the issue frequently in various forums to malign India.
Now with China having started its dam project in its part of the basin, the river flow patterns downstream are bound to be affected. India should view this seriously in the light of past experience in the Sutlej basin. In August 2000, flash floods left a trail of destruction in Himachal Pradesh. Prior to that, in the summer months, there were reduced river flows into the Bhakra reservoir, an unusual feature during the snow-melting season. The causes were not known then but were presumed to be due to Chinese construction activities in the river upstream. Again, in 2004 and 2005, heavy flows from China caused panic in India and even necessitated the closure of the Naptha Jhakri project for a couple of days.
Of late, Pakistan is blaming India for shortfalls in Indus flows even though they are aware of Chinese structures upstream which affect the flows. The experience of Thailand and other co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to operations of the Chinese dams upstream should also be a lesson to us. The indiscriminate upstream reservoir operations by China affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism projects. The flood flows released from its reservoirs inundated many lands in these states. China never bothered about their protests and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) could not do much on the complaints of these states as China is not a member of the MRC.
Likewise, China is not associated with the IWT. Of the four co-basin states, India and Pakistan are only parties to the treaty. As such, there are no river water agreements between China and these countries except for a joint declaration made in 2006 between India and China to share the hydrological data of such rivers.
The existing international laws on trans-boundary rivers being weak, it is highly essential to have proper water-sharing agreements among the co-basin states to avoid future conflicts in the Indus basin. Hence, a comprehensive review of the IWT is a compelling necessity to address the changing geopolitical situation and emerging international norms for sharing these rivers. India has to press Pakistan for such a review.
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to relevant articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, to which it is also a signatory. Article 31 inter alia states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose. In this case, the stated purpose is to achieve optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters.
If Pakistan still does not accept our request for the review, India has to draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from the treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances. India can exercise this option since this change has now occurred with China entering the scene to exploit Indus waters in its territory.
The increased demand for water from the Indus system is already triggering disputes among the basin states in India while Pakistan is blaming us for its water woes even when its surplus flows are discharging into the sea unused. It is therefore for India to seize this opportunity to call the bluff and insist for the review of the treaty taking into account the changes that have occurred since 1960.
(The Tribune,dated, 4th April, 2010)
Chinese disastrous plans
Chinese disaster in the making
The damming of Brahmaputra by China is bound to cause untold misery and devastation. New Delhi should engage Beijing in serious discussions on trans-boundary rivers
According to media reports, the Brahmaputra river in China (known as Yarlung Tsangpo), is presently witnessing a damming spree with a major hydro-electric project under construction at Zangmu to be followed by five more dams across the river. Though the Chinese have denied having any such plans, and the Indian Government pleads lack of information thereon, data received from satellite imageries do indicate some activities in the reported area.
China has every right to build dams in their part of the Brahmaputhra and we cannot dispute their right to do so. But what we have to worry is about the impact of these dams downstream in Indian territory. With weak international laws and having no agreements on the river, India has presently no leverage with China to protect our interests.
One anticipated impact is the likely reduction in flow downstream, if China diverts the lean flows of the river outside the basin for power generation or to meet the water needs of its arid north-east. Another impact is the possible flooding downstream, from release of heavy flood flows during monsoons.
According to experts on China, the projects presently proposed by it need not be viewed with alarm since these do not cause potentially disastrous effects in the channel discharge. Further, Chinese authorities can ill-afford to trigger protests from locals due to the diversions causing a dry riverbed downstream. Dam experts point out that construction of mega-projects is not feasible, the terrain being prone to severe earthquakes.
Notwithstanding these optimistic observations, we should remain pragmatic about the signs emanating from across the border. The construction of the highway linking Bome to Medok city in the Nyingtri Prefecture to facilitate movement of material and heavy machinery, opening of an airport at high altitude in the Prefecture for providing easy access to the Tsangpo gorge, etc, are indicative of the Chinese plans.
The past experience of co-basin states like Thailand in the Mekong basin due to the dams constructed in the Chinese territory would be relevant here. These states had protested to the Mekong River Commission against the indiscriminate upstream reservoir operations which affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities. The worst occurred in 2002, when China released flood flows from its reservoirs, inundating vast stretches of their territories. China did not bother about their protests, nor the objections raised by MRC stating that it is not a member of the commission.
India too had suffered heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past.
The argument that it is not possible to construct huge diversion structures in this terrain has already been disproved by China’s Gigantic Water Diversion project for transferring 1.8 billion cubic metres of water to Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun river, through a 85 km-long tunnel driven in the mountainous north-east having similar problems.
The expectation that our neighbour would inform us about their plans on the river, is also unfounded. When they constructed the Senge-Ali hydro-project on the Indus (Western Tibet), Pakistan was not knowledgeable about it. Also, as per reports, the Chinese authorities did not bother about the locals protesting about a dry river downstream.
India, therefore, has to take immediate actions to engage China in serious discussions on the trans-boundary rivers since there are no agreements at present between the two in this regard, except for a joint declaration made in 2006 for sharing hydrological data. This alone is not adequate to address our concerns.
Being an upper riparian, China may not be keen to enter into any agreement with us on water sharing issues, but there is a possibility since it is interested in new relationships on environmental issues. This change is evident as revealed in the aftermath of the Copenhagen climate conference, as it has sought India’s help in co-ordinating efforts with developing countries. Hence time is ripe for India to pursue with China to institutionalise a joint committee for environmental impacts on trans-boundary rivers, in which our concerns could be discussed. This golden opportunity should not be lost.
In the meanwhile, we should not remain as mute spectators watching helplessly our neighbour’s plans. We have to protect our interests. We have to construct storage structures in the river at any cost giving top priority, so as to regulate the wide water level fluctuations and floods caused by reservoir operations upstream. We should not allow another Mekong to repeat here due to China’s dams upstream.
(The Pioneer,dated,11th February,2010)
::
.
The damming of Brahmaputra by China is bound to cause untold misery and devastation. New Delhi should engage Beijing in serious discussions on trans-boundary rivers
According to media reports, the Brahmaputra river in China (known as Yarlung Tsangpo), is presently witnessing a damming spree with a major hydro-electric project under construction at Zangmu to be followed by five more dams across the river. Though the Chinese have denied having any such plans, and the Indian Government pleads lack of information thereon, data received from satellite imageries do indicate some activities in the reported area.
China has every right to build dams in their part of the Brahmaputhra and we cannot dispute their right to do so. But what we have to worry is about the impact of these dams downstream in Indian territory. With weak international laws and having no agreements on the river, India has presently no leverage with China to protect our interests.
One anticipated impact is the likely reduction in flow downstream, if China diverts the lean flows of the river outside the basin for power generation or to meet the water needs of its arid north-east. Another impact is the possible flooding downstream, from release of heavy flood flows during monsoons.
According to experts on China, the projects presently proposed by it need not be viewed with alarm since these do not cause potentially disastrous effects in the channel discharge. Further, Chinese authorities can ill-afford to trigger protests from locals due to the diversions causing a dry riverbed downstream. Dam experts point out that construction of mega-projects is not feasible, the terrain being prone to severe earthquakes.
Notwithstanding these optimistic observations, we should remain pragmatic about the signs emanating from across the border. The construction of the highway linking Bome to Medok city in the Nyingtri Prefecture to facilitate movement of material and heavy machinery, opening of an airport at high altitude in the Prefecture for providing easy access to the Tsangpo gorge, etc, are indicative of the Chinese plans.
The past experience of co-basin states like Thailand in the Mekong basin due to the dams constructed in the Chinese territory would be relevant here. These states had protested to the Mekong River Commission against the indiscriminate upstream reservoir operations which affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities. The worst occurred in 2002, when China released flood flows from its reservoirs, inundating vast stretches of their territories. China did not bother about their protests, nor the objections raised by MRC stating that it is not a member of the commission.
India too had suffered heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past.
The argument that it is not possible to construct huge diversion structures in this terrain has already been disproved by China’s Gigantic Water Diversion project for transferring 1.8 billion cubic metres of water to Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun river, through a 85 km-long tunnel driven in the mountainous north-east having similar problems.
The expectation that our neighbour would inform us about their plans on the river, is also unfounded. When they constructed the Senge-Ali hydro-project on the Indus (Western Tibet), Pakistan was not knowledgeable about it. Also, as per reports, the Chinese authorities did not bother about the locals protesting about a dry river downstream.
India, therefore, has to take immediate actions to engage China in serious discussions on the trans-boundary rivers since there are no agreements at present between the two in this regard, except for a joint declaration made in 2006 for sharing hydrological data. This alone is not adequate to address our concerns.
Being an upper riparian, China may not be keen to enter into any agreement with us on water sharing issues, but there is a possibility since it is interested in new relationships on environmental issues. This change is evident as revealed in the aftermath of the Copenhagen climate conference, as it has sought India’s help in co-ordinating efforts with developing countries. Hence time is ripe for India to pursue with China to institutionalise a joint committee for environmental impacts on trans-boundary rivers, in which our concerns could be discussed. This golden opportunity should not be lost.
In the meanwhile, we should not remain as mute spectators watching helplessly our neighbour’s plans. We have to protect our interests. We have to construct storage structures in the river at any cost giving top priority, so as to regulate the wide water level fluctuations and floods caused by reservoir operations upstream. We should not allow another Mekong to repeat here due to China’s dams upstream.
(The Pioneer,dated,11th February,2010)
::
.
Flood threats from China
A flood of problems
China plans to divert Tibetan rivers to its water-starved regions, which is bad news for India both economically and environmentally, writes MSMenon
The Himalayas constitute one of the largest reservoirs of snow and ice in the world and the perennial flow of the rivers originating from the glaciers ensure a stable supply of water to regions dominated by the monsoon rains. Consequently, the hydrological regimes of the rivers –Jndus, Brahmaputhra, etc.-originating from Tibet, are sustained by this important feature.
For many years since independence, India held the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows in these rivers considering the terrain and population conditions in Tibet. But recent Chinese activities to exploit the potential of Sutlej and Brahmaputhra (Yarlung Tsangpo) within its territory have fuelled many misgivings in India
One of the serious problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow river is presently reduced to a seasonal stream and Yangtse river, too, is in a critical situation. Since China does not want its aspiration to superpower status thwarted by water crisis, it decided to exploit the bounteous water reserves in the Tibetan region to augment its hydropower and irrigation needs.
Chinese experts have found the diversion of waters from the wet south to the arid north through three links- the eastern, central and western – to be the best option to ward off the crisis. The southern part of the western link envisages the diversion of the upper Brahmaputhra. They have also identified the huge hydropower potential available for cascade development in the upper Mekong (Lancang river),upper Brahmaputhra ( having hydropotential more than twice the Three Gorges Project) and Sutlej (offering immense power).
Based on these findings, China planned eight hydro –dams in the Mekong basin. Of these, two have been completed and one is under construction. The co-basin states of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand protested, but China did not bother; neither did it care for the objections raised by the Mekong River Commission, stating that it is not a member in MRC.
Subsequently, the downstream states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese reservoir operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities and the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more water than normal from its reservoirs into the river below during the period of heavy down pours . But China went ahead with its projects.
Reports on the Chinese plans to divert the Tsangpo had been appearing in the media since last few decades and China continued to deny these. The proposals quoted in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982) detailed the diversion plans for annual power generation of 240 to 330 billion units. A report in the Scientific American (1996) narrated the plans to divert the Tsangpo waters to Gobi desert blasting a 20km. Channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives.
After many such reports in the media, in 2003, Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed plans for Tsangpo Water Diversion Project having two components; one, a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40,000 mw to utilise the potential of the river falling through 3000 m. in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of water by pumping to the north-western provinces of Xingjiang and Gansu. The project will be sited at the Great Bend where the river takes a U- turn to enter India; the construction is scheduled from 2009.
The existing Sutlej barrage and the planned structures on Brahmaputhra have the potential to control river flows into India. For example, if the Chinese divert waters during the glacial melting periods and release large flood flows during the monsoon, Indian irrigation and power projects would suffer.
The flash floods in August 2000 when water levels in Sutlej rose by about 30 m. In two hours at the Nathpa Jhakri Project (NJP) left behind a trail of destruction in the state. Luckily, the Bhakra reservoir downstream could absorb the floods, thereby containing the devastation of lower reaches. Almost during the same period, floods from the Tibetan Brahmaputhra devastated many parts of Arunachal Pradesh. The flow patterns indicated dam failure. Though china denied it, satellite imageries confirmed broken structures in Tsangpo.
Similar flood situations in Sutlej necessitating closure of NJP and evacuation of people from adjoining areas had occurred on a few occasions since 2004.
Presently, there are no agreements between India and China on trans-boundary rivers. Even in the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, China is not a party. Hence, regarding the utilisation of Tibetan rivers, China is not answerable to India under any treaty provisions. Hence, India has to strive to bring China under a treaty for the use of the Tibetan rivers. We should also use this opportunity to seek a review of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Interestingly, some time back, the Chinese National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage had shown interest to enter into an MOU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information on water related issues. But the mandarins of India’s Water Resources Ministry, in their wisdom, decided not to encourage it. Recently, China has shown renewed interest to activate the joint mechanism set up in November, 2006 for sharing hydrological information on these rivers. It is for India to seize this opportunity.
Also, India has to take steps to minimise the impact on its rivers due to upstream operations such as reduced flows or flash floods. The actions include (a) setting up of more flow forecasting stations and (b) construction of cascade projects on rivers near the border to facilitate flood absorption and water conservation. Hence the proposed Khab project(s) on Sutlej and the Siang project(s) on Brahmaputhra have strategic importance.
India has to take special interest and act fast to implement these schemes to take care of the threats from the Tibetan rivers.
(The Pioneer, dated,18th December, 2007)
China plans to divert Tibetan rivers to its water-starved regions, which is bad news for India both economically and environmentally, writes MSMenon
The Himalayas constitute one of the largest reservoirs of snow and ice in the world and the perennial flow of the rivers originating from the glaciers ensure a stable supply of water to regions dominated by the monsoon rains. Consequently, the hydrological regimes of the rivers –Jndus, Brahmaputhra, etc.-originating from Tibet, are sustained by this important feature.
For many years since independence, India held the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows in these rivers considering the terrain and population conditions in Tibet. But recent Chinese activities to exploit the potential of Sutlej and Brahmaputhra (Yarlung Tsangpo) within its territory have fuelled many misgivings in India
One of the serious problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow river is presently reduced to a seasonal stream and Yangtse river, too, is in a critical situation. Since China does not want its aspiration to superpower status thwarted by water crisis, it decided to exploit the bounteous water reserves in the Tibetan region to augment its hydropower and irrigation needs.
Chinese experts have found the diversion of waters from the wet south to the arid north through three links- the eastern, central and western – to be the best option to ward off the crisis. The southern part of the western link envisages the diversion of the upper Brahmaputhra. They have also identified the huge hydropower potential available for cascade development in the upper Mekong (Lancang river),upper Brahmaputhra ( having hydropotential more than twice the Three Gorges Project) and Sutlej (offering immense power).
Based on these findings, China planned eight hydro –dams in the Mekong basin. Of these, two have been completed and one is under construction. The co-basin states of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand protested, but China did not bother; neither did it care for the objections raised by the Mekong River Commission, stating that it is not a member in MRC.
Subsequently, the downstream states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese reservoir operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities and the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more water than normal from its reservoirs into the river below during the period of heavy down pours . But China went ahead with its projects.
Reports on the Chinese plans to divert the Tsangpo had been appearing in the media since last few decades and China continued to deny these. The proposals quoted in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982) detailed the diversion plans for annual power generation of 240 to 330 billion units. A report in the Scientific American (1996) narrated the plans to divert the Tsangpo waters to Gobi desert blasting a 20km. Channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives.
