IWT - Review

Review the Indus Waters Treaty

It is highly biased in favour of Pakistan, and every effort is being made by that country to stall development of hydel projects in India, says M S Menon

The internationally lauded, much hyped agreement on the Indus waters, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between the Governments of India and Pakistan is back in the news, but for the wrong reasons. Since then, Pakistan has been raising the bogey of violation of the treaty to stall or delay any such Projects in J&K
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Construction of the Wular Project (J&K) had to be stopped by India just to accommodate the tantrums of Pakistan. More recently, the Baglihar Project (J&K) was in the news with Pakistan getting a World Bank nominate, a “Neutral Expert” to go into the features of the project, thus delaying its construction. It is now targeting the Kishan Ganga Project (J&K) raising similar objections to stall it.

Background of the dispute
Partition resulted in the division of the Indus basin between the two countries triggering dispute on the sharing and utilization of the Indus waters. Continued negotiations between India and Pakistan held under the auspices of the World Bank culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the World Bank brokered the treaty, it is not a guarantor but has certain responsibilities to ensure its smooth functioning.

The treaty allocated, with some restrictions, the waters of the three western rivers – The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan and the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - to India. Signed as a gesture of international cooperation and good will, it envisages the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system. But even after five decades, due to Pakistan’s interference, India has been able to develop only a limited 1500 MW hydropower out of a potential of 8769 MW from its share in the western rivers.

Biased Provisions of the treaty.
An impression has been created internationally that the Indus Waters Treaty is a model for international river water agreements since it has inbuilt resilience and has survived two wars between the countries. To claim that the treaty has outlived the tempests of history is a blasphemy; and to extol it as a model for principles of water sharing and utilisation is a sacrilege. Subsequent events have proved that equitable sharing was not the concern and complete utilization was never the intention of the vested interests who strived for the treaty; the underlying objective seems to be only to perpetuate the dispute.

They made a mockery of equity in the distribution of the Indus waters by allocating three rivers each to the disputants to give an impression that they have equally divided the Indus system. India got only 20 to 25 percent of the total flows. Further, they faulted by ignoring the seventh prominent river, the Kabul river of the Indus system thereby permitting Pakistan the unbridled use of its waters in addition to the three western rivers.

If we delve deep into the principles of water allocation and other provisions in the treaty, it would be clear that the real facts on the much-hyped treaty are concealed and buried under a mountain of rhetoric. Working of the treaty has revealed that India has accommodated more than what is expected of her even though the proposals in the treaty were biased in favour of Pakistan.

The treaty is being used as a handle by Pakistan to scuttle India’s storage projects in J&K. Its objections to Indian projects have always been couched in a language of non-constructive application of the treaty provisions. The costly alternatives suggested by the Pakistan ignored sound engineering economics and practices, and India had been pointing out all such anomalies.
On its part, India, has been always willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of peaceful relations. But this spirit of accommodation is being considered as a weakness by Pakistan which is becoming more aggressive to make the Indian projects a subject of endless debate thereby impeding their implementation. The delay tactics have affected developmental efforts in J&K.

Disenchantment with the Treaty is growing in India as Pakistan has succeeded in stalling the Indian projects, 27 in all, by objecting or adversely commenting on them in spite of India supplying the requisite data. It is time India remodelled its strategy in dealing with Pakistan in this regard. India should go ahead with the construction of all planned projects as these are well within the treaty provisions. There is no provision in the Treaty necessitating India taking formal clearance from Pakistan for these projects. Nor is there any provision to stop the construction of a project pending resolution of Pakistan’s objections. What is needed is a strong will to implement the projects.

A review of the treaty is required considering the inequity in water allocation, design and construction technologies then suggested- which have now become out dated - and inherent ambiguity in treaty clauses giving undue benefit to Pakistan. Though there is no exit option in the treaty, there is an option for review. India should ask the World Bank to review the treaty clauses including the water sharing formula in the light of Helsinki Rules (1967) and other international guidelines so that injustice done to India in the treaty is rectified.
With the demand for water increasing and scarcity looming large, we have to get our rightful share of Indus waters. It is time to strike at the root of the problem. A review of the treaty is what Government of India should bid for.

(The Pioneer, dt. 20th June,2005)