Does Kerala lack water?
M.S.Menon illuminates the complexities behind water-surplus issues related to the ILR.
In the 11th National Water Convention inaugurated last year, President APJ Abdul Kalam had voiced his concerns regarding India’s water sector and the need for interlinking of rivers to mitigate sufferings from the recurring floods and droughts.
The main problem of taking the Interlinking (ILR) Project, beyond the drawing board stage, is the opposition of water-rich States in sparing their surplus waters. This aspect has only recently received needed attention. Hence in the National Convention, the topic of consensus building measures in ILR project was discussed and the outcome is of special interest to Kerala.
The data for most of the river basins in the country indicates that there is surplus water in many States. But ‘water’ has become an emotive issue and no political leadership in a water-rich State would agree to spare its present surplus to a deficit State for fear of facing political oblivion.
In this regard, the proposal brought out in the convention is for compensating water-surplus. The basic principle is that by releasing part of the surplus to the deficit State, the donor State will have to be compensated either in cash or in kind (like food grains produced, power generated etc.) by the donee State.
Such principles are being followed within the country and also abroad for water transfers. For example, the agreement between Kerala and Tamil Nadu(1970) for utilising the Periyar river waters of Kerala for power generation has a provision for compensation based on the units of power generated due to the scheme. Abroad, in Spain, the donor regions are compensated for regional development after assessing the losses that transferred water would cause to the regional economy.
In view of such existing practices, there should not be any objection for compensating the water surplus of a donor State. The compensation would enable it to plan the use of the remaining unutilised water optimally by reprioriitising and implementing the required projects expeditiously with the available finances. The done State would be able to provide more water for irrigation, hydel power generation, etc., thus affording a win-win situation for both the parties. The acceptance of this concept would encourage water saving in the donor State to facilitate more water to be spared in lieu of the compensation.
Kerala has been objecting to the ILR project, pointing out that, in the summer months, many parts in the State face acute water scarcity even for drinking purposes though there is harmful abundance in the monsoon months. The State, then has to take the blame since, due to limited fund allocations, executable projects continue at snail pace, If at all. In 1995, Kerala’s Centre for Water Resources Development and Management (CWRDM) had brought out the “Water Atlas of Kerala’ covering all the rivers of the State and indicating the possible utilisation of resources. A decade thereafter, of the estimated water resources of about 60 billion cubic metres (BCM), less than 20% only has been harnessed so far, mainly due to resource crunch, though environmental and social issues too have contributed to the slow progress.
All along, tactical concerns in the electoral policies had impelled State leadership to turn down suggestions on water transfers. Implicit in the justification was the mystical belief that within a foreseeable future, the State would be able to utilise all its water and, hence, if the water right is given away now, it would be a loss for ever. Even while billions of cubic metres of fresh water get discharged into the sea unutilised every year, the State continues to be engaged in its fanciful aspirations, blissfully lacking any feasible programme to achieve the optimum utilisation of its waters.
Past data indicate that every year many important river systems of the state, like, Bharatapuzha, Periyar, Chaliar, Valapatnam, etc., have discharged on an average more than 60% of the monsoon flows into the Arabian sea. This would not have happened if storages- major, medium and minor – were constructed to hold back river flows. The lakes thus formed would have helped conserve water, recharge ground water and even checked salinity intrusion, similar to the storages constructed successfully on the west flowing rivers in the Saurashtra and Kutch regions (Gujarat). Where suitable sites for constructing solid structures are not available, even installation of rubber dams as done in the Jhanjhavathi Project (A.P.) could be attempted.
Unless concrete action is planned, new initiatives launched and considerable ground work done by the Kerala Government, the proposals for optimum use of its waters would remain only a pipe dream for want of funds and the CWRDM studies would end up in the time –worn pages of Government files, ultimately consigned to the dustbins of history. Hence approaches are needed to enable the fruition of planned projects of Kerala.
An assessment to determine the extent of surplus water able to be spared for the ILR Project on a long term basis is needed. This assessment must contain the nature and compensation to be sought, formula for water transfer during deficit flow periods and frame work for new drinking water projects, and irrigation and hydro schemes on the basis of compensation to be received from surplus water.
It is time Kerala got active in discussions on the ILR project and staked its claims for compensation of its surplus waters.