After many such reports in the media, in 2003, Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed plans for Tsangpo Water Diversion Project having two components; one, a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40,000 mw to utilise the potential of the river falling through 3000 m. in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of water by pumping to the north-western provinces of Xingjiang and Gansu. The project will be sited at the Great Bend where the river takes a U- turn to enter India; the construction is scheduled from 2009.
The existing Sutlej barrage and the planned structures on Brahmaputhra have the potential to control river flows into India. For example, if the Chinese divert waters during the glacial melting periods and release large flood flows during the monsoon, Indian irrigation and power projects would suffer.
The flash floods in August 2000 when water levels in Sutlej rose by about 30 m. In two hours at the Nathpa Jhakri Project (NJP) left behind a trail of destruction in the state. Luckily, the Bhakra reservoir downstream could absorb the floods, thereby containing the devastation of lower reaches. Almost during the same period, floods from the Tibetan Brahmaputhra devastated many parts of Arunachal Pradesh. The flow patterns indicated dam failure. Though china denied it, satellite imageries confirmed broken structures in Tsangpo.
Similar flood situations in Sutlej necessitating closure of NJP and evacuation of people from adjoining areas had occurred on a few occasions since 2004.
Presently, there are no agreements between India and China on trans-boundary rivers. Even in the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, China is not a party. Hence, regarding the utilisation of Tibetan rivers, China is not answerable to India under any treaty provisions. Hence, India has to strive to bring China under a treaty for the use of the Tibetan rivers. We should also use this opportunity to seek a review of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Interestingly, some time back, the Chinese National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage had shown interest to enter into an MOU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information on water related issues. But the mandarins of India’s Water Resources Ministry, in their wisdom, decided not to encourage it. Recently, China has shown renewed interest to activate the joint mechanism set up in November, 2006 for sharing hydrological information on these rivers. It is for India to seize this opportunity.
Also, India has to take steps to minimise the impact on its rivers due to upstream operations such as reduced flows or flash floods. The actions include (a) setting up of more flow forecasting stations and (b) construction of cascade projects on rivers near the border to facilitate flood absorption and water conservation. Hence the proposed Khab project(s) on Sutlej and the Siang project(s) on Brahmaputhra have strategic importance.
India has to take special interest and act fast to implement these schemes to take care of the threats from the Tibetan rivers.
(The Pioneer, dated,18th December, 2007)
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Protests against Sardar Sarovar Dam
Downstream of Protest.
Professional agitators cannot be allowed to stall Sardar Sarover Project, M.S.Menon.
It’s curtains for the time being, on the ongoing drama against the construction of the Sardar Sarover Project (SSP) with the Supreme Court refusing to stay the work on the plea made by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). For the past few weeks, the project has hit rough weather, forced by political opportunists and nourished by anti-development ‘Jholawalas’ supported by page three socialites.
The crusade against SSP by the activists at the site, in the law courts and the media- all in order to ensure sustainable development in their career graph- has caused considerable damage to infrastructure development. The SSP could certainly get into the Guinness Book of World Records for the number of court cases it faces.
The recent surge in the agitation against SSP is the consequence of the Narmada Control Authority’s (NCA) permission to raise the height of the dam from the existing 110 metre to 121.9 metre after being satisfied on the much disputed resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) aspects of the project. A well-laid out mechanism for overseeing the implementation of the directives given by Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) and the apex court had provided the requisite inputs/clearances to NCA to approve the proposal to raise the height of the Sardar Sarovar dam recently.
The activists were itching to revive their agitation because they were upset with the dwindling interest in their anti-dam movement by the public. Desperate to create a framework to justify their war on SSP, they were even ready to embrace irrelevant issues because that was the only viable strategy left for them to sustain themselves. The NCA’s approval to raise the dam’s height gave them this opportunity.
Union Minister for Water Resources, Saifuddin Soz, fell into their trap when confronted by the activists about the project’s failure to settle all the project affected persons (PAPs), and suo-motto proposed to convene the review committee meeting of the NCA (RCNCA) and to review the decision taken. The Minister’s proposal encouraged the activists to take the matter to the streets. Soon, hunger strikes, relay hunger strikes and protests by page three personalities ensued, with an obliging media providing adequate coverage.
The outcome of the RCNCA meeting was a split decision on political lines regarding the project construction which necessitated the Central Government to set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) to visit the R&R sites and report on the progress therein. The Madhya Pradesh Government protested against the GoM site visits, complaining that the ministers visited only few villages hand-picked by NBA and GoM report failed to give a complete picture of the R&R activities in Madhya Pradesh. Mean while, the apex court in response to a court case filed by NBA, authorised the Prime Minister to take needed actions.
Based on the Supreme Court’s direction, the Prime Minister constituted a three member panel, chaired by Mr. V.K.Shunglu, to report within three months on the status of rehabilitation efforts in Madhya Pradesh and recommend a system to enable the concerned PAPs get the benefits within the next three months. As usual, NBA and the professional agitators objected to the setting up of the Shunglu Committee.
In the years since construction of SSP began, these activists, labouring under an ideology –induced myopia, had been attacking the project suggesting alternatives mostly amusing, many times bizarre. They kept pushing the option of small water harvesting structures for irrigation, of projects using solar energy, biomass, etc., to generate equivalent power, to replace SSP.
Luckily for them, the Report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD Report, December,2000) came in handy to espouse their cause. However, as the WCD Report got exposed as a frame work for sustained under development for countries like India, the activists turned to the campaign of ‘stop the dam’.
Time and again, activists who have been churning out alternatives to SSP have been told that :
The limited monsoon periods and possible monsoon failures in the country necessitate large storages to ensure continued water availability every year during the eight non-monsoon months and the small storages get dried up when monsoon fails. Like- wise, the present shortage in the country’s peaking capacity of energy being more than 10000 mw and the capacity generated at present from solar and biomass energy world over being less than 5000mw, these options would have to remain confined to serve small areas under pilot projects at present.
The irony of these activists still supporting local small structures as a substitute to SSP is emblematic of the delusions of the country’s mis-informed elite. With the development agenda hijacked by individual micro-views and hostile attitudes, the country’s development plans are getting mired in endless debates with fact based reasoning becoming the casualty. The hijackers, a motley bunch, have all along thrived on trivialising projects of national importance.
Unfortunately, by accepting the easy path of ignoring rather than confronting eco- fascism, our present rulers are saddled with a problem that is turning into a night-mare in the field of water resources development (WRD) projects. Further, hydro -politics has contributed to our water woes and is the manifestation of the disease that threatens to infest all WRD projects. We have to be extremely concerned about this.
There is no second opinion that proper implementation of R&R packages would enable the displaced to lead a better life compared to the pathetically harsh conditions to which they are subjected in the interiors. The lapses in R&R, if any, have to be rectified. To achieve these objectives, the activists could sit together and collaborate with authorities to ensure proper implementation of R&R. The anti-dam brigade and their followers may treat this proposal as frivolous and amusing since, to them, publicity is more important than genuine service.
(The Pioneer, dated, 13th May, 2006)
Professional agitators cannot be allowed to stall Sardar Sarover Project, M.S.Menon.
It’s curtains for the time being, on the ongoing drama against the construction of the Sardar Sarover Project (SSP) with the Supreme Court refusing to stay the work on the plea made by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). For the past few weeks, the project has hit rough weather, forced by political opportunists and nourished by anti-development ‘Jholawalas’ supported by page three socialites.
The crusade against SSP by the activists at the site, in the law courts and the media- all in order to ensure sustainable development in their career graph- has caused considerable damage to infrastructure development. The SSP could certainly get into the Guinness Book of World Records for the number of court cases it faces.
The recent surge in the agitation against SSP is the consequence of the Narmada Control Authority’s (NCA) permission to raise the height of the dam from the existing 110 metre to 121.9 metre after being satisfied on the much disputed resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) aspects of the project. A well-laid out mechanism for overseeing the implementation of the directives given by Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) and the apex court had provided the requisite inputs/clearances to NCA to approve the proposal to raise the height of the Sardar Sarovar dam recently.
The activists were itching to revive their agitation because they were upset with the dwindling interest in their anti-dam movement by the public. Desperate to create a framework to justify their war on SSP, they were even ready to embrace irrelevant issues because that was the only viable strategy left for them to sustain themselves. The NCA’s approval to raise the dam’s height gave them this opportunity.
Union Minister for Water Resources, Saifuddin Soz, fell into their trap when confronted by the activists about the project’s failure to settle all the project affected persons (PAPs), and suo-motto proposed to convene the review committee meeting of the NCA (RCNCA) and to review the decision taken. The Minister’s proposal encouraged the activists to take the matter to the streets. Soon, hunger strikes, relay hunger strikes and protests by page three personalities ensued, with an obliging media providing adequate coverage.
The outcome of the RCNCA meeting was a split decision on political lines regarding the project construction which necessitated the Central Government to set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) to visit the R&R sites and report on the progress therein. The Madhya Pradesh Government protested against the GoM site visits, complaining that the ministers visited only few villages hand-picked by NBA and GoM report failed to give a complete picture of the R&R activities in Madhya Pradesh. Mean while, the apex court in response to a court case filed by NBA, authorised the Prime Minister to take needed actions.
Based on the Supreme Court’s direction, the Prime Minister constituted a three member panel, chaired by Mr. V.K.Shunglu, to report within three months on the status of rehabilitation efforts in Madhya Pradesh and recommend a system to enable the concerned PAPs get the benefits within the next three months. As usual, NBA and the professional agitators objected to the setting up of the Shunglu Committee.
In the years since construction of SSP began, these activists, labouring under an ideology –induced myopia, had been attacking the project suggesting alternatives mostly amusing, many times bizarre. They kept pushing the option of small water harvesting structures for irrigation, of projects using solar energy, biomass, etc., to generate equivalent power, to replace SSP.
Luckily for them, the Report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD Report, December,2000) came in handy to espouse their cause. However, as the WCD Report got exposed as a frame work for sustained under development for countries like India, the activists turned to the campaign of ‘stop the dam’.
Time and again, activists who have been churning out alternatives to SSP have been told that :
The limited monsoon periods and possible monsoon failures in the country necessitate large storages to ensure continued water availability every year during the eight non-monsoon months and the small storages get dried up when monsoon fails. Like- wise, the present shortage in the country’s peaking capacity of energy being more than 10000 mw and the capacity generated at present from solar and biomass energy world over being less than 5000mw, these options would have to remain confined to serve small areas under pilot projects at present.
The irony of these activists still supporting local small structures as a substitute to SSP is emblematic of the delusions of the country’s mis-informed elite. With the development agenda hijacked by individual micro-views and hostile attitudes, the country’s development plans are getting mired in endless debates with fact based reasoning becoming the casualty. The hijackers, a motley bunch, have all along thrived on trivialising projects of national importance.
Unfortunately, by accepting the easy path of ignoring rather than confronting eco- fascism, our present rulers are saddled with a problem that is turning into a night-mare in the field of water resources development (WRD) projects. Further, hydro -politics has contributed to our water woes and is the manifestation of the disease that threatens to infest all WRD projects. We have to be extremely concerned about this.
There is no second opinion that proper implementation of R&R packages would enable the displaced to lead a better life compared to the pathetically harsh conditions to which they are subjected in the interiors. The lapses in R&R, if any, have to be rectified. To achieve these objectives, the activists could sit together and collaborate with authorities to ensure proper implementation of R&R. The anti-dam brigade and their followers may treat this proposal as frivolous and amusing since, to them, publicity is more important than genuine service.
(The Pioneer, dated, 13th May, 2006)
Ken - Betwa Link Project
Linking Rivers to Prosperity
Conserving water will remove poverty, the worst environmental pollutant in developing societies, says M.S.Menon
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and the Union Minister of Water, marks the beginning of a mega project of interlinking of rivers (ILR). This project is an important milestone for inter-basin transfer of waters. According to this understanding, a detailed project report on the link connecting the two interstate rivers will take into account all social and environmental aspects. Data gained will serve as a test case for undertaking more ambitious river link projects in the future.
The Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP), one of 30 links proposed under the national Perspective plan for which feasibility studies were carried out by the National water Development Agency, envisages diversion of surplus waters from the Ken river to the water deficit Betwa river, as both are tributaries of Yamuna. According to the proposal, 1020 million cubic metres of will be diverted from Ken basin in a link canal that will be 231 km. long. The canal will traverse both states to provide irrigation and drinking water benefits to the people affected. Apart from power generation, the scheme would also provide incidental benefits such as ground water recharge, reservoir pisciculture, and better communications system due to increased infrastructure such as canal, roads etc. Total cost of the project is estimated as Rs.1988.74 Crore (1994-95 price level.)
India’s water resources are characterised by uneven distribution in space and time, leading to endemic and sporadic problems of floods and droughts. The ILR project will provide one solution to these perennial problems. While the scheme appealed to water-deficit states, water-endowed regions were not in favour of diverting their surpluses to needy basins. Hence, the immediate task of authorities was to build a consensus of States in agreement with the proposal. The signing of the MOU on Ken-Betwa link is the outcome of such efforts.
The ILR project has attracted criticisms from environmental and social activists, cynics and self-appointed experts. According to them, instead of wasting money and time on this project, it is better to go for viable micro-level water harvesting alternatives. Some misguided prophets have also forecast that – just like the national highways under the Golden Quadrilateral Project became a conveyor belts of noxious emissions – the canal system under the project will become an open sewer garlanding the length and breadth of the country.
The criticism against the ILR project is mainly because critics have not got their fundamental facts correct. They forget that the development of local micro-water harvesting structures has its own limitations, such as, supplementing water resources availability due to failing monsoons. More over, most local options have become white elephants in their implementation, such as, the ‘Neeru-Meeru’ scheme of Andhra Pradesh, various structures built in the Saurashtra region of Gujarat, and the check dams in the Shivalik foot hills in Haryana.
The transfer of water from surplus to deficit areas to meet local requirements is not a new concept. Presently, more than 500 Billion Cubic Metres (BCM) of water are transferred through man-made links around the world. Even in India, long distance water transfer has existed for centuries and has served to help those in need.
Poverty is the worst environmental pollutant and its eradication will involve reform of land and water use. The ILR project will open up windows of opportunity for the poor struggling to survive recurring floods and droughts. Additionally, the major use of water is for food production. It is not that the farming community alone is responsible for the water crisis, but each of us, as consumers of food, is also contributing to the scarcity. As reported by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage(ICID), in the process of producing a kilogram of food grain, 500 to 4000 litres of water are used, while to produce a kilogram of grain fed beef, 10000 litres of water are used. Thus, according to ICID, each of us, on a daily basis, ‘eats’ 2000 to 5000 litres of water, drinks 5 litres of water and uses 40 to 400 litres of water for hygiene and sanitation.
It is imperative that a detailed report be conducted to avert the looming water crisis that has arisen over the politicisation of water. Water surplus States must emulate the example shown by M.P and U.P. to shed hydro-politics and make the ILR project an immediate reality.
(The Pioneer, dated, 7th December,2005)
Conserving water will remove poverty, the worst environmental pollutant in developing societies, says M.S.Menon
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the Chief Ministers of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and the Union Minister of Water, marks the beginning of a mega project of interlinking of rivers (ILR). This project is an important milestone for inter-basin transfer of waters. According to this understanding, a detailed project report on the link connecting the two interstate rivers will take into account all social and environmental aspects. Data gained will serve as a test case for undertaking more ambitious river link projects in the future.
The Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP), one of 30 links proposed under the national Perspective plan for which feasibility studies were carried out by the National water Development Agency, envisages diversion of surplus waters from the Ken river to the water deficit Betwa river, as both are tributaries of Yamuna. According to the proposal, 1020 million cubic metres of will be diverted from Ken basin in a link canal that will be 231 km. long. The canal will traverse both states to provide irrigation and drinking water benefits to the people affected. Apart from power generation, the scheme would also provide incidental benefits such as ground water recharge, reservoir pisciculture, and better communications system due to increased infrastructure such as canal, roads etc. Total cost of the project is estimated as Rs.1988.74 Crore (1994-95 price level.)
