Sardar Sarovar Project

Another Perspective

The Sardar Sarovar project has been delayed far too long and needs to be allowed to yield results quickly. The debates around the numerous issues have more or less run aground.



The Sardar Sarovar Dam (SSD) is back in the news, not as a monster concealing a time bomb waiting to cause devastation but as a benefactor delivering Narmada waters to the far-flung drought-affected villages and towns of Gujarat to quench the thirst of millions of people there. Though due to the sustained efforts of anti-dam activists the dam is still far from completion, 10,000 cusecs of water from the lake formed behind the semi-completed dam could be released into the Narmada Main Canal to feed parched rivers, canals and lakes en route to facilitate drinking water supply in this year’s worst drought, thus proving wrong the forecasts of its critics.
Narmada is the fifth largest river in the country with an average annual flow of 36.5 Million Acre Feet (MAF) almost equalling the combined inflows of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Originating in Madhya Pradesh, it has a catchment area of about a lakh square kilometres and drains large parts of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat, before emptying into the Gulf of Cambay. Though one of the largest rivers, it is also the least developed.
The history of development of the Narmada river, is the tragic story of hydro-politics hampering development and is a narration of the attempts made by those in power entrenched in the narrow confines of their limited perception working at cross purposes with co-sharers. Initial investigations for Narmada basin development were taken up by Central Water Commission (CWC) in 1947 and detailed investigations and studies were also carried out later on. Thereafter, at the initiative of the then union minister of irrigation and power, an agreement known as Bhopal Agreement was also arrived at in November 1963 by the chief ministers of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. However, this agreement remained only on paper due to the subsequent rejection of the agreement by Madhya Pradesh. This necessitated the setting up of a central committee headed by A N Khosla in 1964, but due to the disagreement among the states, the Khosla Committee Report recommending a master plan for the basin also ended up in the government archives.
The never ending disputes among the states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra led to the setting up of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) by the government of India in 1969. Rajasthan was also made a party in the proceedings of the tribunal considering various issues. NWDT declared its award in December 1979 taking into account existing agreements, utilisation and demands made by the states, and also the voluminous studies and investigations carried out till then as also the data available on the basin. The award is unique since apart from orders on sharing the available waters among the four states, it included directions regarding the resettlement and rehabilitation (R and R) of the project affected families (PAF), time frame for construction of the SSD and Narmada Sagar Dam as also their salient features/levels; cost and benefit sharing and orders for setting up organisation like the Narmada Control Authority to monitor the implementation of the award, and Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee to guide the project construction. For reviewing the various decisions of the authority, directions were also given to set up a high powered ministerial review committee chaired by the union minister for water resources. Based on the tribunal’s directions, an overall plan was made by the states envisaging 30 major, 135 medium and more than 3,000 minor dam projects to harness the water of the Narmada basin. SSD in Gujarat is the major terminal dam on the main course of the river, the remaining 29 being in Madhya Pradesh.
The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) envisages a 139 m high dam across the river, an underground river bed power house (1,200 MW) a canal head power house (250 MW) and 700 km long Main Canal to irrigate more than 2.5 million ha of land in Gujarat and in Rajasthan, and to provide drinking water facilities to 8,215 villages and 135 urban centres, mostly located in the Saurashtra and Kachchh areas. In addition, 881villages affected by fluoride will get potable water. Other benefits include protection against floods in the downstream villages and against the advancement of deserts like Little Rann of Kachchh. The estimated cost of the project was Rs 6,406 crore (1986 price level) envisaging an increased annual production of Rs 1,400 crore due to agriculture, domestic water supply and power generation.
Raging Controversies
The construction of the dam commenced in 1987, a full seven years after the tribunal gave the award. Initially the progress in the project construction was appreciable but later on the project got mired in controversies particularly in regard to environmental aspects and R and R.
Environmental awareness and related issues concerning SSP are developments subsequent to NWDT. This debate on the project devolves around many issues like reservoir-induced seismicity, vanishing flora and fauna, health implications, etc. Even at present, knowledge on environmental impacts is limited and those who suggest concerned studies are even unaware of the feasibility of achieving results based on these. Interference with nature is not an abomination, it has to be done with great understanding so as to mitigate the adverse impacts. The studies carried out by the project and actions taken thereon indicate the seriousness with which these issues are addressed by the project authorities. In view of the commitments already made, it can be safely assumed that as fuller understanding of the impacts emerge, timely responsive actions would also get introduced into the system.