(The Pioneer, dt. 15th March, 2006)
Monday, March 29, 2010
IWT - Review
Review the Indus Waters Treaty
It is highly biased in favour of Pakistan, and every effort is being made by that country to stall development of hydel projects in India, says M S Menon
The internationally lauded, much hyped agreement on the Indus waters, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between the Governments of India and Pakistan is back in the news, but for the wrong reasons. Since then, Pakistan has been raising the bogey of violation of the treaty to stall or delay any such Projects in J&K
.
Construction of the Wular Project (J&K) had to be stopped by India just to accommodate the tantrums of Pakistan. More recently, the Baglihar Project (J&K) was in the news with Pakistan getting a World Bank nominate, a “Neutral Expert” to go into the features of the project, thus delaying its construction. It is now targeting the Kishan Ganga Project (J&K) raising similar objections to stall it.
Background of the dispute
Partition resulted in the division of the Indus basin between the two countries triggering dispute on the sharing and utilization of the Indus waters. Continued negotiations between India and Pakistan held under the auspices of the World Bank culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the World Bank brokered the treaty, it is not a guarantor but has certain responsibilities to ensure its smooth functioning.
The treaty allocated, with some restrictions, the waters of the three western rivers – The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan and the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - to India. Signed as a gesture of international cooperation and good will, it envisages the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system. But even after five decades, due to Pakistan’s interference, India has been able to develop only a limited 1500 MW hydropower out of a potential of 8769 MW from its share in the western rivers.
Biased Provisions of the treaty.
An impression has been created internationally that the Indus Waters Treaty is a model for international river water agreements since it has inbuilt resilience and has survived two wars between the countries. To claim that the treaty has outlived the tempests of history is a blasphemy; and to extol it as a model for principles of water sharing and utilisation is a sacrilege. Subsequent events have proved that equitable sharing was not the concern and complete utilization was never the intention of the vested interests who strived for the treaty; the underlying objective seems to be only to perpetuate the dispute.
They made a mockery of equity in the distribution of the Indus waters by allocating three rivers each to the disputants to give an impression that they have equally divided the Indus system. India got only 20 to 25 percent of the total flows. Further, they faulted by ignoring the seventh prominent river, the Kabul river of the Indus system thereby permitting Pakistan the unbridled use of its waters in addition to the three western rivers.
If we delve deep into the principles of water allocation and other provisions in the treaty, it would be clear that the real facts on the much-hyped treaty are concealed and buried under a mountain of rhetoric. Working of the treaty has revealed that India has accommodated more than what is expected of her even though the proposals in the treaty were biased in favour of Pakistan.
The treaty is being used as a handle by Pakistan to scuttle India’s storage projects in J&K. Its objections to Indian projects have always been couched in a language of non-constructive application of the treaty provisions. The costly alternatives suggested by the Pakistan ignored sound engineering economics and practices, and India had been pointing out all such anomalies.
On its part, India, has been always willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of peaceful relations. But this spirit of accommodation is being considered as a weakness by Pakistan which is becoming more aggressive to make the Indian projects a subject of endless debate thereby impeding their implementation. The delay tactics have affected developmental efforts in J&K.
Disenchantment with the Treaty is growing in India as Pakistan has succeeded in stalling the Indian projects, 27 in all, by objecting or adversely commenting on them in spite of India supplying the requisite data. It is time India remodelled its strategy in dealing with Pakistan in this regard. India should go ahead with the construction of all planned projects as these are well within the treaty provisions. There is no provision in the Treaty necessitating India taking formal clearance from Pakistan for these projects. Nor is there any provision to stop the construction of a project pending resolution of Pakistan’s objections. What is needed is a strong will to implement the projects.
A review of the treaty is required considering the inequity in water allocation, design and construction technologies then suggested- which have now become out dated - and inherent ambiguity in treaty clauses giving undue benefit to Pakistan. Though there is no exit option in the treaty, there is an option for review. India should ask the World Bank to review the treaty clauses including the water sharing formula in the light of Helsinki Rules (1967) and other international guidelines so that injustice done to India in the treaty is rectified.
With the demand for water increasing and scarcity looming large, we have to get our rightful share of Indus waters. It is time to strike at the root of the problem. A review of the treaty is what Government of India should bid for.