India’s water resources are characterised by uneven distribution in space and time, leading to endemic and sporadic problems of floods and droughts. The ILR project will provide one solution to these perennial problems. While the scheme appealed to water-deficit states, water-endowed regions were not in favour of diverting their surpluses to needy basins. Hence, the immediate task of authorities was to build a consensus of States in agreement with the proposal. The signing of the MOU on Ken-Betwa link is the outcome of such efforts.
The ILR project has attracted criticisms from environmental and social activists, cynics and self-appointed experts. According to them, instead of wasting money and time on this project, it is better to go for viable micro-level water harvesting alternatives. Some misguided prophets have also forecast that – just like the national highways under the Golden Quadrilateral Project became a conveyor belts of noxious emissions – the canal system under the project will become an open sewer garlanding the length and breadth of the country.
The criticism against the ILR project is mainly because critics have not got their fundamental facts correct. They forget that the development of local micro-water harvesting structures has its own limitations, such as, supplementing water resources availability due to failing monsoons. More over, most local options have become white elephants in their implementation, such as, the ‘Neeru-Meeru’ scheme of Andhra Pradesh, various structures built in the Saurashtra region of Gujarat, and the check dams in the Shivalik foot hills in Haryana.
The transfer of water from surplus to deficit areas to meet local requirements is not a new concept. Presently, more than 500 Billion Cubic Metres (BCM) of water are transferred through man-made links around the world. Even in India, long distance water transfer has existed for centuries and has served to help those in need.
Poverty is the worst environmental pollutant and its eradication will involve reform of land and water use. The ILR project will open up windows of opportunity for the poor struggling to survive recurring floods and droughts. Additionally, the major use of water is for food production. It is not that the farming community alone is responsible for the water crisis, but each of us, as consumers of food, is also contributing to the scarcity. As reported by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage(ICID), in the process of producing a kilogram of food grain, 500 to 4000 litres of water are used, while to produce a kilogram of grain fed beef, 10000 litres of water are used. Thus, according to ICID, each of us, on a daily basis, ‘eats’ 2000 to 5000 litres of water, drinks 5 litres of water and uses 40 to 400 litres of water for hygiene and sanitation.
It is imperative that a detailed report be conducted to avert the looming water crisis that has arisen over the politicisation of water. Water surplus States must emulate the example shown by M.P and U.P. to shed hydro-politics and make the ILR project an immediate reality.
(The Pioneer, dated, 7th December,2005)
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
Interlinking of Rivers in India
Part-1
Linking rivers, linking people.
Interbasin transfer of water represents a great challenge and opportunity for the country, says M S Menon
The proposal for interlinking the rivers in the country is getting international media attention, thanks to the delegates present at the recently held ‘Peoples World Water Forum’ and ‘World Socialist Forum’ in the country. Using weapons of mass disinformation, some of them reported to have attacked the proposal terming it as ‘destructive’ so that these nation bashers could appear as liberals to ingratiate themselves to a class of people inside and outside the country. Such a brazen approach betrays lack of preliminary understanding of the proposal and reflects callousness in raising concerns in international fora.
During the same time, but at a different venue, the President of India, addressing a galaxy of top scientists, intellectuals and experts commended the proposal stating that it would provide a solution to the perennial problems of floods and droughts in the country.
The main characteristic of India’s water resources is its uneven distribution in space and time leading to endemic and sporadic problems of floods and droughts. Two-third’s of the annually available water resource of 1950 Billion Cubic Metre (BCM) is contributed by the Ganga- Brahmaputhra- Meghna (GBM) system, covering one-third of the country’s geographical area. Consequently, the remaining two-thirds of the country has to remain satisfied with the balance resource, and face scarcity while the GBM basin experiences floods. Hence if resource abundant rivers like the Brahmaputhra, the Ganga, etc. could be linked with the seasonal peninsular rivers, the available water resources could be optimally harnessed, and the miseries of recurring droughts and floods could be contained to a great extent.
Suggestions for the National Water Grid, ‘The Ganga –Cauvery Link’ were initially mooted in 1972 by Dr. K.L. Rao, then Union Minister for Irrigation and Power. Subsequently, many proposals were received by the Government for interlinking of rivers, notable among them being the ‘Garland Canal’ suggested by Capt. Dastur in 1974. However, all these proposals were found to be either prohibitively costly or not practical.
The continued onslaught of floods and droughts in the country prompted the Government of India to come out with the National Perspective Plan for interlinking of rivers comprising two components, namely- ‘The Himalayan river component ‘ envisaging storages and interlinking canal systems to transfer surplus flows from the Himalayan rivers, and ‘ The Peninsular river component’ envisaging similar works to transfer surpluses from the Mahanadi, Godavari and West flowing rivers to drought- prone areas.
Accordingly, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1980 to study and suggest possible links. As per the studies, when fully implemented the mega project is estimated to bring an additional area of 35 million hectares under irrigation and generate additional power of 34000MW with an investment of Rs. 5,60,000 crore spread over 30 years. The proposal got a boost after the President of India, Prime Minister, Judges of the Supreme Court and many political leaders endorsed it as a preferred solution for combating recurring droughts in the country.
Subsequently, a taskforce headed by the former Union Energy Minister, Suresh Prabhu, was set up to devise a frame-work for implementing the project. While the scheme appealed to water-deficit states, water endowed regions were not in favour of diverting their surplus to needy basins. Hence the immediate task of Suresh Prabhu was to get consensus of these states for the proposal.
Criticism against the project came from environmental and social activists, cynics and self- appointed experts. According to some, instead of wasting time and money on this grandiose project, it is better to go for viable micro-level water harvesting alternatives to get similar benefits with small investments. Others see the destruction of cultures, communities and eco systems. Doubts have also been raised not only about the engineering feasibility of lifting the water across basins but also on issues of environmental impacts, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced people, etc.
Criticism of the project has also come from some prophets of doom pointing out that the canal system under the project might become an open sewer garlanding the length and breadth of the country in the same manner as the works under the ‘Golden Quadrilateral Project’ converting the national highways into a network of conveyor belts of noxious emissions!
(The article is to be concluded)
(The Pioneer,dt.9th March,2004)
Linking rivers, linking people.
Interbasin transfer of water represents a great challenge and opportunity for the country, says M S Menon
The proposal for interlinking the rivers in the country is getting international media attention, thanks to the delegates present at the recently held ‘Peoples World Water Forum’ and ‘World Socialist Forum’ in the country. Using weapons of mass disinformation, some of them reported to have attacked the proposal terming it as ‘destructive’ so that these nation bashers could appear as liberals to ingratiate themselves to a class of people inside and outside the country. Such a brazen approach betrays lack of preliminary understanding of the proposal and reflects callousness in raising concerns in international fora.
During the same time, but at a different venue, the President of India, addressing a galaxy of top scientists, intellectuals and experts commended the proposal stating that it would provide a solution to the perennial problems of floods and droughts in the country.
The main characteristic of India’s water resources is its uneven distribution in space and time leading to endemic and sporadic problems of floods and droughts. Two-third’s of the annually available water resource of 1950 Billion Cubic Metre (BCM) is contributed by the Ganga- Brahmaputhra- Meghna (GBM) system, covering one-third of the country’s geographical area. Consequently, the remaining two-thirds of the country has to remain satisfied with the balance resource, and face scarcity while the GBM basin experiences floods. Hence if resource abundant rivers like the Brahmaputhra, the Ganga, etc. could be linked with the seasonal peninsular rivers, the available water resources could be optimally harnessed, and the miseries of recurring droughts and floods could be contained to a great extent.
Suggestions for the National Water Grid, ‘The Ganga –Cauvery Link’ were initially mooted in 1972 by Dr. K.L. Rao, then Union Minister for Irrigation and Power. Subsequently, many proposals were received by the Government for interlinking of rivers, notable among them being the ‘Garland Canal’ suggested by Capt. Dastur in 1974. However, all these proposals were found to be either prohibitively costly or not practical.
The continued onslaught of floods and droughts in the country prompted the Government of India to come out with the National Perspective Plan for interlinking of rivers comprising two components, namely- ‘The Himalayan river component ‘ envisaging storages and interlinking canal systems to transfer surplus flows from the Himalayan rivers, and ‘ The Peninsular river component’ envisaging similar works to transfer surpluses from the Mahanadi, Godavari and West flowing rivers to drought- prone areas.
Accordingly, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1980 to study and suggest possible links. As per the studies, when fully implemented the mega project is estimated to bring an additional area of 35 million hectares under irrigation and generate additional power of 34000MW with an investment of Rs. 5,60,000 crore spread over 30 years. The proposal got a boost after the President of India, Prime Minister, Judges of the Supreme Court and many political leaders endorsed it as a preferred solution for combating recurring droughts in the country.
Subsequently, a taskforce headed by the former Union Energy Minister, Suresh Prabhu, was set up to devise a frame-work for implementing the project. While the scheme appealed to water-deficit states, water endowed regions were not in favour of diverting their surplus to needy basins. Hence the immediate task of Suresh Prabhu was to get consensus of these states for the proposal.
Criticism against the project came from environmental and social activists, cynics and self- appointed experts. According to some, instead of wasting time and money on this grandiose project, it is better to go for viable micro-level water harvesting alternatives to get similar benefits with small investments. Others see the destruction of cultures, communities and eco systems. Doubts have also been raised not only about the engineering feasibility of lifting the water across basins but also on issues of environmental impacts, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced people, etc.
Criticism of the project has also come from some prophets of doom pointing out that the canal system under the project might become an open sewer garlanding the length and breadth of the country in the same manner as the works under the ‘Golden Quadrilateral Project’ converting the national highways into a network of conveyor belts of noxious emissions!
(The article is to be concluded)
(The Pioneer,dt.9th March,2004)
Interlinking of rivers in India
Part-2.
Water for future perfect
There is no other option but to develop and manage scarce water resources, says M.S.menon.
There are suggestions that water availability can be ensured better by demand management rather than opting for supply management through costly water transfers. The option of import of food grains to meet its shortfall instead of investing in mega project s has also been mooted by some others.
The transfer of water from surplus areas to deficit areas to meet local requirements is not a new concept world over since presently a transfer of 540 BCM of water through man-made links is occurring globally every year. Even in India, long distance water transfer is in existence since centuries, such as the Western Yamuna Canal, Kurnool-Cuddappah Canal, etc., annually transferring 29 BCM of water through various links at present. People continue to reap benefits from these projects.
Why then there is so much criticism against the proposal for a national water grid? The reason is not far to seek. The critics have not got their fundamentals right. In a scenario of undependable and irregular monsoon like ours the suggested alternative of small storages would dry up with failing monsoons, negating the very purpose for which they are built. The oft repeated demand management option, by itself, cannot meet the needed future requirements of 1200BCM of water by the year2050 as we have harnessed only about 10% of the annual available surface flows at present.
Regarding imports, it is needless to say that the current world trade in food grains is too small to feed India’s surging population and hence, we cannot afford to be not self sufficient in food grain production. The objections raised on the feasibility of the water project construction quoting likely technical problems in pumping, tunnelling works, etc. have been ruled out by engineers since, according to them, these are not insurmountable with modern technology. Environmental awareness and related issues being recent developments at the international level, knowledge on environmental impacts is limited even to those who suggest concerned studies.
Interference with nature is not an abomination and with gaining experience, this issue would be addressed with great understanding to mitigate the adverse impacts as is being done in the ongoing projects in the country. There is also no dispute on the fact that for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the project affected people, a humanitarian approach is needed. Considering the happenings in other water resource projects, it is certain that timely responsive actions would be taken by the experienced implementing agencies in this regard.
The country has no option but to develop and manage its fresh water resources or face increasing distress in coming years. The challenge is to cope with the entire gamut of needs; water needs, land use needs and terrestrial and aquatic eco-system needs. To reconcile the conflict of interests, balancing of human livelihood interests against unavoidable environmental consequences has to be achieved. Since humans are an evident part of the eco-system, it has to be realised that change and disturbances are unavoidable and are a part of the natural and human dominated landscapes.
Development has to be sustainable. But with a rapidly growing population living on the margin of subsistence, whether sustainability is possible without adequate development is the moot point, since poverty is the worst polluter and with growing population the pressure becomes greater. It is within these constraints that development must progress with sustainability a critical criterion.
Inter-basin transfer of water represents a great challenge and opportunity for the country. It is not an end by itself but a means to an end- the end is to alleviate poverty and improve quality of life while protecting the environment. The projects and links would make the states interdependent fostering day to day cooperation, thus proving as an integrating factor facilitating the discharge of responsibilities towards the states and citizens. Too much of analysis is paralysing us into inaction. Let us remain vigilant of the vested interests and embedded activists concerned only with their sustainability. We should not allow them to paint a bleak picture of our efforts for sustainable development. (concluded)
(The Pioneer, dt.10th March,2004)
Water for future perfect
There is no other option but to develop and manage scarce water resources, says M.S.menon.
There are suggestions that water availability can be ensured better by demand management rather than opting for supply management through costly water transfers. The option of import of food grains to meet its shortfall instead of investing in mega project s has also been mooted by some others.
The transfer of water from surplus areas to deficit areas to meet local requirements is not a new concept world over since presently a transfer of 540 BCM of water through man-made links is occurring globally every year. Even in India, long distance water transfer is in existence since centuries, such as the Western Yamuna Canal, Kurnool-Cuddappah Canal, etc., annually transferring 29 BCM of water through various links at present. People continue to reap benefits from these projects.
Why then there is so much criticism against the proposal for a national water grid? The reason is not far to seek. The critics have not got their fundamentals right. In a scenario of undependable and irregular monsoon like ours the suggested alternative of small storages would dry up with failing monsoons, negating the very purpose for which they are built. The oft repeated demand management option, by itself, cannot meet the needed future requirements of 1200BCM of water by the year2050 as we have harnessed only about 10% of the annual available surface flows at present.
Regarding imports, it is needless to say that the current world trade in food grains is too small to feed India’s surging population and hence, we cannot afford to be not self sufficient in food grain production. The objections raised on the feasibility of the water project construction quoting likely technical problems in pumping, tunnelling works, etc. have been ruled out by engineers since, according to them, these are not insurmountable with modern technology. Environmental awareness and related issues being recent developments at the international level, knowledge on environmental impacts is limited even to those who suggest concerned studies.
Interference with nature is not an abomination and with gaining experience, this issue would be addressed with great understanding to mitigate the adverse impacts as is being done in the ongoing projects in the country. There is also no dispute on the fact that for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the project affected people, a humanitarian approach is needed. Considering the happenings in other water resource projects, it is certain that timely responsive actions would be taken by the experienced implementing agencies in this regard.
The country has no option but to develop and manage its fresh water resources or face increasing distress in coming years. The challenge is to cope with the entire gamut of needs; water needs, land use needs and terrestrial and aquatic eco-system needs. To reconcile the conflict of interests, balancing of human livelihood interests against unavoidable environmental consequences has to be achieved. Since humans are an evident part of the eco-system, it has to be realised that change and disturbances are unavoidable and are a part of the natural and human dominated landscapes.
Development has to be sustainable. But with a rapidly growing population living on the margin of subsistence, whether sustainability is possible without adequate development is the moot point, since poverty is the worst polluter and with growing population the pressure becomes greater. It is within these constraints that development must progress with sustainability a critical criterion.
Inter-basin transfer of water represents a great challenge and opportunity for the country. It is not an end by itself but a means to an end- the end is to alleviate poverty and improve quality of life while protecting the environment. The projects and links would make the states interdependent fostering day to day cooperation, thus proving as an integrating factor facilitating the discharge of responsibilities towards the states and citizens. Too much of analysis is paralysing us into inaction. Let us remain vigilant of the vested interests and embedded activists concerned only with their sustainability. We should not allow them to paint a bleak picture of our efforts for sustainable development. (concluded)
(The Pioneer, dt.10th March,2004)
Monday, March 29, 2010
Kerala Waters
Does Kerala lack water?