On the R and R front it is seen that though compared to the package specified in the award for PAFs, packages offered by the state governments are better. However, according to the NGOs, the implementation is not satisfactory. This deficiency gave rise to a series of court cases right up to the Supreme Court of India. The judicial intervention at various stages did activate the authorities to set up a grievance redressal machinery in each state headed by a retired high court judge so as to ensure proper implementation of R and R. The apex court had also given adequate direction to the states in this regard. Consequently, this issue is getting fuller attention from the concerned authorities.
The self-appointed experts and do-gooders who wanted the project construction to be stopped, could not accept the verdict given by the apex court permitting further construction of the dam. These anti-dam activists had all along been parroting the project as an environmental disaster, forecasting dreadful consequences that would spell doom for the region and country at large. According to them, there are many options providing benefits equivalent to SSP, minimising population displacement and for improving the environment. The work done by Anna Hazare in Maharashtra and Tarun Bharat Sangh in Rajasthan is being quoted by them for stressing that with such localised watershed development activities, SSP would not be needed. For them, the Report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), December 2000, eulogising the option of small water harvesting structures in lieu of large dams became the guide to attack large dams in general and SSP in particular. They also advocate the alternative suggested by Subhash Paranjpe and K J Joy (the P J proposal) to get the full benefits from a restructured low SSP. The alternative of going for non-conventional energy sources is also flaunted by them claiming equivalent power benefits. Ignoring such available options, the engineer-contractor-politician nexus is clamouring, they bemoan, to complete an unproductive, risky project to fatten their pockets and to ruin the country. The dooms-day people assert that none of the so-called benefits would reach the poor and not even a drop of water would be available to the far-flung Saurashtra and Kachchh regions even years after the completion of the project. Their allegations and consequent clarifications by the authorities have left the public more confused.
The replication of a number of small storages to tap the rainfall is one of the options suggested in this context by many including WCD. To hold the equivalent storage provided in SSD, about 2 lakh ha would have to be acquired for small tanks displacing more than 1,00,000 small time farmers in the process. Land acquisition problems and large displacement of people under this option seems to have been ignored by these intellectuals. Further, when the rains fail, these tanks will get dried up negating the very purpose for which they are built. In the PJ proposal, many of the theories propounded and assumptions made are questionable and its technical feasibility to get the benefits is doubtful. The much talked about option of power generation through solar, wind, tidal and such other sources as a substitute for SSP will remain a distant dream since India’s present-day shortage in peaking capacity is more than 10,000 MW while the present capacity world over due to these sources is a measly 2,000 MW. In short, all these offered options can supplement the benefits of SSP, but none can be a substitute for the project. The critics in their blindfolded enthusiasm to stop the dam construction appears to have lost sight of these ground realities.
Needed Action
While some of the water development needs can be met by small dams and conjunctive use of aquifers, large dams like SSD cannot be wished away in the monsoonic climate condition of India to produce the foodgrains needed by the burgeoning population of the country. The seasonal nature of the rainfall and its variation from year to year cause water shortage thereby necessitating storages to be built to use the water when needed. At the same time, the environmental dimensions of water should also receive adequate attention within the irrigation sector as also the resettlement and rehabilitation of project affected people. Unfortunately, instead of striving for mitigating adverse environmental impacts and facilitating the process of R and R the vested interests are only pooling their energies to stop the project construction. For this purpose, they have roped in local illiterates and a disinformed intelligentsia to malign the project and question its benefits. They have created fallacies and myths to displace logical reasoning. Ignoring the limitations of their suggested options and turning a blind eye to the facts, they have been campaigning even in the international fora against the project and its benefits. However, with the Narmada waters flowing into the distant regions of Saurashtra and Kachchh, one of their blatant lies has now been nailed and they have been exposed.
We have lost precious time and precious water. The projected benefits for SSP would have been available now but for the delays engineered by vested interests. As the water crisis is deepening particularly in the western region, a strategy has to be developed to educate the public about the project.
(Economic and Political Weekly, 27th September,2003)