(The Pioneer, dt. 20th June,2005)
It is highly biased in favour of Pakistan, and every effort is being made by that country to stall development of hydel projects in India, says M S Menon
The internationally lauded, much hyped agreement on the Indus waters, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between the Governments of India and Pakistan is back in the news, but for the wrong reasons. Since then, Pakistan has been raising the bogey of violation of the treaty to stall or delay any such Projects in J&K
.
Construction of the Wular Project (J&K) had to be stopped by India just to accommodate the tantrums of Pakistan. More recently, the Baglihar Project (J&K) was in the news with Pakistan getting a World Bank nominate, a “Neutral Expert” to go into the features of the project, thus delaying its construction. It is now targeting the Kishan Ganga Project (J&K) raising similar objections to stall it.
Background of the dispute
Partition resulted in the division of the Indus basin between the two countries triggering dispute on the sharing and utilization of the Indus waters. Continued negotiations between India and Pakistan held under the auspices of the World Bank culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the World Bank brokered the treaty, it is not a guarantor but has certain responsibilities to ensure its smooth functioning.
The treaty allocated, with some restrictions, the waters of the three western rivers – The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan and the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi - to India. Signed as a gesture of international cooperation and good will, it envisages the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus system. But even after five decades, due to Pakistan’s interference, India has been able to develop only a limited 1500 MW hydropower out of a potential of 8769 MW from its share in the western rivers.
Biased Provisions of the treaty.
An impression has been created internationally that the Indus Waters Treaty is a model for international river water agreements since it has inbuilt resilience and has survived two wars between the countries. To claim that the treaty has outlived the tempests of history is a blasphemy; and to extol it as a model for principles of water sharing and utilisation is a sacrilege. Subsequent events have proved that equitable sharing was not the concern and complete utilization was never the intention of the vested interests who strived for the treaty; the underlying objective seems to be only to perpetuate the dispute.
They made a mockery of equity in the distribution of the Indus waters by allocating three rivers each to the disputants to give an impression that they have equally divided the Indus system. India got only 20 to 25 percent of the total flows. Further, they faulted by ignoring the seventh prominent river, the Kabul river of the Indus system thereby permitting Pakistan the unbridled use of its waters in addition to the three western rivers.
If we delve deep into the principles of water allocation and other provisions in the treaty, it would be clear that the real facts on the much-hyped treaty are concealed and buried under a mountain of rhetoric. Working of the treaty has revealed that India has accommodated more than what is expected of her even though the proposals in the treaty were biased in favour of Pakistan.
The treaty is being used as a handle by Pakistan to scuttle India’s storage projects in J&K. Its objections to Indian projects have always been couched in a language of non-constructive application of the treaty provisions. The costly alternatives suggested by the Pakistan ignored sound engineering economics and practices, and India had been pointing out all such anomalies.
On its part, India, has been always willing to accommodate Pakistan in the interest of peaceful relations. But this spirit of accommodation is being considered as a weakness by Pakistan which is becoming more aggressive to make the Indian projects a subject of endless debate thereby impeding their implementation. The delay tactics have affected developmental efforts in J&K.
Disenchantment with the Treaty is growing in India as Pakistan has succeeded in stalling the Indian projects, 27 in all, by objecting or adversely commenting on them in spite of India supplying the requisite data. It is time India remodelled its strategy in dealing with Pakistan in this regard. India should go ahead with the construction of all planned projects as these are well within the treaty provisions. There is no provision in the Treaty necessitating India taking formal clearance from Pakistan for these projects. Nor is there any provision to stop the construction of a project pending resolution of Pakistan’s objections. What is needed is a strong will to implement the projects.
A review of the treaty is required considering the inequity in water allocation, design and construction technologies then suggested- which have now become out dated - and inherent ambiguity in treaty clauses giving undue benefit to Pakistan. Though there is no exit option in the treaty, there is an option for review. India should ask the World Bank to review the treaty clauses including the water sharing formula in the light of Helsinki Rules (1967) and other international guidelines so that injustice done to India in the treaty is rectified.
With the demand for water increasing and scarcity looming large, we have to get our rightful share of Indus waters. It is time to strike at the root of the problem. A review of the treaty is what Government of India should bid for.
(The Pioneer, dt. 20th June,2005)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)