M.S.Menon illuminates the complexities behind water-surplus issues related to the ILR.
In the 11th National Water Convention inaugurated last year, President APJ Abdul Kalam had voiced his concerns regarding India’s water sector and the need for interlinking of rivers to mitigate sufferings from the recurring floods and droughts.
The main problem of taking the Interlinking (ILR) Project, beyond the drawing board stage, is the opposition of water-rich States in sparing their surplus waters. This aspect has only recently received needed attention. Hence in the National Convention, the topic of consensus building measures in ILR project was discussed and the outcome is of special interest to Kerala.
The data for most of the river basins in the country indicates that there is surplus water in many States. But ‘water’ has become an emotive issue and no political leadership in a water-rich State would agree to spare its present surplus to a deficit State for fear of facing political oblivion.
In this regard, the proposal brought out in the convention is for compensating water-surplus. The basic principle is that by releasing part of the surplus to the deficit State, the donor State will have to be compensated either in cash or in kind (like food grains produced, power generated etc.) by the donee State.
Such principles are being followed within the country and also abroad for water transfers. For example, the agreement between Kerala and Tamil Nadu(1970) for utilising the Periyar river waters of Kerala for power generation has a provision for compensation based on the units of power generated due to the scheme. Abroad, in Spain, the donor regions are compensated for regional development after assessing the losses that transferred water would cause to the regional economy.
In view of such existing practices, there should not be any objection for compensating the water surplus of a donor State. The compensation would enable it to plan the use of the remaining unutilised water optimally by reprioriitising and implementing the required projects expeditiously with the available finances. The done State would be able to provide more water for irrigation, hydel power generation, etc., thus affording a win-win situation for both the parties. The acceptance of this concept would encourage water saving in the donor State to facilitate more water to be spared in lieu of the compensation.
Kerala has been objecting to the ILR project, pointing out that, in the summer months, many parts in the State face acute water scarcity even for drinking purposes though there is harmful abundance in the monsoon months. The State, then has to take the blame since, due to limited fund allocations, executable projects continue at snail pace, If at all. In 1995, Kerala’s Centre for Water Resources Development and Management (CWRDM) had brought out the “Water Atlas of Kerala’ covering all the rivers of the State and indicating the possible utilisation of resources. A decade thereafter, of the estimated water resources of about 60 billion cubic metres (BCM), less than 20% only has been harnessed so far, mainly due to resource crunch, though environmental and social issues too have contributed to the slow progress.
All along, tactical concerns in the electoral policies had impelled State leadership to turn down suggestions on water transfers. Implicit in the justification was the mystical belief that within a foreseeable future, the State would be able to utilise all its water and, hence, if the water right is given away now, it would be a loss for ever. Even while billions of cubic metres of fresh water get discharged into the sea unutilised every year, the State continues to be engaged in its fanciful aspirations, blissfully lacking any feasible programme to achieve the optimum utilisation of its waters.
Past data indicate that every year many important river systems of the state, like, Bharatapuzha, Periyar, Chaliar, Valapatnam, etc., have discharged on an average more than 60% of the monsoon flows into the Arabian sea. This would not have happened if storages- major, medium and minor – were constructed to hold back river flows. The lakes thus formed would have helped conserve water, recharge ground water and even checked salinity intrusion, similar to the storages constructed successfully on the west flowing rivers in the Saurashtra and Kutch regions (Gujarat). Where suitable sites for constructing solid structures are not available, even installation of rubber dams as done in the Jhanjhavathi Project (A.P.) could be attempted.
Unless concrete action is planned, new initiatives launched and considerable ground work done by the Kerala Government, the proposals for optimum use of its waters would remain only a pipe dream for want of funds and the CWRDM studies would end up in the time –worn pages of Government files, ultimately consigned to the dustbins of history. Hence approaches are needed to enable the fruition of planned projects of Kerala.
An assessment to determine the extent of surplus water able to be spared for the ILR Project on a long term basis is needed. This assessment must contain the nature and compensation to be sought, formula for water transfer during deficit flow periods and frame work for new drinking water projects, and irrigation and hydro schemes on the basis of compensation to be received from surplus water.
It is time Kerala got active in discussions on the ILR project and staked its claims for compensation of its surplus waters.
(The Pioneer, dt. 15th March, 2006)
M.S.Menon illuminates the complexities behind water-surplus issues related to the ILR.
In the 11th National Water Convention inaugurated last year, President APJ Abdul Kalam had voiced his concerns regarding India’s water sector and the need for interlinking of rivers to mitigate sufferings from the recurring floods and droughts.
The main problem of taking the Interlinking (ILR) Project, beyond the drawing board stage, is the opposition of water-rich States in sparing their surplus waters. This aspect has only recently received needed attention. Hence in the National Convention, the topic of consensus building measures in ILR project was discussed and the outcome is of special interest to Kerala.
The data for most of the river basins in the country indicates that there is surplus water in many States. But ‘water’ has become an emotive issue and no political leadership in a water-rich State would agree to spare its present surplus to a deficit State for fear of facing political oblivion.
In this regard, the proposal brought out in the convention is for compensating water-surplus. The basic principle is that by releasing part of the surplus to the deficit State, the donor State will have to be compensated either in cash or in kind (like food grains produced, power generated etc.) by the donee State.
Such principles are being followed within the country and also abroad for water transfers. For example, the agreement between Kerala and Tamil Nadu(1970) for utilising the Periyar river waters of Kerala for power generation has a provision for compensation based on the units of power generated due to the scheme. Abroad, in Spain, the donor regions are compensated for regional development after assessing the losses that transferred water would cause to the regional economy.
In view of such existing practices, there should not be any objection for compensating the water surplus of a donor State. The compensation would enable it to plan the use of the remaining unutilised water optimally by reprioriitising and implementing the required projects expeditiously with the available finances. The done State would be able to provide more water for irrigation, hydel power generation, etc., thus affording a win-win situation for both the parties. The acceptance of this concept would encourage water saving in the donor State to facilitate more water to be spared in lieu of the compensation.
Kerala has been objecting to the ILR project, pointing out that, in the summer months, many parts in the State face acute water scarcity even for drinking purposes though there is harmful abundance in the monsoon months. The State, then has to take the blame since, due to limited fund allocations, executable projects continue at snail pace, If at all. In 1995, Kerala’s Centre for Water Resources Development and Management (CWRDM) had brought out the “Water Atlas of Kerala’ covering all the rivers of the State and indicating the possible utilisation of resources. A decade thereafter, of the estimated water resources of about 60 billion cubic metres (BCM), less than 20% only has been harnessed so far, mainly due to resource crunch, though environmental and social issues too have contributed to the slow progress.
All along, tactical concerns in the electoral policies had impelled State leadership to turn down suggestions on water transfers. Implicit in the justification was the mystical belief that within a foreseeable future, the State would be able to utilise all its water and, hence, if the water right is given away now, it would be a loss for ever. Even while billions of cubic metres of fresh water get discharged into the sea unutilised every year, the State continues to be engaged in its fanciful aspirations, blissfully lacking any feasible programme to achieve the optimum utilisation of its waters.
Past data indicate that every year many important river systems of the state, like, Bharatapuzha, Periyar, Chaliar, Valapatnam, etc., have discharged on an average more than 60% of the monsoon flows into the Arabian sea. This would not have happened if storages- major, medium and minor – were constructed to hold back river flows. The lakes thus formed would have helped conserve water, recharge ground water and even checked salinity intrusion, similar to the storages constructed successfully on the west flowing rivers in the Saurashtra and Kutch regions (Gujarat). Where suitable sites for constructing solid structures are not available, even installation of rubber dams as done in the Jhanjhavathi Project (A.P.) could be attempted.
Unless concrete action is planned, new initiatives launched and considerable ground work done by the Kerala Government, the proposals for optimum use of its waters would remain only a pipe dream for want of funds and the CWRDM studies would end up in the time –worn pages of Government files, ultimately consigned to the dustbins of history. Hence approaches are needed to enable the fruition of planned projects of Kerala.
An assessment to determine the extent of surplus water able to be spared for the ILR Project on a long term basis is needed. This assessment must contain the nature and compensation to be sought, formula for water transfer during deficit flow periods and frame work for new drinking water projects, and irrigation and hydro schemes on the basis of compensation to be received from surplus water.
It is time Kerala got active in discussions on the ILR project and staked its claims for compensation of its surplus waters.
(The Pioneer, dt. 15th March, 2006)
IWT - Review
Review the Indus Waters Treaty
It is highly biased in favour of Pakistan, and every effort is being made by that country to stall development of hydel projects in India, says M S Menon
The internationally lauded, much hyped agreement on the Indus waters, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between the Governments of India and Pakistan is back in the news, but for the wrong reasons. Since then, Pakistan has been raising the bogey of violation of the treaty to stall or delay any such Projects in J&K
.
Construction of the Wular Project (J&K) had to be stopped by India just to accommodate the tantrums of Pakistan. More recently, the Baglihar Project (J&K) was in the news with Pakistan getting a World Bank nominate, a “Neutral Expert” to go into the features of the project, thus delaying its construction. It is now targeting the Kishan Ganga Project (J&K) raising similar objections to stall it.
Background of the dispute
Partition resulted in the division of the Indus basin between the two countries triggering dispute on the sharing and utilization of the Indus waters. Continued negotiations between India and Pakistan held under the auspices of the World Bank culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the World Bank brokered the treaty, it is not a guarantor but has certain responsibilities to ensure its smooth functioning.
The treaty allocated, with some restrictions, the waters of the three western rivers – The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan and the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - to India. Signed as a gesture of international cooperation and good will, it envisages the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system. But even after five decades, due to Pakistan’s interference, India has been able to develop only a limited 1500 MW hydropower out of a potential of 8769 MW from its share in the western rivers.
Biased Provisions of the treaty.
An impression has been created internationally that the Indus Waters Treaty is a model for international river water agreements since it has inbuilt resilience and has survived two wars between the countries. To claim that the treaty has outlived the tempests of history is a blasphemy; and to extol it as a model for principles of water sharing and utilisation is a sacrilege. Subsequent events have proved that equitable sharing was not the concern and complete utilization was never the intention of the vested interests who strived for the treaty; the underlying objective seems to be only to perpetuate the dispute.
They made a mockery of equity in the distribution of the Indus waters by allocating three rivers each to the disputants to give an impression that they have equally divided the Indus system. India got only 20 to 25 percent of the total flows. Further, they faulted by ignoring the seventh prominent river, the Kabul river of the Indus system thereby permitting Pakistan the unbridled use of its waters in addition to the three western rivers.
If we delve deep into the principles of water allocation and other provisions in the treaty, it would be clear that the real facts on the much-hyped treaty are concealed and buried under a mountain of rhetoric. Working of the treaty has revealed that India has accommodated more than what is expected of her even though the proposals in the treaty were biased in favour of Pakistan.
The treaty is being used as a handle by Pakistan to scuttle India’s storage projects in J&K. Its objections to Indian projects have always been couched in a language of non-constructive application of the treaty provisions. The costly alternatives suggested by the Pakistan ignored sound engineering economics and practices, and India had been pointing out all such anomalies.
On its part, India, has been always willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of peaceful relations. But this spirit of accommodation is being considered as a weakness by Pakistan which is becoming more aggressive to make the Indian projects a subject of endless debate thereby impeding their implementation. The delay tactics have affected developmental efforts in J&K.
Disenchantment with the Treaty is growing in India as Pakistan has succeeded in stalling the Indian projects, 27 in all, by objecting or adversely commenting on them in spite of India supplying the requisite data. It is time India remodelled its strategy in dealing with Pakistan in this regard. India should go ahead with the construction of all planned projects as these are well within the treaty provisions. There is no provision in the Treaty necessitating India taking formal clearance from Pakistan for these projects. Nor is there any provision to stop the construction of a project pending resolution of Pakistan’s objections. What is needed is a strong will to implement the projects.
A review of the treaty is required considering the inequity in water allocation, design and construction technologies then suggested- which have now become out dated - and inherent ambiguity in treaty clauses giving undue benefit to Pakistan. Though there is no exit option in the treaty, there is an option for review. India should ask the World Bank to review the treaty clauses including the water sharing formula in the light of Helsinki Rules (1967) and other international guidelines so that injustice done to India in the treaty is rectified.
With the demand for water increasing and scarcity looming large, we have to get our rightful share of Indus waters. It is time to strike at the root of the problem. A review of the treaty is what Government of India should bid for.
(The Pioneer, dt. 20th June,2005)
It is highly biased in favour of Pakistan, and every effort is being made by that country to stall development of hydel projects in India, says M S Menon
The internationally lauded, much hyped agreement on the Indus waters, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between the Governments of India and Pakistan is back in the news, but for the wrong reasons. Since then, Pakistan has been raising the bogey of violation of the treaty to stall or delay any such Projects in J&K
.
Construction of the Wular Project (J&K) had to be stopped by India just to accommodate the tantrums of Pakistan. More recently, the Baglihar Project (J&K) was in the news with Pakistan getting a World Bank nominate, a “Neutral Expert” to go into the features of the project, thus delaying its construction. It is now targeting the Kishan Ganga Project (J&K) raising similar objections to stall it.
Background of the dispute
Partition resulted in the division of the Indus basin between the two countries triggering dispute on the sharing and utilization of the Indus waters. Continued negotiations between India and Pakistan held under the auspices of the World Bank culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the World Bank brokered the treaty, it is not a guarantor but has certain responsibilities to ensure its smooth functioning.
The treaty allocated, with some restrictions, the waters of the three western rivers – The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan and the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - to India. Signed as a gesture of international cooperation and good will, it envisages the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system. But even after five decades, due to Pakistan’s interference, India has been able to develop only a limited 1500 MW hydropower out of a potential of 8769 MW from its share in the western rivers.
Biased Provisions of the treaty.
An impression has been created internationally that the Indus Waters Treaty is a model for international river water agreements since it has inbuilt resilience and has survived two wars between the countries. To claim that the treaty has outlived the tempests of history is a blasphemy; and to extol it as a model for principles of water sharing and utilisation is a sacrilege. Subsequent events have proved that equitable sharing was not the concern and complete utilization was never the intention of the vested interests who strived for the treaty; the underlying objective seems to be only to perpetuate the dispute.
They made a mockery of equity in the distribution of the Indus waters by allocating three rivers each to the disputants to give an impression that they have equally divided the Indus system. India got only 20 to 25 percent of the total flows. Further, they faulted by ignoring the seventh prominent river, the Kabul river of the Indus system thereby permitting Pakistan the unbridled use of its waters in addition to the three western rivers.
If we delve deep into the principles of water allocation and other provisions in the treaty, it would be clear that the real facts on the much-hyped treaty are concealed and buried under a mountain of rhetoric. Working of the treaty has revealed that India has accommodated more than what is expected of her even though the proposals in the treaty were biased in favour of Pakistan.
The treaty is being used as a handle by Pakistan to scuttle India’s storage projects in J&K. Its objections to Indian projects have always been couched in a language of non-constructive application of the treaty provisions. The costly alternatives suggested by the Pakistan ignored sound engineering economics and practices, and India had been pointing out all such anomalies.
On its part, India, has been always willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of peaceful relations. But this spirit of accommodation is being considered as a weakness by Pakistan which is becoming more aggressive to make the Indian projects a subject of endless debate thereby impeding their implementation. The delay tactics have affected developmental efforts in J&K.
Disenchantment with the Treaty is growing in India as Pakistan has succeeded in stalling the Indian projects, 27 in all, by objecting or adversely commenting on them in spite of India supplying the requisite data. It is time India remodelled its strategy in dealing with Pakistan in this regard. India should go ahead with the construction of all planned projects as these are well within the treaty provisions. There is no provision in the Treaty necessitating India taking formal clearance from Pakistan for these projects. Nor is there any provision to stop the construction of a project pending resolution of Pakistan’s objections. What is needed is a strong will to implement the projects.
A review of the treaty is required considering the inequity in water allocation, design and construction technologies then suggested- which have now become out dated - and inherent ambiguity in treaty clauses giving undue benefit to Pakistan. Though there is no exit option in the treaty, there is an option for review. India should ask the World Bank to review the treaty clauses including the water sharing formula in the light of Helsinki Rules (1967) and other international guidelines so that injustice done to India in the treaty is rectified.
With the demand for water increasing and scarcity looming large, we have to get our rightful share of Indus waters. It is time to strike at the root of the problem. A review of the treaty is what Government of India should bid for.
(The Pioneer, dt. 20th June,2005)
Saturday, January 16, 2010
Punchhi Commission and Water issues
Water issues for Punchhi Commission
The terms of reference for the Punchhi Commission on Centre-State relations (2007), inter-alia, include the issues of sharing inter-State rivers and implementation of the river linking project. Though various high-power commissions and committees had examined these aspects in the past and made recommendations, some contentious points, as brought out below, on the Central government’s powers to regulate inter-State rivers, setting up river basin organisations, compensating the States for water surplus, etc., have remained unattended and hence would have to be addressed by the present Commission. More than 80 per cent of India’s water resources are contributed by interState rivers; but due to continued disputes among the states, a major portion of this precious asset has remained unutilised. An interState river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Hence, a conflict of interest is bound to arise among the co-basin States unless they are motivated to cooperate and share the water to reap benefits. However, the government of India, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, has been taking the stand that ‘water’ is a ‘State subject’.
This issue was examined earlier by the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988). The Commission concluded that Entry 56 of List I under the Constitution gives ample powers to the Union government to regulate and develop the inter-State rivers.
Inter-State rivers issue
While the Sarkaria Commission strongly supported the Union to use the power given to it under the Constitution, it did not appear to have examined whether the term “control, regulation and development” would include the ‘allocation’ of water to the State, though the ‘Entry’ in the present form appears adequate to cover the ‘apportionment’ and ‘use’ of these rivers under the power given to ‘regulate’ such rivers. Since within each State, the State decides the allocation, it could be argued that similar action could be taken by the Centre to allocate inter-State waters to states. These aspects need to be deliberated and clarified further.
Groundwater is another disputed issue, since the Indian Easement Act (1882) links access to groundwater with land ownership. However, neither the Krishna, Godavari and Narmada Tribunals examined this subject, nor was it addressed by the Sarkaria Commission. The controversy has cropped up since the U.N. Convention on international water courses (1997) had defined the water course as a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting a “unitary whole”. Also, the Working Group on inter–basin transfers, set up by the National Commission on water resources (1999), had observed that the fluvial part of groundwater needs to be considered as part of the water resources of a basin. The disputes arise mostly for want of agreement among the States concerned.
Move for consensus
Though the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has prepared detailed project reports, for implementation of the link schemes, the States have to agree. Water-rich States insist that they have no water to spare and do not want to negotiate away their future water uses. These have to be discussed in detail. Pricing the surplus water would encourage them to optimally use the water.
For enabling such discussions and for consensus building, River Basin Organisations (RBOs) with adequate powers, have to be constituted by amending the existing River Board’s Act (1956), which provides only for advisory boards. Constituting RBOs, pricing water, etc, would have to be addressed by the Commission.
With the spectre of drought looming large over many States while floods are ravaging large tracts in other parts of the country, the available option to minimise the distress, i.e., of linking rivers for transferring flood waters to water-deficit regions, continues to be a distant dream due to hydropolitics. It is to be hoped that the recommendations of the Commission would enable the Central government to take proactive decisions on the issues facing the water sector.
(The Hindu, dated 30th August, 2009)
•
The terms of reference for the Punchhi Commission on Centre-State relations (2007), inter-alia, include the issues of sharing inter-State rivers and implementation of the river linking project. Though various high-power commissions and committees had examined these aspects in the past and made recommendations, some contentious points, as brought out below, on the Central government’s powers to regulate inter-State rivers, setting up river basin organisations, compensating the States for water surplus, etc., have remained unattended and hence would have to be addressed by the present Commission. More than 80 per cent of India’s water resources are contributed by interState rivers; but due to continued disputes among the states, a major portion of this precious asset has remained unutilised. An interState river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Hence, a conflict of interest is bound to arise among the co-basin States unless they are motivated to cooperate and share the water to reap benefits. However, the government of India, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, has been taking the stand that ‘water’ is a ‘State subject’.
This issue was examined earlier by the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988). The Commission concluded that Entry 56 of List I under the Constitution gives ample powers to the Union government to regulate and develop the inter-State rivers.
Inter-State rivers issue
While the Sarkaria Commission strongly supported the Union to use the power given to it under the Constitution, it did not appear to have examined whether the term “control, regulation and development” would include the ‘allocation’ of water to the State, though the ‘Entry’ in the present form appears adequate to cover the ‘apportionment’ and ‘use’ of these rivers under the power given to ‘regulate’ such rivers. Since within each State, the State decides the allocation, it could be argued that similar action could be taken by the Centre to allocate inter-State waters to states. These aspects need to be deliberated and clarified further.
Groundwater is another disputed issue, since the Indian Easement Act (1882) links access to groundwater with land ownership. However, neither the Krishna, Godavari and Narmada Tribunals examined this subject, nor was it addressed by the Sarkaria Commission. The controversy has cropped up since the U.N. Convention on international water courses (1997) had defined the water course as a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting a “unitary whole”. Also, the Working Group on inter–basin transfers, set up by the National Commission on water resources (1999), had observed that the fluvial part of groundwater needs to be considered as part of the water resources of a basin. The disputes arise mostly for want of agreement among the States concerned.
Move for consensus
Though the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has prepared detailed project reports, for implementation of the link schemes, the States have to agree. Water-rich States insist that they have no water to spare and do not want to negotiate away their future water uses. These have to be discussed in detail. Pricing the surplus water would encourage them to optimally use the water.
For enabling such discussions and for consensus building, River Basin Organisations (RBOs) with adequate powers, have to be constituted by amending the existing River Board’s Act (1956), which provides only for advisory boards. Constituting RBOs, pricing water, etc, would have to be addressed by the Commission.
With the spectre of drought looming large over many States while floods are ravaging large tracts in other parts of the country, the available option to minimise the distress, i.e., of linking rivers for transferring flood waters to water-deficit regions, continues to be a distant dream due to hydropolitics. It is to be hoped that the recommendations of the Commission would enable the Central government to take proactive decisions on the issues facing the water sector.
(The Hindu, dated 30th August, 2009)
•
Indus Water Treaty
Withdraw from Indus treaty
THE despicable act of mass-casualty terrorism carried out by Pakistan sponsored terrorists on November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, and subsequent denials by our neighbour have revealed that India’s policy of appeasing Pakistan in the hope of peace had the opposite effect of what this country had hoped for.
Our often misplaced generosity had emboldened our neighbour to redouble its mischief with impunity, proving thereby that there is no short-cut to peace with Pakistan.
Unless Pakistan is made to realise that such acts of theirs against India would harm them more than hurting India, engaging them in the so-called peace process would ultimately turn out to be an exercise in futility.
Many retaliatory actions have been proposed and considered in the agonised deliberations subsequently held in India such as snapping tourism and trade, recalling our High Commissioner and even war.
Certainly war is not an option. But there is one option which can hurt Pakistan most — that of announcing India’s intent to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, signed between the two countries allocating the Indus waters .
As per the IWT, while Pakistan got the entire waters of the western rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) , India got the eastern rivers (The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) ie; only 20 per cent of the total water resources of the basin against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent.
If India walks out, the collapse of this Pakistan-biased treaty would trigger serious problems of water shortages there since India would then be having the option to divert and use its equitable share of Indus waters, which was denied all along due to the existing treaty provisions.
Internationally, an impression has been created by vested interests that the treaty is a model for trans-boundary river water agreements because of its in-built resilience and since it has survived two wars between the countries.
However, the fact is that even in spite of the unfair water allocations and treaty provisions, India has been always accommodating Pakistan’s unreasonable demands in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations.
The reduced allocation has caused water shortages in our states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan seriously affecting irrigated agriculture.
Also, endless arguments raised by our neighbour to delay every project planned by India, have grounded the pace of infrastructure development, particularly in J&K.
The treaty does not explicitly provide for an exit option or a mechanism to withdraw from the agreements. The only possibility is to modify the provisions by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two countries; but, this would remain a distant dream in view of the prevailing circumstances.
The time has, therefore, come to put an end to the covert wars waged by that country against India and the option available to us is by justifying India’s right to withdraw from the treaty citing Pakistan’s non-compliance with the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 on denial of terrorist sanctuaries and support.
Any pronouncement to walk out of the treaty would need to be followed by requisite actions to show that India means business since pious declarations alone would not stop the flow of the river. Hence, we must be ready with our plans to control and divert the river flows.
In this connection, available data indicate that, in the past, India had planned many schemes across the western rivers to tap the hydropower potential as permitted in the treaty. However, not much has been done to study the diversion possibilities of water from the western to the eastern rivers to augment the flows in the Indian side.
For example, there is a possibility of diverting the Indus at a point upstream of the Stakna hydro power project to a tributary of the Sutlej through a tunnel.
Similarly , the Chenab waters could be diverted from the river Chandra, a tributary of the Chenab, to a tributary of the Beas and from the Chenab main at Marlu to a tributary of the Ravi through tunnels.
A possibility also exists for constructing large dams on the Jhelum to facilitate the diversion of waters to the Chenab and to the Ravi.
In view of the large irrigation water demands made by Indian states, field surveys and sub-surface investigations should be taken up urgently and detailed project reports got ready for implementation of various diversion proposals.
It is, therefore, for India to take the lead in its own defence so that Pakistan would be forced to abide by the UN Security Council Resolution for ending terrorism.
(The Tribune, dated 30th January, 2009)
THE despicable act of mass-casualty terrorism carried out by Pakistan sponsored terrorists on November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, and subsequent denials by our neighbour have revealed that India’s policy of appeasing Pakistan in the hope of peace had the opposite effect of what this country had hoped for.
Our often misplaced generosity had emboldened our neighbour to redouble its mischief with impunity, proving thereby that there is no short-cut to peace with Pakistan.
Unless Pakistan is made to realise that such acts of theirs against India would harm them more than hurting India, engaging them in the so-called peace process would ultimately turn out to be an exercise in futility.
Many retaliatory actions have been proposed and considered in the agonised deliberations subsequently held in India such as snapping tourism and trade, recalling our High Commissioner and even war.
Certainly war is not an option. But there is one option which can hurt Pakistan most — that of announcing India’s intent to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, signed between the two countries allocating the Indus waters .
As per the IWT, while Pakistan got the entire waters of the western rivers (The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) , India got the eastern rivers (The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) ie; only 20 per cent of the total water resources of the basin against its rightful share of more than 40 per cent.
If India walks out, the collapse of this Pakistan-biased treaty would trigger serious problems of water shortages there since India would then be having the option to divert and use its equitable share of Indus waters, which was denied all along due to the existing treaty provisions.
Internationally, an impression has been created by vested interests that the treaty is a model for trans-boundary river water agreements because of its in-built resilience and since it has survived two wars between the countries.
However, the fact is that even in spite of the unfair water allocations and treaty provisions, India has been always accommodating Pakistan’s unreasonable demands in the interest of peaceful neighbourly relations.
The reduced allocation has caused water shortages in our states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan seriously affecting irrigated agriculture.
Also, endless arguments raised by our neighbour to delay every project planned by India, have grounded the pace of infrastructure development, particularly in J&K.
The treaty does not explicitly provide for an exit option or a mechanism to withdraw from the agreements. The only possibility is to modify the provisions by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two countries; but, this would remain a distant dream in view of the prevailing circumstances.
The time has, therefore, come to put an end to the covert wars waged by that country against India and the option available to us is by justifying India’s right to withdraw from the treaty citing Pakistan’s non-compliance with the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 on denial of terrorist sanctuaries and support.
Any pronouncement to walk out of the treaty would need to be followed by requisite actions to show that India means business since pious declarations alone would not stop the flow of the river. Hence, we must be ready with our plans to control and divert the river flows.
In this connection, available data indicate that, in the past, India had planned many schemes across the western rivers to tap the hydropower potential as permitted in the treaty. However, not much has been done to study the diversion possibilities of water from the western to the eastern rivers to augment the flows in the Indian side.
For example, there is a possibility of diverting the Indus at a point upstream of the Stakna hydro power project to a tributary of the Sutlej through a tunnel.
Similarly , the Chenab waters could be diverted from the river Chandra, a tributary of the Chenab, to a tributary of the Beas and from the Chenab main at Marlu to a tributary of the Ravi through tunnels.
A possibility also exists for constructing large dams on the Jhelum to facilitate the diversion of waters to the Chenab and to the Ravi.
In view of the large irrigation water demands made by Indian states, field surveys and sub-surface investigations should be taken up urgently and detailed project reports got ready for implementation of various diversion proposals.
It is, therefore, for India to take the lead in its own defence so that Pakistan would be forced to abide by the UN Security Council Resolution for ending terrorism.
(The Tribune, dated 30th January, 2009)
disastrous floods
To prevent disastrous floods, avoid hydropolitics
The Centre must play a proactive role in coordinating all river and flood management agencies, writes MS Menon
Incessant rains and resulting floods this year have wreaked havoc in many parts of the country. When the flooded Kosi river unleashed by a bund breach in Nepal ravaged north Bihar and the Mahanadi in spate inundated many areas of Orissa, almost at the same time torrential rains caused water levels rising above danger marks in the Ganga and its tributaries, including the Yamuna, flooding many parts of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and New Delhi.
As the flood waters continued to inflict misery on millions of people, blame game among the power mongers started, opening the floodgates of hydropolitics, thereby affecting relief and rehabilitation efforts. Activists pursuing the fixed agenda of 'no dams, no embankments' also jumped into the fray to remain in the limelight.
The war of words would continue but there is a need to examine why various studies and flood control measures carried out in the past failed to deliver.
In 1980, the Rashtriya Barh Ayog had assessed the area prone to floods at 34 million hectares and reasonable protection available to about 10 mha. RBA had advised many actions including enactment of laws to regulate man-made activities in the flood plains. But most of its recommendations were not acted upon.
In 1999 the National Commission for Water Resources had observed that storage dams and embankments did provide effective protection to large flood-prone areas and prevent the loss of standing crops. It recommended performance review of selected embankments and stressed the need for associating the beneficiaries in the upkeep of the embankments. The commission also suggested adoption of nonstructural measures like flood forecasting to minimise flood impacts.
In 2004, unprecedented floods in the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers necessitated the Centre to constitute a Task Force (TF) to suggest remedial measures. The Task Force recommended more involvement by the Centre to make flood management efforts effective. The Working Group of the 11th Planning Commission had also emphasised the need for Central involvement and for setting up a Central Flood Management Organisation.
But the Centre's response remained lukewarm like before.
In the meanwhile, the much-hyped River Linking Project to divert flood waters to water deficit areas is progressing at snail's pace and not even a single link has been executed so far. The Centre does not appear to be serious about this project also.
Recently, as an aftermath of the Kosi floods, another 'dream' project has been announced by declaring the river Ganga as a national river. As per reports, this step is to ensure an integrated approach in the sustainable use of Ganga waters, flood management and pollution management, instead of the current piecemeal efforts taken up in a fragmented manner by different agencies in this regard.
What is required is a coordination among the concerned authorities and not pious words and hollow promises. Rather than taking shelter on the plea that 'water' is a state subject, the Centre should take proactive action on the recommendations made by the various committees and focus on the River Linking Project.
(The Pioneer, dated 20th november, 2008)
The Centre must play a proactive role in coordinating all river and flood management agencies, writes MS Menon
Incessant rains and resulting floods this year have wreaked havoc in many parts of the country. When the flooded Kosi river unleashed by a bund breach in Nepal ravaged north Bihar and the Mahanadi in spate inundated many areas of Orissa, almost at the same time torrential rains caused water levels rising above danger marks in the Ganga and its tributaries, including the Yamuna, flooding many parts of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and New Delhi.
As the flood waters continued to inflict misery on millions of people, blame game among the power mongers started, opening the floodgates of hydropolitics, thereby affecting relief and rehabilitation efforts. Activists pursuing the fixed agenda of 'no dams, no embankments' also jumped into the fray to remain in the limelight.
The war of words would continue but there is a need to examine why various studies and flood control measures carried out in the past failed to deliver.
In 1980, the Rashtriya Barh Ayog had assessed the area prone to floods at 34 million hectares and reasonable protection available to about 10 mha. RBA had advised many actions including enactment of laws to regulate man-made activities in the flood plains. But most of its recommendations were not acted upon.
In 1999 the National Commission for Water Resources had observed that storage dams and embankments did provide effective protection to large flood-prone areas and prevent the loss of standing crops. It recommended performance review of selected embankments and stressed the need for associating the beneficiaries in the upkeep of the embankments. The commission also suggested adoption of nonstructural measures like flood forecasting to minimise flood impacts.
In 2004, unprecedented floods in the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers necessitated the Centre to constitute a Task Force (TF) to suggest remedial measures. The Task Force recommended more involvement by the Centre to make flood management efforts effective. The Working Group of the 11th Planning Commission had also emphasised the need for Central involvement and for setting up a Central Flood Management Organisation.
But the Centre's response remained lukewarm like before.
In the meanwhile, the much-hyped River Linking Project to divert flood waters to water deficit areas is progressing at snail's pace and not even a single link has been executed so far. The Centre does not appear to be serious about this project also.
Recently, as an aftermath of the Kosi floods, another 'dream' project has been announced by declaring the river Ganga as a national river. As per reports, this step is to ensure an integrated approach in the sustainable use of Ganga waters, flood management and pollution management, instead of the current piecemeal efforts taken up in a fragmented manner by different agencies in this regard.
What is required is a coordination among the concerned authorities and not pious words and hollow promises. Rather than taking shelter on the plea that 'water' is a state subject, the Centre should take proactive action on the recommendations made by the various committees and focus on the River Linking Project.
(The Pioneer, dated 20th november, 2008)
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Cooperation with Nepal
Towards bilateral cooperation with Nepal
The river Kosi, originating from the southern slopes of the Himalayas, flows through the flat plains of the Nepal Terai, before it enters India, downstream of Hanumannagar. The river has been notorious in changing its course from east to west, having drifted more than 100 km from its original course and sweeping over an area of 13,000 sq km in India and 1,000 sq km in Nepal since the 18th century. It has therefore been described as Bihar’s river of sorrow. The construction of a barrage with embankments at Hanumannagar in 1963 changed this scenario to a great extent ensuring the river to be confined to a definite channel, thus preventing lateral movements for the last few decades. However, the recent breach of the bund at Kusaha in Nepal caused the surging waters of the Kosi leaving its earlier course to follow the lay of the land to the east with gargantuan sheets of water spread over more than 1,000 sq km in Nepal and India, before joining the Ganga.
The present deluge has not only brought about vast devastation but has also triggered the blame game among the governments concerned. The Nepal government has blamed India for the calamity. Quoting the provisions of the Kosi Project Agreement (1954), Kathmandu pointed out that it was India’s responsibility for the repair, maintenance and overall surveillance of the Kusaha embankment within Nepalese territory. While the central government blamed the Bihar government for not taking timely action, the latter blamed Nepal for not cooperating with it and not allowing Indian contractors to do the maintenance jobs.
Lack of agreement
India has to live with the fact that the chronic floods caused by the Himalayan rivers originating from Nepal can be controlled only by damming them and carrying out river training works.
Though both countries have entered into agreements for specific development aspects of the rivers such as the Kosi, the Gandak and the Mahakali, implementation has been poor for various reasons. The proposal to have a Kosi High Dam envisaging irrigation, power and flood control benefits mooted more than five decades back is still to see the light of the day.
Same is the case regarding the Kamla Multipurpose project, Pancheswar project and the Karnali hydroelectric project.For the past 30 years, committees for embankment construction, monitoring works, inundation problems, etc., have been examining and advising the governments concerned on these international rivers. For issues connected specifically with the Kosi also there are many committees. Unfortunately, everyone is working in isolation without knowing or caring to know what others are doing and years of analysis paralysed them into inaction when tragedy struck now. The integrated development of the Himalayan rivers calls for cooperation and India should work for such cooperation with Nepal since dams on these rivers alone can provide a certain degree of protection against floods.
Taming the rivers
A change in the bureaucratic mindset of rigidly sticking to our terms while dealing with Nepal can help to find an agreed plan of action not only to tame the Kosi but also other rivers originating from Nepal. Discussions at political level should enable the setting up of a high power Indo-Nepal Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) at the ministerial level to function better than the Indo-Pak Permanent Indus Commission and the Indo-Bangladesh JRC. It would then be possible to set up specific project authorities for the Kosi, Karnali, etc., with equal representation from both the countries and having adequate administrative and financial powers.
Such a step similar to the Tala project (Bhutan)would enable timely implementation of the projects and their proper maintenance to avoid calamitous situations. In view of the reported moves being made by China to enter the hydro-development field in Nepal, India has to move fast to resolve the contentious issues to get the best out of the Himalayan rivers.
(The Hindu, dated 21st September, 2008)
The river Kosi, originating from the southern slopes of the Himalayas, flows through the flat plains of the Nepal Terai, before it enters India, downstream of Hanumannagar. The river has been notorious in changing its course from east to west, having drifted more than 100 km from its original course and sweeping over an area of 13,000 sq km in India and 1,000 sq km in Nepal since the 18th century. It has therefore been described as Bihar’s river of sorrow. The construction of a barrage with embankments at Hanumannagar in 1963 changed this scenario to a great extent ensuring the river to be confined to a definite channel, thus preventing lateral movements for the last few decades. However, the recent breach of the bund at Kusaha in Nepal caused the surging waters of the Kosi leaving its earlier course to follow the lay of the land to the east with gargantuan sheets of water spread over more than 1,000 sq km in Nepal and India, before joining the Ganga.
The present deluge has not only brought about vast devastation but has also triggered the blame game among the governments concerned. The Nepal government has blamed India for the calamity. Quoting the provisions of the Kosi Project Agreement (1954), Kathmandu pointed out that it was India’s responsibility for the repair, maintenance and overall surveillance of the Kusaha embankment within Nepalese territory. While the central government blamed the Bihar government for not taking timely action, the latter blamed Nepal for not cooperating with it and not allowing Indian contractors to do the maintenance jobs.
Lack of agreement
India has to live with the fact that the chronic floods caused by the Himalayan rivers originating from Nepal can be controlled only by damming them and carrying out river training works.
Though both countries have entered into agreements for specific development aspects of the rivers such as the Kosi, the Gandak and the Mahakali, implementation has been poor for various reasons. The proposal to have a Kosi High Dam envisaging irrigation, power and flood control benefits mooted more than five decades back is still to see the light of the day.
Same is the case regarding the Kamla Multipurpose project, Pancheswar project and the Karnali hydroelectric project.For the past 30 years, committees for embankment construction, monitoring works, inundation problems, etc., have been examining and advising the governments concerned on these international rivers. For issues connected specifically with the Kosi also there are many committees. Unfortunately, everyone is working in isolation without knowing or caring to know what others are doing and years of analysis paralysed them into inaction when tragedy struck now. The integrated development of the Himalayan rivers calls for cooperation and India should work for such cooperation with Nepal since dams on these rivers alone can provide a certain degree of protection against floods.
Taming the rivers
A change in the bureaucratic mindset of rigidly sticking to our terms while dealing with Nepal can help to find an agreed plan of action not only to tame the Kosi but also other rivers originating from Nepal. Discussions at political level should enable the setting up of a high power Indo-Nepal Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) at the ministerial level to function better than the Indo-Pak Permanent Indus Commission and the Indo-Bangladesh JRC. It would then be possible to set up specific project authorities for the Kosi, Karnali, etc., with equal representation from both the countries and having adequate administrative and financial powers.
Such a step similar to the Tala project (Bhutan)would enable timely implementation of the projects and their proper maintenance to avoid calamitous situations. In view of the reported moves being made by China to enter the hydro-development field in Nepal, India has to move fast to resolve the contentious issues to get the best out of the Himalayan rivers.
(The Hindu, dated 21st September, 2008)
Cleaning Yamuna
Krishna's river turns cesspool
But all is not lost: With the right effort by the right people Yamuna can be saved
The river Yamuna, in its 22 km stretch between Wazirabad barrage and Okhla, is today an aquatic mass of pollution, a filthy choked drain with tonnes of sewage and industrial effluents discharging into it. Many committees after examining the factors causing the deterioration of its water quality suggested measures to improve the condition. Even the Supreme Court expressed concern over Yamuna's poor water quality and directed a High Powered Committee to be set up to formulate an action plan to clean the river.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was initiated and sewage treatment plants (STPs) were installed in the drains that empty into the Yamuna. The plan, known as YAP-1, failed to achieve the objectives envisaged as the existing/constructed STPs remained under utilised due to shortcomings in the sewerage network. Thus even after spending crores of rupees, the Yamuna continues to be dirty.
Presently. sewage of about 3800 million litres daily (mld) is generated in Delhi whereas the treatment capacity available is only for 2330 mld and sewage actually treated is 1600 mld due to deficiencies in the network. The trunk sewers are heavily silted while many of the internal sewers and peripheral sewers are old, undersized or damaged. Further, nearly 40 per cent of Delhi's population does not have any sewerage facility. Consequently, the treated, untreated and uncollected sewage finds its way through storm water drains joining the river and causing unacceptable levels of pollution.
The Yamuna in Delhi is polluted primarily because 21 drains empty their waste waters directly into the river. Of these, the 25 km long Najafgarh drain alone carries about 50 per cent of the municipal waste in addition to draining 60 per cent of Delhi's watershed. This drain collects treated waste water from 4 STPs and untreated waste from 38 drains outfalling into it and discharges into Yamuna about 21 cumecs of waste waters containing 90 per cent of the raw sewage.
It is therefore not surprising that the plan (YAP-1) failed.
World over, many rivers flow through major urban concentrations carrying the city's pollutants. The Thames flowing through London and the Rhine in Europe are such examples. These rivers could be revived with people's unstinted support and by implementing well studied, needed works.
The failure of YAP-1 led the authorities to come up with a new plan,YAP-2. The plan would have three components: Mapping the major drains -- Najafgarh drain, Supplementary drain and Shahdara drain -- to assess desilting, repairs and other works needed; protecting the other 18 drains which outfall directly into the river from becoming the dumpyards of Delhi garbage so as to ensure optimum functioning of the STPs installed in these drains; and constructing a sewage interceptor system to intercept the sewage falling into these drains. The new plan is expected to become operational by 2012-13.
Here, it would be better to examine whether the present proposal would really be able to reduce the river pollution. One of the main parameters to assess water quality is the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) level in water which, according to Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), should not be more than 3 mg/litre in this river stretch. Presently it is almost 15 times more. Even if all the sewage is intercepted and treated using conventional process at STPs, BOD level can at best be brought down to 20. Hence other technologies have also to be thought of to supplement the efforts.
One method to bring down the level to the acceptable figure is to dilute the sewage by releasing more water into the river. For diluting the present sewage flow (30 cumecs), it is estimated that about 450 cumecs of fresh water would be needed. However, this much water is not available/sparable due to the existing demands for irrigation, drinking and other needs of the co-basin States.
Another method is to use the technology involving constructed wetlands for reducing the pollution. This method has been successful in improving the condition of the much polluted Kshipra river near Ujjain and other water bodies in Madhya Pradesh. In Kshipra, an artificial floating island (AFI) of size 200 sqm was installed at the confluence of the city's domestic waste water drain with the river and quality of water downstream tested. The field trials carried out by Prof Billore of Vikram University have shown a reduction of 40-50 per cent of pollutants comprising nitrates, ammonia etc and also substantial lowering of the BOD levels in Kshipra.
Cleaning the Yamuna would need a combination of technologies such as constructed wetlands and STPs for intercepting and treating the sewage and proper maintenance of the created infrastructure. With people's active participation and the administration taking the right steps, the Yamuna experiment could become a great environmental success story.
(The Pioneer, dated 11th September, 2008)
But all is not lost: With the right effort by the right people Yamuna can be saved
The river Yamuna, in its 22 km stretch between Wazirabad barrage and Okhla, is today an aquatic mass of pollution, a filthy choked drain with tonnes of sewage and industrial effluents discharging into it. Many committees after examining the factors causing the deterioration of its water quality suggested measures to improve the condition. Even the Supreme Court expressed concern over Yamuna's poor water quality and directed a High Powered Committee to be set up to formulate an action plan to clean the river.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) was initiated and sewage treatment plants (STPs) were installed in the drains that empty into the Yamuna. The plan, known as YAP-1, failed to achieve the objectives envisaged as the existing/constructed STPs remained under utilised due to shortcomings in the sewerage network. Thus even after spending crores of rupees, the Yamuna continues to be dirty.
Presently. sewage of about 3800 million litres daily (mld) is generated in Delhi whereas the treatment capacity available is only for 2330 mld and sewage actually treated is 1600 mld due to deficiencies in the network. The trunk sewers are heavily silted while many of the internal sewers and peripheral sewers are old, undersized or damaged. Further, nearly 40 per cent of Delhi's population does not have any sewerage facility. Consequently, the treated, untreated and uncollected sewage finds its way through storm water drains joining the river and causing unacceptable levels of pollution.
The Yamuna in Delhi is polluted primarily because 21 drains empty their waste waters directly into the river. Of these, the 25 km long Najafgarh drain alone carries about 50 per cent of the municipal waste in addition to draining 60 per cent of Delhi's watershed. This drain collects treated waste water from 4 STPs and untreated waste from 38 drains outfalling into it and discharges into Yamuna about 21 cumecs of waste waters containing 90 per cent of the raw sewage.
It is therefore not surprising that the plan (YAP-1) failed.
World over, many rivers flow through major urban concentrations carrying the city's pollutants. The Thames flowing through London and the Rhine in Europe are such examples. These rivers could be revived with people's unstinted support and by implementing well studied, needed works.
The failure of YAP-1 led the authorities to come up with a new plan,YAP-2. The plan would have three components: Mapping the major drains -- Najafgarh drain, Supplementary drain and Shahdara drain -- to assess desilting, repairs and other works needed; protecting the other 18 drains which outfall directly into the river from becoming the dumpyards of Delhi garbage so as to ensure optimum functioning of the STPs installed in these drains; and constructing a sewage interceptor system to intercept the sewage falling into these drains. The new plan is expected to become operational by 2012-13.
Here, it would be better to examine whether the present proposal would really be able to reduce the river pollution. One of the main parameters to assess water quality is the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) level in water which, according to Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), should not be more than 3 mg/litre in this river stretch. Presently it is almost 15 times more. Even if all the sewage is intercepted and treated using conventional process at STPs, BOD level can at best be brought down to 20. Hence other technologies have also to be thought of to supplement the efforts.
One method to bring down the level to the acceptable figure is to dilute the sewage by releasing more water into the river. For diluting the present sewage flow (30 cumecs), it is estimated that about 450 cumecs of fresh water would be needed. However, this much water is not available/sparable due to the existing demands for irrigation, drinking and other needs of the co-basin States.
Another method is to use the technology involving constructed wetlands for reducing the pollution. This method has been successful in improving the condition of the much polluted Kshipra river near Ujjain and other water bodies in Madhya Pradesh. In Kshipra, an artificial floating island (AFI) of size 200 sqm was installed at the confluence of the city's domestic waste water drain with the river and quality of water downstream tested. The field trials carried out by Prof Billore of Vikram University have shown a reduction of 40-50 per cent of pollutants comprising nitrates, ammonia etc and also substantial lowering of the BOD levels in Kshipra.
Cleaning the Yamuna would need a combination of technologies such as constructed wetlands and STPs for intercepting and treating the sewage and proper maintenance of the created infrastructure. With people's active participation and the administration taking the right steps, the Yamuna experiment could become a great environmental success story.
(The Pioneer, dated 11th September, 2008)
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Kishanganga Project ( Indus)
India has to act fast on Kishanganga project
PAKISTAN is again resorting to accusations about projects in J&K after it failed to convince the World Bank about India violating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions in the Baglihar project. Its attempt now is to make the Kishanganga Project a disputed scheme, thereby seeking the bank’s intervention and delaying the project.
Pakistan’s only objective seems to be to stall India’s efforts in developing the hydro-potential in the Indus system, permitted by the IWT (1960), a treaty lauded as a model for international agreements on water sharing, though it is nothing of the sort.
International treaties on the use of trans-boundary rivers aim at achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the water resources to benefit the co-basin states. But this is not happening in the case of the IWT.
Unlike other international water treaties, IWT is unique in ignoring accepted international practices. For example, the method adopted for water sharing is by equal distribution of the number of rivers in the system flowing through India, rather than equitable distribution of water in the entire basin; there is no time limit for its operational validity thus making it an agreement ad-infinitum; there is no provision for either party to withdraw from the treaty; its clauses enable non-constructive application of treaty provisions to stall developmental efforts but are not very specific on sound engineering practices needed to achieve the objectives.
All along, the treaty has been hyped as a model for sharing and utilisation of any international river, since, due to its in-built resilience, it could survive two wars and many war-like situations between the two countries in the past. But the fact is that it has outlived the tempests of history only because India was willing to adjust to Pakistan’s tantrums, though India got a raw deal in the treaty getting only about 20 per cent share of the Indus waters against more than 40 per cent due on equity considerations. Other treaty provisions are also favouring Pakistan.
India has always been willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of good neighbourly relations. Encouraged by our tolerance, Pakistan continues to make Indian projects a subject of endless debate, to delay implementation. Construction of the Wular project meant to facilitate cheap inland water transport to the apple growers of interior J&K, had to be stopped. Completion of the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450MW) was delayed by many years.
Pakistan has so far succeeded in delaying more than 25 Indian projects raising the bogey of treaty violations.Consequently, out of the estimated 8825 mw of hydro-potential to be exploited by India from the western rivers of the Indus system, only about 1300 mw has been harnessed so far. This has affected development plans in J&K.
The Kishanganga project envisages construction of a dam across the Kishanganga river, a tributary of the Jhelum. The ponded waters would be diverted through a tunnel and a powerhouse again to the main Jhelum river and in the process would generate 330 mw of power using a drop of 297 metres. With the diverted Jhelum water returning back to the main river, Pak’s share of Jhelum water would remain unaffected.
The project details were furnished to Pakistan in the nineties, as per the treaty provisions. As usual, Pakistan objected, insisting out that the Indian project affected their existing uses downstream. In meetings after meetings India sought details of their existing uses, but instead of the details, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India to attract World Bank intervention.
Recent media reports indicate that China has offered help to Pakistan to overcome its water and power crisis. It has promised help to construct their Basha dam. It is also reported that Pakistan has awarded the 2.16 billion dollar Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project at a site downstream of our project, to Chinese companies, to complete the work in 7 years.
Experience shows that China is least concerned about Indian protests. Thus, while engaging India on unending discussions, Pakistan would be able to complete the project before India and then claim that the Indian project would affect the existing power generation, and hence would be violating treaty provisions.
India should take up and complete the Kishanganga project immediately. It has lost many trying to appease Pakistan. Still, it is not too late. India has to act and act fast.
(The Tribune, dated 22nd May, 2008)
PAKISTAN is again resorting to accusations about projects in J&K after it failed to convince the World Bank about India violating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) provisions in the Baglihar project. Its attempt now is to make the Kishanganga Project a disputed scheme, thereby seeking the bank’s intervention and delaying the project.
Pakistan’s only objective seems to be to stall India’s efforts in developing the hydro-potential in the Indus system, permitted by the IWT (1960), a treaty lauded as a model for international agreements on water sharing, though it is nothing of the sort.
International treaties on the use of trans-boundary rivers aim at achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the water resources to benefit the co-basin states. But this is not happening in the case of the IWT.
Unlike other international water treaties, IWT is unique in ignoring accepted international practices. For example, the method adopted for water sharing is by equal distribution of the number of rivers in the system flowing through India, rather than equitable distribution of water in the entire basin; there is no time limit for its operational validity thus making it an agreement ad-infinitum; there is no provision for either party to withdraw from the treaty; its clauses enable non-constructive application of treaty provisions to stall developmental efforts but are not very specific on sound engineering practices needed to achieve the objectives.
All along, the treaty has been hyped as a model for sharing and utilisation of any international river, since, due to its in-built resilience, it could survive two wars and many war-like situations between the two countries in the past. But the fact is that it has outlived the tempests of history only because India was willing to adjust to Pakistan’s tantrums, though India got a raw deal in the treaty getting only about 20 per cent share of the Indus waters against more than 40 per cent due on equity considerations. Other treaty provisions are also favouring Pakistan.
India has always been willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of good neighbourly relations. Encouraged by our tolerance, Pakistan continues to make Indian projects a subject of endless debate, to delay implementation. Construction of the Wular project meant to facilitate cheap inland water transport to the apple growers of interior J&K, had to be stopped. Completion of the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450MW) was delayed by many years.
Pakistan has so far succeeded in delaying more than 25 Indian projects raising the bogey of treaty violations.Consequently, out of the estimated 8825 mw of hydro-potential to be exploited by India from the western rivers of the Indus system, only about 1300 mw has been harnessed so far. This has affected development plans in J&K.
The Kishanganga project envisages construction of a dam across the Kishanganga river, a tributary of the Jhelum. The ponded waters would be diverted through a tunnel and a powerhouse again to the main Jhelum river and in the process would generate 330 mw of power using a drop of 297 metres. With the diverted Jhelum water returning back to the main river, Pak’s share of Jhelum water would remain unaffected.
The project details were furnished to Pakistan in the nineties, as per the treaty provisions. As usual, Pakistan objected, insisting out that the Indian project affected their existing uses downstream. In meetings after meetings India sought details of their existing uses, but instead of the details, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India to attract World Bank intervention.
Recent media reports indicate that China has offered help to Pakistan to overcome its water and power crisis. It has promised help to construct their Basha dam. It is also reported that Pakistan has awarded the 2.16 billion dollar Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project at a site downstream of our project, to Chinese companies, to complete the work in 7 years.
Experience shows that China is least concerned about Indian protests. Thus, while engaging India on unending discussions, Pakistan would be able to complete the project before India and then claim that the Indian project would affect the existing power generation, and hence would be violating treaty provisions.
India should take up and complete the Kishanganga project immediately. It has lost many trying to appease Pakistan. Still, it is not too late. India has to act and act fast.
(The Tribune, dated 22nd May, 2008)
Needed River Basin Authorities
Need for river basin authorities
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution can provide a platform to build consensus among States
On the occasion of World Water Day, 2002, Kofi Annan, the then U.N. Secretary General, had warned that “water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.” Similar sentiments were echoed recently by Ban Ki-moon in his message on World Water Day, 2008, that the problems growing from the scarcity of a vital resource (like water) would spill over state borders creating a high risk of violent conflict.
We do not have to look elsewhere for examples in this regard since it is happening right here in India. The Hogenakkal project, a drinking water scheme across the interstate Cauvery river planned by Tamil Nadu recently, caused a serious law and order situation both in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with tempers running high in the States.
Hydropolitics
Similarly widespread protests raged in Orissa when Andhra Pradesh started works on the Mahendratanaya drinking water and irrigation project in the interstate Vamsadhara river basin. Unfortunately, such situations occur due to hydropolitics encouraging ad hoc measures for resolving problems, ignoring needed actions with long term vision, particularly in the case of interstate rivers.
An interstate river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Conflict of interest is the normal state of affairs when the uneven distribution of rainfall in space and time leads to endemic problems of water shortage in the basin.
Consequently, the co-basin States start claiming ownership rights to water flowing through their territories forgetting their obligation to cooperate with each other, thus causing irreparable harm to the principle of federalism of the polity. The Central government, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, takes the plea that under the Constitution, water is a State subject and Central intervention is possible only when the subject is brought under “Central” or “Concurrent” List.
Non-use of a given power
In this connection, the opinion of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) would be of interest. The Commission had stated that the Centre could take over the regulation and development of interstate river waters by virtue of Entry 56, List 1 (Central List) of the Constitution. It had also observed that “the present situation is more a case of non-use of a given power by the Union than one of want of the same.”
It had also pointed out that with more frequent meetings of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC), chaired by the Prime Minister with Chief Ministers as members, the points of difference on water issues between the States could be resolved through accommodation.
Unfortunately, NWRC was not able to meet frequently and find time to discuss and sort out the issues with the result that water disputes continued for want of a duly empowered forum to enable mutual consultations among the States and to focus the dialogue on water needs rather than water rights.
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution comprising Central and State representatives would be able to provide a platform to build consensus among the States through discussions.
Interestingly, the River Boards Act, 1956, has a provision for setting up River Basin Organisations (RBO). But the Act provides only for boards advisory in nature and hence does not give any authority to the Central government to control and develop the interstate rivers or regulate the activities of the State governments in these matters.
Though in 1988, the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources had recommended setting up of RBOs having authority for regulation and control of the basin under Article 246 by suitable enactments, as of now, there is not a single RBO established for the purpose. A duly empowered, well structured RBO alone would be able to promote ethically based behaviour and action in a river basin and guide all parties towards a common goal and collective good.
The composition, powers, etc., of RBOs have to be detailed while planning the organisation to ensure that conflicts do not crop up during the operational stages and thereafter, as happened in the Murray-Darling Basin Organisation in Australia and in the Fracer Basin Council in Canada.
Considering the fact that interstate rivers contribute a major share of the utilisable water resources of the country, a legally backed RBO has to be in position to accelerate the consensus building process to optimally utilise the precious water resources of the country, as the demand for fresh water is increasingly taking centre-stage on the economic and political agenda, and more and more disputes are arising between States.
(The Hindu, dated 20th April, 2008)
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution can provide a platform to build consensus among States
On the occasion of World Water Day, 2002, Kofi Annan, the then U.N. Secretary General, had warned that “water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.” Similar sentiments were echoed recently by Ban Ki-moon in his message on World Water Day, 2008, that the problems growing from the scarcity of a vital resource (like water) would spill over state borders creating a high risk of violent conflict.
We do not have to look elsewhere for examples in this regard since it is happening right here in India. The Hogenakkal project, a drinking water scheme across the interstate Cauvery river planned by Tamil Nadu recently, caused a serious law and order situation both in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with tempers running high in the States.
Hydropolitics
Similarly widespread protests raged in Orissa when Andhra Pradesh started works on the Mahendratanaya drinking water and irrigation project in the interstate Vamsadhara river basin. Unfortunately, such situations occur due to hydropolitics encouraging ad hoc measures for resolving problems, ignoring needed actions with long term vision, particularly in the case of interstate rivers.
An interstate river physically links not only the upstream and downstream users but also the uses. Conflict of interest is the normal state of affairs when the uneven distribution of rainfall in space and time leads to endemic problems of water shortage in the basin.
Consequently, the co-basin States start claiming ownership rights to water flowing through their territories forgetting their obligation to cooperate with each other, thus causing irreparable harm to the principle of federalism of the polity. The Central government, whenever confronted with water disputes among the States, takes the plea that under the Constitution, water is a State subject and Central intervention is possible only when the subject is brought under “Central” or “Concurrent” List.
Non-use of a given power
In this connection, the opinion of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) would be of interest. The Commission had stated that the Centre could take over the regulation and development of interstate river waters by virtue of Entry 56, List 1 (Central List) of the Constitution. It had also observed that “the present situation is more a case of non-use of a given power by the Union than one of want of the same.”
It had also pointed out that with more frequent meetings of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC), chaired by the Prime Minister with Chief Ministers as members, the points of difference on water issues between the States could be resolved through accommodation.
Unfortunately, NWRC was not able to meet frequently and find time to discuss and sort out the issues with the result that water disputes continued for want of a duly empowered forum to enable mutual consultations among the States and to focus the dialogue on water needs rather than water rights.
Water being an emotive issue, only a mandated institution comprising Central and State representatives would be able to provide a platform to build consensus among the States through discussions.
Interestingly, the River Boards Act, 1956, has a provision for setting up River Basin Organisations (RBO). But the Act provides only for boards advisory in nature and hence does not give any authority to the Central government to control and develop the interstate rivers or regulate the activities of the State governments in these matters.
Though in 1988, the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources had recommended setting up of RBOs having authority for regulation and control of the basin under Article 246 by suitable enactments, as of now, there is not a single RBO established for the purpose. A duly empowered, well structured RBO alone would be able to promote ethically based behaviour and action in a river basin and guide all parties towards a common goal and collective good.
The composition, powers, etc., of RBOs have to be detailed while planning the organisation to ensure that conflicts do not crop up during the operational stages and thereafter, as happened in the Murray-Darling Basin Organisation in Australia and in the Fracer Basin Council in Canada.
Considering the fact that interstate rivers contribute a major share of the utilisable water resources of the country, a legally backed RBO has to be in position to accelerate the consensus building process to optimally utilise the precious water resources of the country, as the demand for fresh water is increasingly taking centre-stage on the economic and political agenda, and more and more disputes are arising between States.
(The Hindu, dated 20th April, 2008)
China Aggressive on Rivers
China aggressive on Tibetan rivers
CHINA has recently announced that a 141 km highway linking Bome to Medok City in Nyingtri Prefecture will be constructed next year. An airport has also been opened in this Prefecture at an altitude of 2949 metres. Medok is located near the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangppo (India’s Brahmaputra) where the river takes a sharp U-turn to enter into India. India is interested in these developments since the road and the airstrip at Nyingtri would facilitate construction of the project planned by China at the Great Bend to divert the Brahmaputra waters to its north.
One of the major problems facing China presently is water scarcity, as the mighty Yellow River has become a seasonal stream and the Yangtze river is in a critical condition. China does not want its aspirations to superpower status thwarted by a water crisis and hence its plans to divert the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Region to the arid north through 3 links – the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages the Brahmaputra diversion.
The Chinese plans for using the Brahmaputra waters have been in the news since last few decades, as brought out in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982), and the Scientific American (June, 1996). For many years China had been vehemently denying any such move. However, in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed the plans for the Tsangpo
Diversion Project.
The project, scheduled to start in 2009, would be sited at Permakoe near the Great Bend and would have two components (i) a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40000 MW utilizing the fall of 3000mts. in the river and (ii) arrangements for diverting Tsangpo waters.
The Chinese interventions in the Sutlej, Brahmaputra, etc. could affect river flows into India.Our irrigation and hydroprojects would suffer if the Chinese divert the waters during glacier melting period and release large flows during the monsoon.
In this connection, the experience of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, the co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to China constructing 2 hydro-dams in its territory, should be an eye opener for India.
These states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities; also, the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more waters than normal from its upstream reservoirs into the river below. However, China did not bother about the objections raised by these states and even of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) stating that it is not a member of MRC.
India too had experienced heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past. The large floods in the Sutlej in 2000, 2004 and 2005 necessitated closure of the Nathpa Jhakri Project and evacuation of people from the affected areas. Arunachal Pradesh also suffered due to a flooded Brahmaputra reportedly caused by dam failures in Tibet.
China is not answerable to India on the use of the Tibetan rivers since there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers, a situation similar to the Mekong basin. Hence it would be in the interest of India to enter into an agreement with China for the optimum utilization of the Tibetan rivers as a follow up of the joint declaration made by the two countries in 2006 for exchanging hydrologic data.
Sharing information on flow data alone is not adequate to address our concerns. The impacts on the rivers due to upstream Chinese operations such as (i) reduction of flows by diversion and (ii) floods resulting from breaches or sudden gate openings, have to be addressed by India. Construction of cascade projects across the concerned rivers is therefore a necessity to ensure water conservation and flood absorption. Unfortunately proposed projects like Khab project(s) in Himachal Pradesh and Siang project(s) in Arunachal Pradesh investigated earlier appears to have been dropped on benefit -cost considerations.
The strategic importance including disaster mitigation offered by these projects should have been given due weightage while evaluating them instead of applying the routine norms . It is time Government of India takes special interest to implement these projects to address India’s concerns instead of labouring under an ideology induced myopia.
(The Tribune, dated 26th December, 2007)
CHINA has recently announced that a 141 km highway linking Bome to Medok City in Nyingtri Prefecture will be constructed next year. An airport has also been opened in this Prefecture at an altitude of 2949 metres. Medok is located near the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangppo (India’s Brahmaputra) where the river takes a sharp U-turn to enter into India. India is interested in these developments since the road and the airstrip at Nyingtri would facilitate construction of the project planned by China at the Great Bend to divert the Brahmaputra waters to its north.
One of the major problems facing China presently is water scarcity, as the mighty Yellow River has become a seasonal stream and the Yangtze river is in a critical condition. China does not want its aspirations to superpower status thwarted by a water crisis and hence its plans to divert the abundant water resources of the Tibetan Region to the arid north through 3 links – the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages the Brahmaputra diversion.
The Chinese plans for using the Brahmaputra waters have been in the news since last few decades, as brought out in the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report (1982), and the Scientific American (June, 1996). For many years China had been vehemently denying any such move. However, in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed the plans for the Tsangpo
Diversion Project.
The project, scheduled to start in 2009, would be sited at Permakoe near the Great Bend and would have two components (i) a power plant with an installed capacity of more than 40000 MW utilizing the fall of 3000mts. in the river and (ii) arrangements for diverting Tsangpo waters.
The Chinese interventions in the Sutlej, Brahmaputra, etc. could affect river flows into India.Our irrigation and hydroprojects would suffer if the Chinese divert the waters during glacier melting period and release large flows during the monsoon.
In this connection, the experience of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, the co-basin states of the Mekong basin due to China constructing 2 hydro-dams in its territory, should be an eye opener for India.
These states alleged that the indiscriminate Chinese operations affected their agriculture, fisheries and tourism activities; also, the devastating floods of 2002 in their areas occurred due to China releasing more waters than normal from its upstream reservoirs into the river below. However, China did not bother about the objections raised by these states and even of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) stating that it is not a member of MRC.
India too had experienced heavy losses due to unprecedented floods from Tibetan rivers in the recent past. The large floods in the Sutlej in 2000, 2004 and 2005 necessitated closure of the Nathpa Jhakri Project and evacuation of people from the affected areas. Arunachal Pradesh also suffered due to a flooded Brahmaputra reportedly caused by dam failures in Tibet.
China is not answerable to India on the use of the Tibetan rivers since there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers, a situation similar to the Mekong basin. Hence it would be in the interest of India to enter into an agreement with China for the optimum utilization of the Tibetan rivers as a follow up of the joint declaration made by the two countries in 2006 for exchanging hydrologic data.
Sharing information on flow data alone is not adequate to address our concerns. The impacts on the rivers due to upstream Chinese operations such as (i) reduction of flows by diversion and (ii) floods resulting from breaches or sudden gate openings, have to be addressed by India. Construction of cascade projects across the concerned rivers is therefore a necessity to ensure water conservation and flood absorption. Unfortunately proposed projects like Khab project(s) in Himachal Pradesh and Siang project(s) in Arunachal Pradesh investigated earlier appears to have been dropped on benefit -cost considerations.
The strategic importance including disaster mitigation offered by these projects should have been given due weightage while evaluating them instead of applying the routine norms . It is time Government of India takes special interest to implement these projects to address India’s concerns instead of labouring under an ideology induced myopia.
(The Tribune, dated 26th December, 2007)
Monday, January 11, 2010
China's Rivers
•
India should talk rivers with China
Recent reports on the project proposed by China to divert the Upper Brahmaputra waters (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) do not augur well for India. Though Union water resource minister Saifuddin Soz finds no cause for alarm on the plea that the scheme is only for a small hydro-project (40 MW) to help a local village, the secrecy over diversion has fuelled many misgivings in India.
One of the major problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow River is at present reduced to a seasonal stream and the Yangtze River is also in a critical condition, with pollution aggravating the situation. China does not want its aspiration to super power status thwarted by a water crisis. It knows that fundamental changes have to be made in water management to achieve its objectives; new sources of water have to be located to ward off the impending crisis. The solution it found was in the interbasin water transfer from the wet south to the arid north through three links — the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) diversion.
The proposed diversion of Tsangpo would adversely affect the flow pattern of the river downstream. As China would control the flow to suit its hydropower generation and irrigation demands, India would be at its mercy for releases during dry and flood seasons. The diversion would also upset Indian river linking project, in which Brahmaputra has a decisive role. Further, the use of nuclear explosives for tunnelling through the Himalaya could trigger major earthquakes in the region.
Though Beijing had been secretive about the scheme, frequent media reports did expose the Chinese plans. For example, in February 1982, the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report quoted studies carried out on the feasibility of damming the Tsangpo at the Great Bend where the river takes a sharp U-turn before entering India. The proposed diversion through tunnels would enable 240 to 330 billion units of power generation annually.
Another report in the Scientific American (June, 1996) brought out Chinese engineers assuring the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in December 1995 that Tsangpo waters could be diverted to the Gobi desert blasting a 20 km channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives. A news item in July 2000, described flash floods in the river devastating many areas in Arunachal Pradesh. The flow pattern indicated a dam failure in Tibet and, though China denied it, satellite imagery confirmed this.
After many such reports in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, finally confirmed plans for the Tsangpo Water Diversion Project on the basis of preliminary studies carried out in mid-2003, followed by feasibility studies in October. The project to be located at Perma Koe site at the Great Bend would have two components: one, a power plant with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW to use the river’s potential falling through 3000 m in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of Tsangpo waters by pumping across the Tibet Plateau to the North West provinces. The construction of the project is scheduled to start in 2009.
No one would doubt the Chinese capacity to implement such projects. One example is the gigantic Water Diversion project that annually transfers 1.8 billion cubic metres of water through a 85.3 km long tunnel in the mountainous Northeastern China to the Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun River. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.
In 2003, India had expressed to China its concern over the issue. But, unfortunately, China continues with the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or water quality in the river, considering the terrain and limited culturable area and the population in Tibet. However, unless China is brought under a treaty on the use of the Tibetan rivers, we are bound to suffer. Interestingly, some time ago the Chinese Committee on Irrigation and Drainage was keen to enter in an MoU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information. But India let the opportunity slip through sheer inaction.
At present there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers except for an MoU for sharing hydrological information on these rivers.
There is a glimmer of hope now with China showing renewed interest in activating the joint mechanism set up in 2006 to address the long-pending issues. It is up to India to seize the opportunity.
(The Indian Express, dated 17th July, 2007)
India should talk rivers with China
Recent reports on the project proposed by China to divert the Upper Brahmaputra waters (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) do not augur well for India. Though Union water resource minister Saifuddin Soz finds no cause for alarm on the plea that the scheme is only for a small hydro-project (40 MW) to help a local village, the secrecy over diversion has fuelled many misgivings in India.
One of the major problems facing China today is water scarcity. The mighty Yellow River is at present reduced to a seasonal stream and the Yangtze River is also in a critical condition, with pollution aggravating the situation. China does not want its aspiration to super power status thwarted by a water crisis. It knows that fundamental changes have to be made in water management to achieve its objectives; new sources of water have to be located to ward off the impending crisis. The solution it found was in the interbasin water transfer from the wet south to the arid north through three links — the eastern, central and western. The southern part of the western link envisages Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) diversion.
The proposed diversion of Tsangpo would adversely affect the flow pattern of the river downstream. As China would control the flow to suit its hydropower generation and irrigation demands, India would be at its mercy for releases during dry and flood seasons. The diversion would also upset Indian river linking project, in which Brahmaputra has a decisive role. Further, the use of nuclear explosives for tunnelling through the Himalaya could trigger major earthquakes in the region.
Though Beijing had been secretive about the scheme, frequent media reports did expose the Chinese plans. For example, in February 1982, the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report quoted studies carried out on the feasibility of damming the Tsangpo at the Great Bend where the river takes a sharp U-turn before entering India. The proposed diversion through tunnels would enable 240 to 330 billion units of power generation annually.
Another report in the Scientific American (June, 1996) brought out Chinese engineers assuring the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in December 1995 that Tsangpo waters could be diverted to the Gobi desert blasting a 20 km channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives. A news item in July 2000, described flash floods in the river devastating many areas in Arunachal Pradesh. The flow pattern indicated a dam failure in Tibet and, though China denied it, satellite imagery confirmed this.
After many such reports in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, finally confirmed plans for the Tsangpo Water Diversion Project on the basis of preliminary studies carried out in mid-2003, followed by feasibility studies in October. The project to be located at Perma Koe site at the Great Bend would have two components: one, a power plant with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW to use the river’s potential falling through 3000 m in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of Tsangpo waters by pumping across the Tibet Plateau to the North West provinces. The construction of the project is scheduled to start in 2009.
No one would doubt the Chinese capacity to implement such projects. One example is the gigantic Water Diversion project that annually transfers 1.8 billion cubic metres of water through a 85.3 km long tunnel in the mountainous Northeastern China to the Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun River. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.
In 2003, India had expressed to China its concern over the issue. But, unfortunately, China continues with the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or water quality in the river, considering the terrain and limited culturable area and the population in Tibet. However, unless China is brought under a treaty on the use of the Tibetan rivers, we are bound to suffer. Interestingly, some time ago the Chinese Committee on Irrigation and Drainage was keen to enter in an MoU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information. But India let the opportunity slip through sheer inaction.
At present there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers except for an MoU for sharing hydrological information on these rivers.
There is a glimmer of hope now with China showing renewed interest in activating the joint mechanism set up in 2006 to address the long-pending issues. It is up to India to seize the opportunity.
(The Indian Express, dated 17th July, 2007)
Indus Waters Treaty
A redundant treaty
THE 46-YEAR-OLD history of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the story of a tragedy that began with hope as demonstrated by past events and confirmed by the recent verdict of Raymond Lafitte, the World Bank appointed neutral expert for the Baglihar project.
The treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the aim of achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters, has miserably failed not only in accomplishing the objectives but also in settling water disputes between the two all these years.
A perusal of the treaty would reveal that it is biased in favour of Pakistan, ignoring international rules on equitable distribution of waters. Against India's rightful share of more than 40 per cent of the Indus waters, we got only about 20 per cent in the allocation.
Further, using the loopholes in the treaty, Pakistan succeeded in stalling/delaying Indian projects, 30 in all, planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. At every stage, India agreed to the demands of Pakistan such as stopping the Tulbul project works and closing the sluices in the Salal project, only to maintain good neighbourly relations. This conciliatory approach emboldened Pakistan to allege IWT violations by India on the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450 MW).
India had given the project features of Baglihar to Pakistan in May, 1992 as per treaty provisions. Despite many meetings at Commissioner and Secretary levels, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India on project designs, etc. It was willing for negotiations, if India stopped the work, but this time India did not oblige. Our neighbour then approached the World Bank seeking the appointment of a neutral expert to look into the dispute. Accepting Pakistan's plea, the Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte.
After site visits, discussions with the parties concerned and studying the presentations made by them, the expert has now given his verdict.
Both India and Pakistan have claimed that their contentions have been upheld by the expert. But will the incendiary politics of the subcontinent further trigger more conflicts?
A perusal of the verdict would reveal that while provision of sluices and gated spillway has been accepted by the expert, India would have to modify the design to reduce the height of the dam, limit the pondage and raise the level of the power intake. India has therefore to incur additional costs to carry out these changes and get reduced peak power benefits and flood moderation advantages. By awarding such a decision the expert has overlooked the very basis of the treaty i.e. the maximum utilisation of Indus waters for mutual benefit.
Years of wrangling in the interpretation of the clauses has proved beyond doubt that the treaty has outlived its utility, to address the changing geopolitical situations and emerging norms of international laws. Hence India has to insist on a review of the treaty.
The rights and obligations of the parties to a treaty are well laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 which inter alia states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose."
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances.
Pakistan has already cut out its strategy to delay the Indian projects, next in its agenda being the Kishanganga project (J&K). Hence we cannot and should not allow our development efforts in J&K to be sabotaged by Pakistan wrongly using the provisions of a redundant treaty.
(Thee Hindu, dated 8th April, 2007)
THE 46-YEAR-OLD history of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the story of a tragedy that began with hope as demonstrated by past events and confirmed by the recent verdict of Raymond Lafitte, the World Bank appointed neutral expert for the Baglihar project.
The treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the aim of achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters, has miserably failed not only in accomplishing the objectives but also in settling water disputes between the two all these years.
A perusal of the treaty would reveal that it is biased in favour of Pakistan, ignoring international rules on equitable distribution of waters. Against India's rightful share of more than 40 per cent of the Indus waters, we got only about 20 per cent in the allocation.
Further, using the loopholes in the treaty, Pakistan succeeded in stalling/delaying Indian projects, 30 in all, planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. At every stage, India agreed to the demands of Pakistan such as stopping the Tulbul project works and closing the sluices in the Salal project, only to maintain good neighbourly relations. This conciliatory approach emboldened Pakistan to allege IWT violations by India on the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450 MW).
India had given the project features of Baglihar to Pakistan in May, 1992 as per treaty provisions. Despite many meetings at Commissioner and Secretary levels, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India on project designs, etc. It was willing for negotiations, if India stopped the work, but this time India did not oblige. Our neighbour then approached the World Bank seeking the appointment of a neutral expert to look into the dispute. Accepting Pakistan's plea, the Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte.
After site visits, discussions with the parties concerned and studying the presentations made by them, the expert has now given his verdict.
Both India and Pakistan have claimed that their contentions have been upheld by the expert. But will the incendiary politics of the subcontinent further trigger more conflicts?
A perusal of the verdict would reveal that while provision of sluices and gated spillway has been accepted by the expert, India would have to modify the design to reduce the height of the dam, limit the pondage and raise the level of the power intake. India has therefore to incur additional costs to carry out these changes and get reduced peak power benefits and flood moderation advantages. By awarding such a decision the expert has overlooked the very basis of the treaty i.e. the maximum utilisation of Indus waters for mutual benefit.
Years of wrangling in the interpretation of the clauses has proved beyond doubt that the treaty has outlived its utility, to address the changing geopolitical situations and emerging norms of international laws. Hence India has to insist on a review of the treaty.
The rights and obligations of the parties to a treaty are well laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 which inter alia states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose."
If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances.
Pakistan has already cut out its strategy to delay the Indian projects, next in its agenda being the Kishanganga project (J&K). Hence we cannot and should not allow our development efforts in J&K to be sabotaged by Pakistan wrongly using the provisions of a redundant treaty.
(Thee Hindu, dated 8th April, 2007)
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